THE FREUDIAN ORIENT

EARLY PSYCHOANALYSIS, ANTI-SEMITIC CHALLENGE, AND THE VICISSITUDES OF ORIENTALIST DISCOURSE

Frank F. Scherer

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Early Psychoanalysis, Anti-Semitic Challenge, and the Vicissitudes of Orientalist Discourse

Frank F. Scherer

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To Federika, Isabella, and Heinrich
CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR xi

SERIES EDITOR’S FOREWORD xiii
by Peter L. Rudnytsky

INTRODUCTION xv
Sigmund Freud, Indy Jones, and the Far East

CHAPTER ONE 1
Oriental(ist) scenes

CHAPTER TWO 37
The archaeological sphere of imagination

CHAPTER THREE 73
Travelling the Via Regia
CONTENTS

CONCLUSION
Four theses 111

APPENDIX ONE
Sigmund Freud’s letter to Emil Fluss 115

APPENDIX TWO
Freud’s “archaeology” in citation 116

APPENDIX THREE
Freud’s *Via Regia* in translation 125

REFERENCES 127

INDEX 148
Among the many people to whom I am grateful for assisting with or contributing in some form to this study, there are some who do merit special recognition. At York University, Toronto, John O’Neill taught me about staking one’s independence; Paul Antze drove home the English Freud; Deborah Britzman emphasized the complexities of “difficult knowledge”; Jay Goulding always gave his unconditional support; Aparna Mishra Tarc underlined the productivity of the third space; Patrick Taylor first encouraged me to read Said’s *Orientalism*; Susan Ingram provided a welcoming stage at the Canadian Centre for German and European Studies (CCGES) to test my work. I thank Judith Hawley, the mother of our Social and Political Thought Program, to whom I owe several institutional lives, and Pier Luigi Binda, University of Regina, who got me there in the first place. I also want to thank colleagues and co-students who took an interest in my work such as Karl Dalquist, Paul Brienza, Christiana Beyers, and others. Much appreciated were the insightful discussions I had with Rabbi Aaron Flanzraich of Beth Shalom Synagogue, Toronto.

Abroad, for their inspiring support I want to thank especially Michael Molnar and Ivan Ward of the London Freud Museum, UK; Marie Supova, chairperson of the Sigmund Freud Society, Přibor, Czech
Republic; Christian Huber, former head of archives at the Vienna Freud Museum, Austria; Mott Linn, the coordinator of archives at Clark University, Worcester, USA; Mohammad Tamgidi, sociologist at the University of Massachusetts at Boston, USA; David Biale, University of California at Davis, USA; Birgit Schaebler of Martin Luther University, Halle, Germany; translators John Underwood (London), Sun Feiyu (Beijing), Marta Marin-Dominé (Barcelona), Sophie Asperger (Vienna), Miroslav Privitivy (Příbor, Czech Republic); Milan Krankus (Bratislava, Slovakia); and, not to be forgotten, my long-time friend and advisor, Arabist and Egyptologist, Lorenz Brands, Münster, Germany.

At Karnac Books, I want to thank Rod Tweedy for his cheerful introduction to book making and Cecily Blench for her untiring patience with my questions and concerns. Also, I am most thankful to Prof. Brett Kahr and Prof. Peter L. Rudnytsky who so generously included my work in the very prestigious History of Psychoanalysis series.

Frank F. Scherer
When I first began to read Frank Scherer’s manuscript, and I came across his reference to Dr. John P. “Indy” Jones, who gave a keynote address at a conference on “China and the Far East” at Clark University immediately after the renowned event at which Freud delivered his five lectures, and was further informed that Freud’s final lecture had contained an excursus on the “race suicide question,” in which he warned that “occidental countries will sooner or later have to give way to the oriental countries, because of a greater population of the latter countries”—a jeremiad that was suppressed in the published version of his remarks—I had to ask myself if these alleged facts were supposed to be taken seriously, or part of an elaborate spoof. Freud and Indiana Jones? Freud on the “Yellow Peril”? I had my doubts.

An Internet search, however, soon confirmed both that an actual Indologist named John P. Jones had indeed lectured at a second Clark conference, and that Freud’s comments on race, mentioned in passing by Saul Rosenzweig in his book on the trip to America, were extensively reported in the Worcester Sunday Telegram on September 12, 1909, in an article reproduced for the first time by Scherer, from which my quotations above have been taken. Once I realized that Scherer was educating me about enthralling matters about which I had hitherto been unaware,
it was off to the races, and I knew we had an important book on our hands.

The expectations aroused by this first impression of Scherer’s text were not disappointed as I read on. It soon became clear that *The Freudian Orient* offered a new conceptual paradigm for Freud studies and was teeming with original research. In brief, Scherer goes beyond the by now thoroughly investigated issues of how “race,” in the sense of Freud’s Jewish identity, and gender are intertwined in the formation of psychoanalysis by expanding the discussion to include the vector of Orientalism, introduced by Edward Said in his pioneering book, and by staging an encounter between psychoanalysis and that branch of post-colonial studies concerned specifically with European perceptions and stereotypes of the “East.” Everything we have known about Freud’s dueling allegiances and unstable subjectivity gains additional layers of nuance and complexity once Scherer’s extremely useful classificatory schemas and well-honed critical tools are brought to bear.

Beyond its theoretical power, Scherer’s book continuously impresses and enlightens the reader by virtue of its revelatory treatment of a host of germane topics: the “de-Orientalization” of Freud in the *Standard Edition*; the young Freud’s military expedition to Bosnia-Herzegovina; his 1904 lecture on Hammurabi to the B’nai B’rith; Freud’s allusion in a 1912 letter to Eitingon to the Italian campaign in the Ottoman provinces of what became known as Libya; how the word “Diwan” became transmogrified into “couch”; the metaphor of the *Via Regia*; the Hebrew dedication by Freud’s father in the Philippson Bible he gave to Freud on his thirty-fifth birthday, to name only a few. Written with panache but not preciosity, brief but bristling with fresh ideas and valuable information, *The Freudian Orient* will be essential—though not essentialist—reading for serious scholars of its intersecting disciplinary domains, and is a most welcome addition to the Karnac History of Psychoanalysis series.

*Professor Peter L. Rudnytsky*

*Series Co-Editor*

*Gainesville, Florida*
In the autumn of 1909, Sigmund Freud crossed the North Atlantic for the first time to participate in the celebrations surrounding the twentieth anniversary of Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts. Invited by its president, Dr. Stanley Hall, and organised by the Psychology Department, Freud’s participation was quite substantial giving five lectures on psychoanalysis which eventually became his most widely read publication. Speaking on five consecutive days (Tuesday 7 to Saturday 11 September), Freud decided to touch in his remaining lecture on the question of Occident and Orient in the context of race, sexuality, and gender. Clark University’s bicentennial celebrations included a very busy conference programme extending over several weeks and involving almost all of its departments.

The psychology conference was followed by similar events. One of these, this time arranged by the Department of History, brought together a number of American as well as foreign Orientalists under the heading of China and the Far East. Scheduled to begin on Monday, September 13, the conference was strongly informed by the colonial perspectives of a newly emerging empire as it dealt—one by one—with India, the Philippines, Korea, Hawaii, Japan, and China. The keynote speaker was the reputed Indologist Dr. John P. “Indy” Jones whose address discussed
“The Present Situation in India”. Possibly encouraged by mingling with such a prominent assembly of Orientalists, or perhaps even inspired by the attendance of two visiting scholars from Japan, Dr. Sakyo Kanda and Dr. Kikoso Kakise, Sigmund Freud seemed comfortable enough to venture himself into the Far East in his final (Saturday) lecture.
That the race suicide question is of startling proportions and that the occidental countries will sooner or later have to give way to the oriental countries, because of a greater population of the latter countries, were points made mention of in a lecture given yesterday forenoon under the department of psychology by Dr. Sigmund Freud of Vienna, expert in psychiatry, at the Clark university centennial exercises.

His reference to the race suicide question was made during mention of the laws of all western nations with respect to the sex question which were brought about a good deal by the fact that a large faction of women, and worst of all, the best and cultured women, were not bearing children. He said that sooner or later this would mean a good advantage for Japan and China over the occidental countries, as in those countries women were performing the functions of motherhood, twofold to what they were in western countries. He said that the fear has been expressed that eventually this would cause the orient to conquer the occident, overcoming the occident by reason of having a larger population.
Significantly, this part of Freud’s last talk in America was entirely suppressed in the subsequent publication of his Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1910a). Although briefly mentioned by Rosenzweig (1994, p. 131), it is only from the report that appeared on September 12, 1909, in the local newspaper, the Worcester Sunday Telegram (p. A8, col. 4), that we gain full knowledge of Freud’s stunning utterance. Partly reproduced here for the first time, Freud’s startling Orientalist digression is evidently feeding on Malthusian population principles, contemporary Eurocentric constructs of the “Yellow Peril” as well as earliest Anglo-American notions of eugenics. It would not be difficult to take Freud’s problematic pronouncements on “Orient” and “Occident” as stereotypically Orientalist and essentialist and those concerned with “Chinese” and “Japanese” women as blatantly racist and misogynist. However, this author rejects reading Sigmund Freud, one of the most influential twentieth-century thinkers, in such reductive ways. But how can we make sense of the newspaper clip above? How is it, that one of the most original minds of “Western” modernity who engendered almost single-handedly a language enabling us to talk about “the apparatus of the soul” and its deeper bias, sexuality, would be unable to recognise or analyse his own Orientalist blind spot? How do we explain the complex fact that Freud, whose theories contributed consistently to the dismantling of a unified Cartesian subject and the breaking down of conventional ideas of identity as whole and stable in itself, would succumb to the Orientalist impulse? More fundamentally, are the founding and the early development of psychoanalysis in any way entangled in or compromised by the historical assumptions of Orientalism?

The forcefulness with which Freud deploys the Orientalist stereotype in his Clark University lecture—a “white face performance”, Ann Pellegrini (1997) would argue—betrays their ultimate purpose, which is to distract the audience from another “Oriental menace” found much closer to home, namely, the Ostjude and Freud’s Eastern Jewish origins. In other words, Freud cannot be read as Orientalist alone, he also represents, allegedly, the Oriental. Simultaneously “Western” self and “Eastern” other, Orientalised and Orientalising, (de)colonised and colonising, Freud’s “doubledness” complicates and, thereby, opens up the treacherous terrains of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Orientalist discourse. The cliché-like American snapshot of Sigmund Freud, the soul doctor, in the company of Indy Jones, the science soldier and colonial agent, is indicative of something much larger than
the personalities it captures. Indeed, the picture is a metaphor for the encounter between the founding of psychoanalysis and the regime of (de)coloniality out of which it emerges.

Daniel Boyarin has correctly identified Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, as the “(de)colonised subject” who, with “doubled consciousness” (1997, p. 243), simultaneously expresses anti-Semitic views and resists them. But while Boyarin and others have pointed in this context to the significance of Freud’s “Eastern” Jewish origins and his tendency to muting race into gender discourse (1994; see also Gilman, 1993a and Geller, 2007), they say nothing about Freud’s Orientalism and his internalisation of the anti-Semitic stereotype of the [male] “Jew as feminized Oriental” (Le Rider, 1991b, p. 453). Of course, in America the label “Oriental” is commonly used for people originating in the “Far East” (Lee, 1999) whereas near and Middle Eastern populations are broadly identified with “Jews” and “Arabs”. Boyarin, Geller, and Gilman thus pay no attention to Freud’s “Orient” or, for that matter, to the dramatic expressions of self-Orientalisation found in his correspondence. At the same time, it should be pointed out that Boyarin, even though he never refers to Freud’s Orient(alism) per se, does mention the Orientalism of other writers who discuss Freud in the context of Jewishness (Boyarin, 1994, p. 18, p. 25) such as John Murray Cuddihy in his The Ordeal of Civility. Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity (1974), or Estelle Roith in The Riddle of Freud: Jewish Influences on his Theory of Female Sexuality (1987).

In the works of Gilman (1993b) and Geller (2007) the question of Orientalism is completely obliterated and the Orient only appears as “East”—representing a geostrategic category as opposed to Freud’s cultural “Orient”—which is then indexically erased (as in the English-language Standard Edition of Freud’s writings). The consistency with which these authors have avoided bringing Freud and Orientalism into the same critical arena is revealing in the sense that we may be looking at substantial acts of self-censorship or, in the language of psychoanalysis, of repression. In other words, and to summarise, Freud’s specific Eurocentric imaginings that weave Jewishness and the Orient into one complex fabric are not reflected in the (otherwise) relevant literature. This study, in contrast, endeavours to recover Freud’s Orient from oblivion and the thesis on which it rests states, therefore, the following: Freud’s narcissistic inroads into a variety of literary Orients regularly lead back to an earlier, traumatic East made of Jewishness
and anti-Semitism. Dreading the figure of the “Ostjude” (Eastern Jew), who is often concealed behind his exotic excursions, he develops and deploys his own particular brand of Orientalism as a mode of resistance to anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse. Yet, overburdened by contradiction, Freud’s attempts to resist anti-Semitic Orientalism by way of strategic reversal cannot succeed, as he is unable to extricate himself from the historical assumptions of that discourse. It is, in spite of these difficulties, the revolutionary concept of the unstable subject posited by Freudian psychoanalytic theory, which, ultimately, deconstructs all Orientalist discourse.

Engaging two conceptually different while overlapping approaches to the study of early psychoanalysis, this book brings into conversation Sigmund Freud and Edward Said and, thereby, the founding texts of psychoanalysis and postcolonial studies. While this two-fold enquiry will explore both the Orientalism of psychoanalysis and the psychoanalysis of Orientalism, four critical aspects must be grappled with before we can proceed. First, the central tenets of psychoanalysis and their relation to Freud’s Jewishness and to his struggle with anti-Semitism; second, the productive potential as well as the conceptual strains of Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) as examined in the light of critical theory; third, the vicissitudes of Orientalist discourse and Freud’s employment/deployment thereof as a strategy for resistance; and, finally, the usefulness of a translational perspective in approaching Freud’s writings generally and, particularly, their problematic de-“Orient”alisation in the *Standard Edition*.

Psychoanalysis, Jewishness, Anti-Semitism

René Descartes’ *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* of 1637 marks, according to Ian Maclean, “one of the pivotal moments of Western European thought” (2006, p. vii). Descartes was a major figure in seventeenth-century continental rationalism and a key figure of the Scientific Revolution, advocated by the likes of Spinoza and Leibniz for his “coordinate system” while opposed by empiricists such as Locke and Hume for his “intuition”. Nonetheless, there is little doubt today, Cartesianism and its epitome *cogito ergo sum* (Je pense, donc je suis/I think, therefore I exist) (Descartes, 2006, p. 29) has dominated Western practices of philosophical and scientific enquiry for the past 370 years. Curiously
based on three successive dreams of “a wonderful science” and his interpretations thereof, Descartes’ Discourse has long been inculcated as the foundation of modern philosophy in Europe, the Americas, and elsewhere, propounding a unified subject whose identity is whole and stable in itself. This supposedly stable subject—still much in currency today—was radically unsettled by Sigmund Freud’s “third Copernican revolution” which posits a divided subject emerging at the horizon of the unconscious. Already in the mid and late nineteenth century, Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche allowed for an increasingly split subject in their psychologically tilted philosophies (Gödde, 1999; Nietzsche, 1998; Figl, 1996; Lehrer, 1995; Zentner, 1995). But it is only with Freud’s structural elaboration of the subject as divided into ego, id, and superego that his innovative account of subject formation was fully expounded in The Ego and the Id (1923b).

Freud’s exposition begins with a discussion of the fundamental distinction made in psychoanalysis between what is conscious and what is unconscious (1923b, p. 13). The ego (Ich), as a mental agency closer to consciousness, is seen as representing “reason and common sense”, whereas the id (Es), the unconscious, contains “the passions”. The conscious ego, he asserts, “is first and foremost a body ego” (p. 27) while the unconscious ego consists, on the one hand, of the repressed and, on the other, of the ego ideal or the superego (Überich). These configurations should not be thought of as linear relationships. Freud affirms that “the ego is not sharply separated from the id as it merges into it” and, similarly, “the superego is always close to the id” and “can even act as its representative vis-à-vis the ego” as “it reaches deep down into the id and for that reason is further from consciousness than the ego is” (p. 49). In a subchapter that discusses “the ego’s dependent relations” Freud points out how the ego “carries out repressions in the service and at the behest of the superego” while it may in other moments turn “the same weapon against its harsh taskmaster [the superego]” (p. 52). And whereas “the superego displays its independence of the conscious ego and its intimate relations with the unconscious id” the ego is seen as “a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the superego” (p. 56). Most illustrative for our discussion is the point that the ego pursues not only its own goals against id and superego, it also acts as a mediator between the commands of the instincts (the id), the demands of ethics
and morality (the superego) and the impositions of the outside world or reality.

By and large, Freud’s subject is thoroughly divided, pulled and pushed in several directions, and thus fundamentally unstable. As a result, the unstable subject, this key concept in Freudian psychoanalysis, is exceptionally well suited to explore, explain, and ultimately deconstruct the narcissistic ambivalences involved in the dynamics of love and hatred of the self and hatred and love of the other so quintessential to and characteristic of Orientalist discourse.

In more general terms, Freud’s ego psychology began to take shape in his equally paradigmatic work *On Narcissism: An Introduction* (1914c) and was developed alongside his drive theory, a point that cannot be emphasised enough. This book, therefore, stays consistently close to Freud’s concept of the “unconscious” (1915e) and, with it, to an understanding of “libidinal economics” as underlying all psychoanalytic insight. At the same time, there are some serious critical concerns this writer shares with others. In an effort to take these concerns into account, my thinking is informed by two main premises: a) ego psychology in its North-American (dis)figuration—which thrusts aside Freudian drive theory—“desexualises psychoanalysis” (Boyarin, 1988, p. 31); and b) the desexualisation of psychoanalysis must, in addition, be understood in terms of its “Christianisation” (Pohlen, 2008, p. 324). To take it a step further, here I argue, Freud as a Jewish author and psychoanalysis as a supposedly “Jewish science”—thus labeled by Freud’s former friend and follower C. G. Jung—have been subjected to a not so subtle process of de-“Orient”alisation, an argument to which we will contribute strong evidence in the form of direct observations from the field of translation.

Freud’s ego psychology and in particular his sea-changing concept of the *unstable subject* have acquired added visibility in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as theorists concerned with sexuality, gender, queerness, race, and postcoloniality have increasingly turned to his views on subject formation. And yet, even these “advanced” readings have, apparently, not always been able to refine current criticisms of Freud and his theories. Three critical approaches have become particularly entrenched in academic circles today: androcentrism, phallocentrism, and heteronormativity. First, androcentrism, or male-centredness, is clearly at work in the predominance of the *father complex* so typical of Freudian psychoanalysis pointing to Freud’s
inability to “see” the woman, i.e. the mother (Chodorow, 1999). Second, phallocentrism, as proceeding from a general phallic stage to the presumed penis envy of young women to a universalised castration complex, is evident in all three of these Freudian key-concepts as they are founded on the privileging of the penis, the male sexual organ (Horney, 1967). Third, heteronormativity has been detected in Freud’s notion of normal psychosexual development inherent both in his “four stages” as well as in the widely known Oedipus complex (love of the mother and hate of the father or vice versa) being based on the idea of the nuclear family (father, mother, child)—it is argued that this mythical and classical configuration contributes to the perpetuation of heterosexuality as societal norm (Butler, 1990). These assessments, while justified, have largely failed to take into account Sigmund Freud’s Jewishness, the ever more aggressive expressions of anti-Semitism surrounding him, as well as the Orientalist strategies he employed to resist the latter.

It is not difficult to see how these Freudian concepts flow into each other, how they come together in their patriarchic privileging of the male figure and, conversely, in their implicit repudiation of femininity. While systematically subject to feminist critique, here it is argued that Freud’s repudiation of femininity, as a key element in the early development of psychoanalytical theory, cannot be separated from his traumatic internalisation of the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the [male] Jew as feminised Oriental” which had become “a common topos” in fin-de-siècle Europe (Le Rider, 1991a, p. 110). This particular stereotype is of fundamental importance to my argument as it allows detailed insight into the complexities of Freud’s Orientalist discourse. Its intricate vicissitudes will be discussed in the context of three “doubled” concepts intended to bridge psychoanalytical thought and postcolonial theory further below. Here it should be made clear that Freud’s traumatic introjection of the stereotype is most evident in his suppression of Jewishness/femininity in the textual development of psychoanalysis. Frosh and others (2008; Klein, 2008; Yerushalmi, 1991) have critically commented on the general absence of contextual concern in the study of early psychoanalysis that would take into account Freud’s Jewishness and his lifelong struggle with anti-Semitism.

Although Freud’s recurring attempts at containing aspects of Jewish culture and identity in his writings can be found throughout, they are most apparent in his earlier publications. His Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, for example, postulates that all sexuality, including the
heterosexual type, is infantile and “perverse” (Freud, 1905d, p. 171; see also Passett, 2005, p. 37) and not just that of the Jew as the anti-Semite would have it. Or consider his now famous five case studies of which both the first (“Dora”) and the second (“Little Hans”) endured an iron silence in regards to the Jewishness of these patients. It is precisely in the latter work, entitled Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy (1909b), where Freud inaugurates the “castration complex” as universal phenomenon rather than as a particular feature of the Jewish male, thus exploding another entrenched anti-Semitic construct. Last but not least, the classical and tragic figure of Oedipus Rex, who could not recognise his father Laius nor see his mother Jocasta and whose Greekness was to ensure Freud’s “escape from Jewish queerdom into gentile, phallic heterosexuality” (Boyarin, 1997, p. 215; see Geller, 2007, p. 27). Moreover, as Boyarin has so impressively shown, Freud’s effacement of Jewishness and, with it, his universalising of the particular betrays itself as a recurring “symptom” (Boyarin, 1997, p. 231) leaving indelible imprints on the early development of psychoanalytic theory.

Freud recorded the early beginnings of his lifelong struggle with anti-Semitism in the “hat incident”, a passage that appears in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a, p. 197). Here, Freud describes a traumatic anti-Semitic episode involving his father who, on his way to Saturday prayers, is first verbally abused—“Jew! Get off the pavement.”—and whose traditional Galician “fur cap”, the Shtreimel, is then thrown into the mud by one “Christian”. When little Sigismund asked his father “What did you do?” the latter simply replied that he picked up the cap and continued on his way. His father’s response seemed lacking in heroism to the boy who, thereupon, juxtaposed the scene to another and more satisfying one in which Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar Barkas, lets his son swear in front of the household altar to take vengeance on the Romans. Nowhere else in his writings is Freud more explicit on the intricate relationship between the “Phoenician” or “Semitic” Orient, his Jewish origins and identity, and the protracted struggle with anti-Semitism. One of the greatest military leaders in history, Hannibal (247–183 BC), or Hanniba’al (from the Punic for Ba’al has given me grace), satisfied the growing need young Sigismund felt for positive Semitic role models. Similarly, in his references to Joseph, the biblical dream interpreter, to Moses, the maker of Jewish law and people, or even to Benjamin Disraeli, the “Oriental” Prime Minister of Great Britain, these positive and pro-Semitic ideal types frequently function as the driving force in Freud’s deployment of
the Orient and as an indication of his internalisation of both the Jewish/Christian as well as the Aryan/Semitic divide. Yet, what distinguishes this particular appearance of Freud’s “Jewish Phoenicians”, Hannibal and Hamilcar, from most other “Oriental scenes” in his writings is the potential for resistance.

Although several scholars have emphasised the importance of the “hat incident” for Freud’s later resistance to anti-Semitism, no one appears to have looked closely at the Phoenician hero. Here I want to suggest that Freud, known for his heroic identifications with famous military commanders from Alexander the Great to Napoleon Bonaparte, learned from Hannibal, “the father of strategy”, a fundamental lesson for his own resistance to anti-Semitism: namely, to take the fight to the enemy and to frustrate his opponents by battling on their—Orientalist—terrain. As we will maintain throughout, this strategic reversal, which turns the dreaded Roman siege of Carthage into the bold Carthaginian devastation of the Apennine Peninsula and the racist victimisation of Freud in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Austro-Hungary into his resistance to anti-Semitism on Orientalist grounds, dominates the making of Freud’s Orient.

It is then the objective of this book to critically explore and interpretatively map precisely this discursive, Orientalist terrain both in Freud’s voluminous psychological writings and in his vast professional as well as private correspondence. To do so, it is necessary to outline the extraordinarily productive impact of Edward Said’s widely read while not always well understood Orientalism (1978). Such an outline will open three different while intimately linked perspectives. First, it will offer a close, critical reading of one of the “founding texts” of post-colonial studies, including both de-centred as well as Marxist views. Second, and following from the first, it will indicate the significance of post-Saidian advancements in the conceptualisation of Orientalism. And third, it will facilitate an enhanced understanding of the early development of psychoanalysis in the context of Freud’s Jewishness as well as his complex Orientalist response to ever more aggressive expressions of anti-Semitism.

**Strengths and strains of Orientalism**

In early December 2001 Edward W. Said crossed the North Atlantic once more to give a talk in London on “Freud and the Non-European”,
which was later published under the same title (2003). The anticipated event had been organised by the Freud Museum and took place at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). The lecture given by Said, the celebrated Palestinian-born professor who taught at Columbia University, New York until his untimely passing on 26 September 2003, had been preceded by a drawn-out controversy surrounding his activities as a politically engaged intellectual. His symbolic hurling of a stone or pebble at an abandoned Israeli guardhouse on the Lebanon border (shortly after the retreat of the Israeli Defence Forces) in July 2000 unleashed a wave of accusations portraying him as a violent anti-Semite. No less controversial was, soon thereafter, the decision taken by the Vienna Freud Museum to withdraw the invitation they had extended to Prof. Said for the 2001 Freud Memorial Lecture which was to be held in the place from where Freud and his family had been forced into exile by the Nazis only sixty years earlier (see *The New York Times* March 10, 2001, “A Stone-Throw is a Freudian Slip”; see also the exchange of letters by readers of the *London Review of Books*, Mar-Apr 2001). The London Freud Museum eventually stepped in to facilitate an alternative and more welcoming venue.

Said came flanked by two psychoanalytically trained and in postcolonial matters rather savvy writers, Christopher Bollas and Jacqueline Rose, who offered an insightful introduction and a stimulating response. Said’s title could not fail to produce certain expectations in his international audience regarding the question of Orientalism—which had made him world-renowned in the first place—and its relation to the works of Sigmund Freud and the early development of psychoanalysis. Prof. Said, however, took the talk in a very different direction opening the event with the statement “Freud is what Israel represses” (2003, p. 44). What he referred to was the fact that Freud was a Jewish intellectual who, in spite of his resistance to anti-Semitism, had refused to underwrite the establishment of a nationalist project in the form of a Jewish state in Palestine (see also Yerushalmi, 1991, p. 13).

If Said mentioned his most influential work *Orientalism* (1978) only in passing that evening, he did briefly refer to the nineteenth century French Orientalist Renan and to the reputed contemporary economist Wallerstein’s “Orientalism” (2003, pp. 16 & 22). But he was careful not to associate Freud’s remarks about “primitive”, non-European cultures or “Asiatics” with Orientalism. Instead, he emphasised that both postcolonial studies as well as psychoanalysis are mainly interested
in “the problems of the Other” specifying that these problems lay, for Freud, “outside the limits of reason, convention and, of course, consciousness” (Said, 2003, p. 14). Finally, in the context of his discussion of Freud’s *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13), Said concluded that notwithstanding “Freud’s was a Eurocentric view of culture”, we should not lose sight of “Freud’s implicit refusal, in the end, to erect an insurmountable barrier between non-European primitives and European civilization” (2003, p. 16, p. 19). Summarising Said’s main points on the encounter between psychoanalysis and postcolonial studies we have the following convergences: a) to gain an understanding of the mechanisms of the (latent/manifest) production of otherness, b) to engage in the breaking down of entrenched binaries (self/other) and, following from there,—what Said would and could not articulate, leaving it to the realm of the “implicit”— c) to tap into the theoretical potential of the “unstable subject” in psychoanalysis and the “third term” in postcolonial theory in order to devise strategies of resistance to regimes of (inner/outer) domination. For the main points of difference, we would have to say that Freud was no postmodern and Said no psychoanalyst.

Said’s reconciliatory tone in London was certainly accommodating as he faced an audience of largely pro-Freudian persuasion. It is, however, far removed from the standpoint he takes early on in his paradigmatic and, at the same time, precarious *Orientalism* (Said, 1978). In following Foucault’s model, Said proposes a multiplicity of discursive Orients. He sets out by explaining how western-style Orientalism was often influenced by widely held social and cultural assumptions or even particular scientific theories which found popular acceptance and offers a first distinction of five varieties:

I also try to explain how Orientalism borrowed and was frequently informed by strong ideas, doctrines, and trends ruling the culture. Thus there was (and is) a linguistic Orient, a Freudian Orient, a Spenglerian Orient, a Darwinian Orient, a racist Orient—and so on. (1978, p. 22)

So, what did Said have in mind by coining this “Freudian Orient”? What is the relationship between the founder of psychoanalysis and Orientalism? In which ways did nineteenth-century Orientalism influence the development of psychoanalytic thought? How was Orientalism
to contribute to the formation of its vocabulary and concepts? Which are the characteristics of Freud’s particular “Orient”(alism) and how are these reflected both in his psychological and other writings? The reader will be hard pressed to find an answer to these questions in Said’s famous book. In fact, nowhere else in his Orientalism does Said comment on Freud or the connections between postcolonial theory and psychoanalytic thought. And while he borrowed Freud’s distinction of “latent” and “manifest” from The Interpretation of Dreams without any acknowledgement whatsoever he made no space for either “Freud” or “psychoanalysis” in his index.

By and large, Edward W. Said’s Orientalism (1978) stands out as a seminal work that, although confronted with harsh criticism, has nonetheless managed for more than three decades to maintain much of its paradigmatic stance. While we can appreciate the significance of its political and intellectual positioning, it has not succeeded in dispelling an array of ontological, epistemological, and methodological shortcomings. Orientalism has been perceived as both “forbidding” and “enabling”. Forbidding for the monolithic “Occidentalism” that emerges in its pages and enabling for the enormous critical potential his view of “Orientalism” has produced. This enablement is one of the reasons why this book was, and still is, so enthusiastically received by scholars in the social sciences and humanities. And yet, the popular and academic usages that are sometimes made in the name of Said’s Orientalism seem uncritical and little aware of a number of contradictions that seriously undermine the authority of this founding contribution to the development of postcolonial theory. If Said’s flexible theoretical positioning maybe confounding to some, to others it is precisely this double-sidedness that constitutes the strength of his re-thinking the concept and practice of Orientalism.

However, it is not Said’s unfortunate failure to do away with essentialisms of the Occidental and Oriental kinds, but rather his reinforcement of those categories by entrenching them further into his own scheme and, most significantly, his complete oblivion and unreflective erasure of those concerned, the “Orientals”, that is at issue here. A closer look at Orientalism and, more precisely, at Said’s definitions thereof, will help to explain why the ambiguous and contradictory positioning of his work is of so much importance. It is within the first pages that Said offers three definitions of Orientalism—corporate, academic, and stylistic:
[Orientalism is] a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other … The Orient is an integral part of Europe an material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial style. (Said, 1978, pp. 1–2)

Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident”. (ibid., p. 2)

Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, by settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. (ibid., p. 3)

As identified by Ahmad (1994, p. 180), we are facing not just pressing ontological-epistemological problems, but, moreover, we have an important issue of periodisation on our hands. If there is an “uninterrupted” discursive history—as Said, notwithstanding his own arguments, claims on the same pages—that can be traced from Aeschylus to Dante to Marx to Lewis, then the post-Enlightenment eighteenth century can hardly figure as that “roughly defined starting point” of Orientalist discourse. Leaving aside the historical relevance of these questions, they indicate a typical quality of Said’s Orientalism that resides in its hybrid positioning. The theoretical and methodological influences apparent in Said’s opus magnum are twofold. On the one hand we have his “humanist” claims and, on the other, his use of Foucauldian discourse theory. Having acquired strong formational background in comparative European literatures, Said appears deeply inspired by German comparativists such as Auerbach, Curtius, and Spitzer who were keen on creating an aura of “High Humanism” around their academic endeavours (Ahmad, 1994, p. 162). The humanist stance reappears in Said’s Orientalism in
the form of a totalised European history tracing its beginnings—and its Orientalisms—back to Greek classics. This idea was countered in highly critical fashion by the Subaltern Studies Group and several postcolonial thinkers (see Spivak, 1996; Bhabha, 1994; Prakash, 1990). There is, then, the difficulty to reconcile traditional notions of “High Humanism” with post-structural readings of “Nietzschean anti-humanism” as proposed in Foucault’s archaeo-historical writings. If Clifford points to this conceptual weakness, he also affirms the foundational status of Orientalism by stating “Said’s humanist perspectives do not harmonise with his use of methods derived from Foucault, who is of course a radical critic of humanism. But however wary and inconsistent its appeals, Orientalism is a pioneering attempt to use Foucault systematically in an extended cultural analysis” (Clifford, 1988, p. 264).

The critique of Said leads, then, to a critique of Foucault, which must include five issues. First, Foucault’s postmodern concept of “discourse”, derived from Saussurian linguistics, remains embedded in a structuralist model which is essentially apolitical and which makes no space for the “subject” or its political agency (see O’Neill, 1995, pp. 15–23). Second, the origins of “discourse” in linguistics makes it part of a language code and, therefore, of a symbolic order which comes after the phenomenon of the “body” (for comparison, see Freud’s four stages of psychosexual development and, in particular, the oral stage which exists before language; Freud, 1905d; Merleau-Ponty, 2002). Third, the linguistic turn (Giddens, 1990) informs the constructionist paradigm which results, on the one hand, in an endless process of (de-)construction, while producing, on the other, an unlimited proliferation of discursive possibilities (Craib, 1997). Fourth, in purely methodological terms, Foucault’s sources are largely French, that is, from France and therefore wide open to the charge of eurocentrism/ethnocentrism (compare with Bourdieu, 1977; Stoler, 1995). Finally, according to Liebmann-Schaub (1989), Foucault himself seems to have struggled with certain forms of Orientalist discourse. Back to Said.

Another problem is found in the relationship that exists between Orientalism and colonialism. Prioritising textuality, Said argues that Orientalism “produced” the Orient (1978, p. 3), meaning that colonialism is a product of Orientalism itself. Ahmad opposes this view by arguing that this “narrative of convergence between colonial knowledges and colonial powers simply cannot be assembled within cultural studies itself, because histories of economic exploitation, political
coercion, and military conquest play the far more constitutive part; those other histories are the ones which provide the enabling conditions for the so-called Orientalist discourse as such” (Ahmad, 1994, p. 164). It is of little help to the theoretical architecture of Orientalism when Said introduces (shortly after corroborating his indebtedness to Foucauldian discourse theory), Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony”, which pertains to the larger body of Marxist theory. Said thus depends for his conceptual strategy on a very flexible positionality, constantly vacillating between humanist and anti-humanist paradigms. Still, the point being made here consists not merely in the paradoxical accomplishment of Said’s entrenching essentialist distinctions made between the “Occident” and the “Orient”, but also in his complete neglect, and thus his erasure, of the subaltern voice. As Aijaz Ahmad remarks:

A notable feature of Orientalism is that it examines the history of Western textualities about the non-West quite in isolation from how these textualities might have been received, accepted, modified, challenged, overthrown, or reproduced by the intelligentsias of the colonized countries; not as an undifferentiated mass but as situated social agents impelled by our own conflicts, contradictions, distinct social and political locations, of class, gender, region, religious affiliation, and so on—hence a peculiar disjuncture in the architecture of the book. (Ahmad, 1994, p. 172)

We have not only theoretical and methodological contradictions accompanied by hybrid strategies, but also a fateful obliteration in the silence around those involved—the “Orientals”—which has confronted Said’s Orientalism with the devastating charge of “Occidentalism”. In other words, Said essentialises Europe and the West, the “Occident”, as self-identical, fixed being which has always had an essence and a will, an imagination and a project, and the “Orient” as no more than its silenced object. Accordingly, “Said’s discourse analysis does itself not escape the all-inclusive ‘Occidentalism’ he specifically rejects as an alternative to Orientalism” (Clifford, 1988, p. 271). It is this (reversed) charge of “Occidentalism” which has motivated other writers to go beyond Orientalism and to find alternatives to conceptualise, in the place of silence and neglect, a dialectics involving those concerned. How can we think of Orientalism as an expandable concept, one that takes into account the ways in which it is received, accepted, modified, rejected, or otherwise
challenged by the subaltern? Furthermore, how can we conceptualise a critique of Orientalism that includes the subaltern voice? To reach beyond Orientalism means to employ its critical propensities in strategic ways, tapping into its enabling potential, which must include the acknowledgment of a plurality of Orientalisms ("proper", "in-reverse", anti-Semitic, pro-Semitic, etc.), as well as the conceptual possibilities of an Orientalist dialectics. A number of authors have worked towards a differentiation of Orientalisms, not just in the sense of national histories and conditions, but also in terms of moving away from a one-sided discourse to one of multiplicity and multivocality. This is of great significance as such a move makes space for the subaltern voice by opening new terrains of struggle and contestation. I agree with Schmitz’ conclusion “the genesis and reception of a critique of Said is of immediate relevance for the question of the im/possible conditions of cultural de-centering in the tense environment of competing positionalities and unequal representational powers” (2008, p. 363) [translated for this edition].

Freud’s semi-colonial “doubledness”, expressed in his simultaneous denouncing and pronouncing of anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse, forces us to reach beyond Said’s own entrenchment of Occidental and Oriental categories. A formidable challenge then to Said’s vacillating conceptual positionalities, the case of Freud’s Orient is not exhausted in an endless process of linguistic (de)construction as suggested by Said’s and Foucault’s discourse theory and rather seen as the symptomatic outcome of an underlying, repressed trauma—"the dreaded figure of the Ostjude" (Eastern Jew)—which returns us to both Freud’s internalisation of the anti-Semitic stereotype and his resistance to it re-inventing his Jewishness as pro-Semitism. These responses are expressed in a number of different and divergent discursive articulations.

The vicissitudes of Orientalist discourse: three doubled concepts

The stereotype of the “Jew as Oriental” is instructive as it perfectly illustrates the intricate complexities of Orientalist discourse in general and of its vicissitudes in Freud’s case in particular. Robertson, in his concise article, “Urheimat Asien”: The Reorientation of German and Austrian Jews, 1900–1925 (1996, pp. 182–192), lays out the various applications of the stereotype. He locates its origins in the writings of celebrated German
writers such as Johann Gottfried Herder, who saw Jews as “foreign Asiatic people” (1804), or Arthur Schopenhauer, who opposed their being extended civil rights as “they remain an Oriental people” (1947). Robertson describes how in nineteenth century Germany and Austria—and, we might add, in Europe at large—“Jewish identity came to be defined by race rather than by religion.” In the ensuing struggle for representation, the term “Oriental” became a major point of contestation. Many Jews resisted anti-Semitic stereotypes using the “Oriental” as a marker of difference that defined them as “unassimilably alien”. Some, especially “those frustrated in their desire for assimilation” as, for example, Walter Rathenau, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Weimar Republic, applied it to themselves (Rathenau’s anonymously published essay “Höre, Israel”, 1897) or to others “in the spirit of self-contempt”. Still “other Jews accepted the term but either changed its content or valued positively the implications that anti-Semites regarded negatively” (Robertson, 1996, p. 182). Robertson goes on to discuss mainly this latter group citing Richard Beer-Hoffmann, Theodor Herzl, Martin Buber, Jacob Wassermann, Theodor Lessing, and Max Brod. Robertson reaches the inescapable conclusion “that in countering anti-Semitic stereotypes with positive images one is still playing the anti-Semitic game” (Robertson, 1996, p. 192). Be these images of negative (self-hatred) or of positive (self-love) valence makes little difference, entering the Orientalist “game” one inextricably subscribes to the historical assumptions of Orientalist discourse at large.

Although without our particular focus on the “Jew as Oriental”, Mendes-Flohr and Reinhartz, editors of a substantial volume entitled The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History (1980), offer an even larger variety of types. Commenting on “the accelerated process of acculturation and assimilation that characterized the Jews’ entrance into modernity” they underscore “Jewish self-identity became problematic.” Mendes-Flohr and Reinhartz then present readings from a number of nineteenth-century Jewish writers who are first divided into two large groups, the “problematic” and the “affirmative” (our negative and positive), and then broken down into four sub-categories each. The problematic responses are represented by “estrangement” (Maimon, Franzos, Kafka); “conversion” (Edler, Mendelsohn, Heine); “cosmopolitanism” (Börne, Luxemburg, Varnhagen, Bernstein, Deutscher); and “self-hatred” (Rathenau, Weininger, Lessing). The second group, the “affirmative” responses, is subdivided into four more groups such
as “national-Zionist” (Hess); “unique sensibility” (Landauer, Bell); Trotzjudentum or “defiant Jewry” (Koestler); and “religious faith” (Rosenzweig, Langer) (Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz, 1980, p. 211). Many of these types effectively overlap and several of the mentioned writers could easily appear in any of the other groupings. Gilman, on the other hand, finds the roots of Jewish self-hatred in “conversion” and includes in his work on Jewish Self-hatred Heine, Börne, Marx, Freud, and Rathenau (Gilman, 1986). In view of so many possibilities, Robertson’s threefold division appears most productive, especially as it stays close to the stereotype of the “Jew as Oriental”. At the same time, Robertson’s article mainly discusses “positive” responses or very briefly the self-hatred of a Rathenau without ever entering the complexities of those responses that maintain the negativity of the anti-Semite while simultaneously resisting anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse—which is Freud’s case. Furthermore, neither Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz nor Robertson mention the imbrications of sexuality and gender with the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the Jew as feminised Oriental” as so effectively laid bare by Jacques Le Rider (1991b, p. 110). Their views thus failed to see the relationship between the racist term and the realm of the gendered and the sexual. In spite of these evasions in the face of what Deborah Britzman calls “difficult knowledge” (1998), we have three fundamental types to work with. There is, first, the stereotype of the “Jew as Oriental” as employed in its “proper” anti-Semitic configuration, that is, to produce and exclude the Jewish Other; second, as applied to the Self in negative (self-hating) terms; and, third, when used for the Self in positively valuing (self-loving) ways.

Evidence for Robertson’s three fundamental types of the stereotype of “the Jew as Oriental” as reflected in Freud’s writings is found abundantly in his letters. Not only was young Freud allergic to “mauscheln”, the inflected German of Eastern Jews (Gilman, 1986, pp. 261–263), on one occasion he even labelled his own brother-in-law, Moritz Freud, a Romanian-born cousin, a “half-Asian” (Halb-Asiate) (Freud, 1985a, p. 340; see also Tögel, 2004, p.41). Then again, in his epistolary exchange with Sandor Ferenczi, he muses about “the heritage of my ancestors … the Orient …” (aus der Erbschaft der Ahnen … dem Orient …) (Freud, 2003, p. 133; Scherer, 2005, p. 95). And yet, instances of directly expressed hatred involving his own self are more difficult to find as these only appear in the form of absence, that is, as the suppression of Jewishness. Freud’s seminal paper entitled Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915c)
proposes categories similar to Robertson’s. Freud writes: “Observation shows us that an instinct may undergo the following vicissitudes: Reversal into its opposite; Turning upon oneself; Repression; Sublimation” (1915c, p. 126).

In considering the “reversal into its opposite”, it is as if Freud is saying no, I am not feminised, I am as masculine (heterosexual) as can be—married, with six children; no, I am not the Oriental, but instead the Orientalist—who knows more about the Orient than most (anti-Semites). In regards to the “turning upon one’s own self”, there are a number of instances where he uses Oriental images for himself—be it as the “sultan” of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis his “great vizier” Ferenczi or as the one who hands out not three but six rings to as many “Oriental” sons. The part of “repression” is apparent in his suppression of Jewishness, as discussed above, while that of “sublimation” clearly comes to the fore in the development of psychoanalytical theory, as we have shown in our discussion of his universalising “symptom”, that is, in his elaboration of (perverse) sexuality, the castration complex, the Oedipus myth, as well as the notion of normalcy, in this way resisting the stereotype of the “Jew as Oriental”.

With Robertson’s threefold distinction of anti-/pro-Semitic Orientalist discourse in mind, this book proposes three “doubled” conceptual tools in the attempt to bridge psychoanalytical thought and postcolonial theory: Orientalism proper or the narcissism of eurocentric difference; Orientalist binaries or West-East splitting in the process of defence; Self-orientalisation or identification with the imperial and royal aggressor. These three doubled, postcolonial cum psychoanalytical concepts will inform this study throughout. Let us define them in some detail.

1. Orientalism proper or the narcissism of eurocentric difference. The notion “Orientalism proper” is borrowed from John MacKenzie’s discussion of Orientalism in history, theory, and the arts (1995, p. 26) and stands diametrically opposed to Sadik Al Azm’s concept of “Orientalism-in-reverse” (1981, p. 5). Whereas the former corresponds to orientalising the Other, the latter means to orientalise the Self. It follows Edward Said’s original definitions of academic, corporate, and stylistic practices in the process of which the “Orient” and “Oriental” otherness are produced. This process is fundamentally based on eurocentric views of racial and cultural difference conceived in terms of Occidental superiority and Oriental
inferiority. In Said’s formulation: “Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient—and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist—either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism” (1978, p. 2). Psychoanalysis allows us to translate Said’s foundational postcolonial concept into what Freud, in his Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a), coined “the narcissism of minor differences” (1930a, pp. 114–115), meaning the tendency to signal aggression in the encounter with the other. Freud speaks here not only of “Spaniards” and “Portuguese” engaged in constant feuds or simply ridiculing each other. In the context of “Jewish people” he unambiguously reminds us of “all the massacres of Jews” as well as “the dream of a Germanic world-dominion” calling for “antisemitism as its complement” (Freud, 1930a, p. 115). If the name “narcissism of minor differences” does not do much to explain it, turning to Freud’s work on narcissism will sharpen the focus.

According to Ernest Jones, Freud used the term “narcissism” for the first time at a Vienna convention in 1909, declaring it to be “a necessary intermediate stage between autoerotism and object-love” (Jones, 1981, p. 304). In Freud’s writings, the concept first appears in a footnote added to the second edition of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) and, in the same year, in the work on Leonardo da Vinci (1910c). In both instances, the term is used to account for object-choice in homosexuals. Freud’s seminal essay “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (“Zur Einführung des Narzissmus”) (1914c), brings together several strands of earlier research introducing at same time new concepts with great significance for the development of psychoanalytic theory. In this sense, Freud begins by reiterating Näcke’s definition of narcissism as “perversion” and Sadger’s note on narcissistic traits in “homosexuals,” but, more importantly, by restating Ranke’s definition of narcissism as part of normal or “regular” human sexual development. This last contribution is considerable in that it opens the way to point, away from perversion, to narcissism as “the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature” (Freud, 1914c, p. 74). Narcissism is thus brought to the discussion in libidinal terms being thought of as a complement to the ego-instinct and as part of a continuum that reaches from pathology (“neurotics”) to normalcy (“every living creature”). These considerations prepared the stage for Freud’s “extension of the libido theory”.
Earlier work with neurotic patients had shown that narcissistic attitudes translate into “limits to their susceptibility to influence” and thus into limits of the psychoanalytic method at large. This finding led Freud to deepen his understanding of narcissism and schizophrenia in the light of libido theory. He continues, therefore, by indicating that schizophrenics display two fundamental characteristics: a) megalomania, which comes into being at the expense of object-libido and b) their marked diversion of interest from the outside world, a process in which “the libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism” (Freud, 1914c, p. 75). If in the case of schizophrenic patients the libido has truly been withdrawn from the object, in neurotics the process appears to follow a different course. Freud explains that even though the neurotic may have “given up his relation to reality,” in contrast to the schizophrenic, “he has by no means broken off his erotic relation to people and things” (Freud, 1914c, p. 74)—he replaces them with others in fantasy. Thus, Freud is led to “look upon the narcissism which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obscured by a number of different influences” (1914c, p. 75). Freud’s innovative distinction between primary and secondary narcissism(s) has been praised as “ground-breaking”. Paul Ricoeur, for example, applauds the concept of “secondary narcissism” as “a new intelligibility that crowns the attainment of the topographic-economic point of view”, foreshadowing “the re-organization of the topography according to the new sequence of ego, id, and superego” (1970, p. 127). To return to “the narcissism of minor differences” and the disposition of aggression toward the other, the withdrawal of libidinal energy from the object onto the ego remains essential to an understanding of the process. So does any insight into eurocentric views of Occidental self and Oriental other.

2. Orientalist binaries or *West-Eastern splitting in the process of defence*. Orientalism always comes in pairs. The basic Orientalist binary opposition of Occident vs. Orient or West/East evokes a series of other rigid and supposedly stable binary contrasts such as, for example, modern/traditional, civilised/primitive, advanced/backward, rational/irrational, self/other, male/female, active/passive, coloniser/colonised, and so on. In structural terms, binary constructs are seen as fundamental organising elements in human philosophy,
language, and culture (Hall, 1997, pp. 234–238). In post-structuralism it is argued that binary oppositions are characteristic of Western thought and that, typically, one of the opposites assumes a role of dominance over the other. The critique of binary oppositions has an important place in post-feminism, post-colonialism, and critical race theory. The post-structural critique of binary constructs consists, however, not simply in a reversal but in their deconstruction. In postcolonial theory this is accomplished by means of introducing a “third term” and, thereby, to undo their apparent stability (Spivak, 1999; Bhabha, 1994). At the same time, the problematic effectiveness of binary oppositions reaches deeper than may be (linguistically) apparent.

The problem has been discussed in depth by Jacques Derrida in his *Différance* (1982) where he proposes an insightful reading. He uses the spelling of the French term *différance* with an *a* instead of the *e* as an example/concept and speaks of it as an “infraction in silence”, something that is written and read but that cannot be heard. He maintains that it [the *a*] cannot be exposed, while indicating “an operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation”. Its meaning is, therefore, constituted through an act of repression and its sign stands as a “deferred presence” which it aims to re-appropriate. He makes two further points. One rests with the fact that *différance* with an *a* is no longer part of the representation of a presence, and the other, as a result, questions the very authority of such presence and of its opposite, that is, of lack, or absence. *Différance*, in Derrida’s writing, “maintains our relationship with that which we necessarily misconstrue, and which exceeds the alternative of presence and absence” (Derrida, 1982, p. 20). This complicated performance of oppositions remains of great importance for a differentiated understanding of the process of signification. In this context, Derrida reminds us how “essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences” (1982, p. 11).

Although Derrida’s discussion pursues its object still further by probing into the discourses of various influential philosophical precedents, it may suffice here to restate that each present element is “related to something other than itself” and, simultaneously, will be
“constituting the present by means of this very relation to what it is not” (Derrida, 1982, p. 13). Each (Orientalist) binary is, then, a radical displacement, which—within its play of differences—remains intimately tied to its opposite, and beyond, to a history of Western representations. If Freud’s most favorite German writer, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, had attempted to undo the Orientalist binary in his *West-Eastern Divan* (1819), Freud both re-entrenched it in the rhetoric surface of his texts and broke it down by way of universal psychoanalytical concepts.

The formulation “splitting in the process of defence” is known in psychoanalysis as *Ichspaltung*, or splitting of the ego, a mental process that is generally associated with pre/ambivalence and considered one of the most primitive defence mechanisms against anxiety in which the object, with both erotic and destructive instincts directed toward it, splits into “good” and “bad” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, pp. 427–429). Although Freud had, mostly in passing, touched on the subject in earlier works such as *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy* (1909b), *The Uncanny* (1919h), or *The Ego and the Id* (1923b), it was only in one of his last papers entitled *Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense* (Freud, 1940e, pp. 275–278), that he dedicated his exclusive attention to the complexities of its workings. In discussing the case of a young boy (perhaps “Little Hans”, perhaps himself), he begins by pointing out that the process of splitting generally “occurs under the influence of a psychical trauma” and situates the origins of the conflict as one between “the demand by the instinct and the prohibition of reality”. However, the child, and potentially later neurotic patient, “takes neither course or rather takes both simultaneously, which comes to the same thing.” In fact, the response to the trauma and conflict is twofold and contrary, including a) the rejection of reality thereby refusing the prohibition, and b) the recognition of the dangers of reality, which are then taken over as pathological symptoms to be (ideally speaking) disposed of at a later time. Even though this split solution may appear as an “ingenious” one as both instinct and reality “obtain their share”, the success of this mental operation is only “achieved at the price of a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on” (1940e, p. 456). In other words, West-Eastern splitting (in the process of defence) comes at the high price of a “schizophrenic” view of the world in general and of self/other relations in particular.
3. Self-orientalisation or *identification with the imperial and royal aggressor*. Aihwa Ong introduced the formulation “self-orientalising discourses” in the context of “overseas Chinese” and her critical view of Said’s own eurocentrism highlights “that the discursive objects (of Orientalism) themselves participate as co-creators of Orientalist codes.” Hence, “Self-narratives valorizing aspects of Chinese culture have emerged to (re)frame diaspora Chinese as cosmopolitan moderns who possess both capital and humanistic values” (Ong, 1993, pp. 766–767). Arif Dirlik takes up Ong’s verb, turns it into a subject, and thus coins the term “self-orientalisation” as practised by “contemporary … Asian intellectuals, which is a manifestation not of powerlessness but newly acquired power” (Dirlik, 1996, p. 96). Yet, unlike Ong’s uncomplicated acceptance, Dirlik has no illusions about the outcome of these discursive strategies when he writes “Self-essentialization may serve the cause of mobilizing against ‘Western’ domination; but in the very process it also consolidates ‘Western’ ideological hegemony by internalising the historical assumptions of orientalism” (1996, p. 140). Needless to say, this equally applies to Freud’s strategic reversal of anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse.

Early on in his discussion of Western Orientalism, Said cautions those concerned, here referring to Arab Nationalists, and draws attention to “the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves …” (1978, p. 25; my emphasis). The practice of Orientalising one’s self denotes a complex process in which the subject takes on the “master”-discourse of the ruling elite, internalises it, and articulates it by confirming the dominant paradigm in conceiving of the self in Orientalist terms. To translate this model and the process back into Freud’s time and place as well as into the language of psychoanalysis, our doubled concept brings together the “master” (i.e. KuK, *Kaiserlich und Königlich* (imperial and royal)) discourse and the ego-psychological idea of identifying with the aggressor. The expression “identification with the aggressor” is not Freud’s. It was coined by Sandor Ferenczi in his 1933 paper “Sprachverwirrung zwischen den Erwachsenen und dem Kind” (The confusion of tongues between adults and the child), where it is used in the context of traumatic experiences undergone by the child at the hands of an adult. In discussing sexual abuse, Ferenczi speaks of
the child’s fear of the “attacker” which, at its highest point of intensity, forces it “to forget itself completely and to identify entirely with the attacker” (sich selbst ganz vergessend sich mit dem Angreifer vollauf zu identifizieren) (Ferenczi, 2004, p. 308 [translated for this edition]). Ferenczi’s very real “attacker” is found again three years later in Anna Freud’s work on the ego and the mechanisms of defence (Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen) (1946a [originally published 1936], p. 125). The same year saw the Strachey-inspired English translation in which Cecil Baines, the translator, turned the specific German-language “attacker” into a more general and Latin-derived “aggressor” (1946b, p. 117). If uses of the “identification with the aggressor” may have changed over time, important for us remains its original form in the context of a child’s traumatic experience (see Britzman, 2005, pp. 175–189).

Christian Jouvenout in his Freud: un cas d’identification à l’agresseur (2003) is attentive to precisely this original configuration consisting of Freud’s Jewishness, his humiliation by anti-Semitism and poverty, and the ensuing “traumatic consequence” in the form of his “identification with the aggressor” (Jouvenot, 2003, p. 10 [translated for this edition]). Jouvenot’s exposé develops along a series of twenty-three traumatic biographical scenes (for an overview see his “Annexes”) which could be subsumed by one of his subtitles: “To be Jewish from Freiberg to Vienna” (2003, p. 240). Most importantly for us, Jouvenot posits a fundamental “duality” in the form of heroic/aggressor identifications based on his notion of a “moi bipolaire”, a bipolar ego, which is composed of ideal ego (“moi ideal” or Idealich) and ego ideal (“ideal du moi” or Ichideal). Jouvenot thus envisions a libidinal economy in which the heroic identification is oriented toward the ideal ego while the identification with the aggressor speaks to the ego ideal. The ideal ego, primarily tied to the superego, is defined as megalomaniac, whereas the ego ideal supposes a temporality linked to object relations and the work of mourning. The ideal ego is seen as strongly narcissistic presenting an archaic formation modelled on an “ego-pleasure-purified”, whereas the ego ideal, which only evolves over time, remains tied to the constitution of the ideal ego (Jouvenot, 2003, pp. 219–235). If this argument appears somewhat circular, this dualistic view of a “bipolar ego” is not without persuasive power. And yet, Jouvenot only mentions the phenomenon of splitting (the French “clivage”) in passing, citing Freud’s 1938 paper twice (2003, p. 51, p. 75) without ever entering a discussion of its implications. This ignoring of splitting in the
aetiology of heroic/aggressor identifications weakens his scheme as it obliterates the interlocking qualities of narcissism, splitting, and “dual” identifications. After translating postcolonial ideas into psychoanalytical concepts, it is time to reflect on the translation of psychoanalysis and its relation to Orientalism in the writings of Sigmund Freud.

**Translating psychoanalysis**

The question of translation is central to this book—on three distinct levels. It promotes, first, an understanding of psychoanalysis as translational process in which dreams, symptoms, and neurotic narratives are carried over (übersetzt) into “plain” language; second, it offers an enhanced methodology based on the psychoanalytical, that is, the exegetical as well as comparative study of Freud’s original German texts as found in his collected works, the *Gesammelte Werke*, hereafter GW, vs. translated writings; and third, it develops an irrefutable anti-Orientalist critique of the most disseminated English version of Freud’s writings, the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, hereafter SE. This study will read the Freudian textual corpus against the grain of excessive medicalisation to which it was subjected by the so-called “Glossary Committee”, implying nothing less than the de-“Orient”alisation and “Christianisation” of a Jewish author and his textual foundation of psychoanalysis.

For the purpose of clarity in regards to Freud’s own lexical uses of the “Orient”, here we will propose a simple distinction between *direct* and *indirect* referencing. *Direct* referencing is to indicate all specific textual evidence of the “Orient” as it appears, for example, in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), in the case history of *The Ratman* (1909d), or in *The New Introductory Lectures* (1933a). *Indirect* referencing will encompass all allusions to ideas, places, or things “Oriental”—from “a tooth out of the Caliph’s jaw” (Freud, 1960, p. 55) to “cuneiform inscriptions” found at “Amarna” (Freud, 1970b, p. 119). Leaving aside, for the moment, Freud’s indirect references, which will be examined in detail throughout the book, here we will focus on Freud’s “Orient” proper, the substantial discrepancies that come into view between the concordances of the SE and the GW, and the questions a careful reading of these discrepancies raises. Both concordances were elaborated under the supervision of the same editor, Dr. Samuel Guttman (1995, 1984), who brought together slightly different teams of collaborators for each project. While for the SE
concordance in 1984 Parrish and Jones are named, the “Konkordanz” of the GW in 1995 was co-produced by Parrish, Ruffing, and Smith. Yet, we should point out that Guttman’s concordances are not accurate, not in English and not in German. A careful recount of the “Orient” results in a total number of entries that goes well beyond his listings, while an inclusion of Freud’s correspondence would far exceed the given estimates.

According to the Concordance of the SE the “Orient” appears only once whereas the word “Oriental” is listed ten times (Guttman, 1984, p. 432). The Konkordanz of the GW, in contrast, lists the “Orient” in all its German grammatical variations, from object to subject to adjectives to plural (i.e. “Orientalen”, “orientalische”, “orientalischem”, “orientalischen”, “orientalischer”, “Orients”), in a grand total of twenty-one instances (Guttman, 1995, p. 342). The ten entries that were lost in translation between English and German editions were either erased or turned into the “East”. This becomes clear when we compare the concordances, once again, for the terms “East” and “Eastern” which are listed in the English-language version in a total of thirty-two entries (Guttman, 1984, p. 352), while appearing in its various German forms (i.e. “Osten”, “Ostens”, “Östliche”, “Östlichen”) only six times (Guttman, 1994, pp. 4054–4055). There is then a strong tendency at work in Strachey’s English translation, the SE, to de-“Orient”alise the German original and, as this study argues, its Jewish author.

In other words, Freud’s “Orient” has been almost completely erased in the widely known English-language SE. Ernest Jones, Freud’s “governor” in Britain and chairman of the “Glossary Committee”, vigorously promoted an agenda that was to bring Freud’s German “Psychoanalyse” into the British Empire. Brenda Maddox speaks in this context of the “transformation of psychoanalysis” (2006). This particular politics of psychoanalysis was carried out by the general editor and leading translator of the SE James Strachey and his associates Alix Strachey and Joan Riviere. In his “General Preface” to the SE Strachey leaves no doubt in regards to his intentions: “The imaginary model (of translation) which I have always kept before me is of the writings of some English man of science of wide education born in the middle of the nineteenth century. And I should like, in an explanatory and patriotic spirit, to emphasize the word ‘English’.” (Strachey, 1981, p. xix; my italics) The transformation of psychoanalysis consisted then, first, in making Freud into “some English (not Jewish) man of science”; second, in medicalising his psychological writings by way of the extensive use of Greek
and Latin forms; and finally, in the de-“Orient”alisation of Freud’s text and—ultimately—his persona which amounts to nothing less than an anti-Semitic, Orientalist censura. To put it differently, all three elements (anglisation, medicalisation, and de-Orientalisation) promote the “de-Judaisation” of Freud and psychoanalysis (Boyarin, 1997), that is, their “Christianization” (Pohlen, 2008) in the process of translation, to bring Freud and his psychoanalysis into a predominantly Protestant British Empire.

At this point, we might inquire into Jones’s and Strachey’s positioning vis-à-vis anti-Semitic and Orientalist discourses. Ernest Jones, Welsh born and with a rather modest middle-class background, was not shy to express certain Orientalist assumptions. Here we will offer but two brief examples chronologically separated by a decade and a half. In 1911, Jones had planned a psychoanalytic study of Napoleon to be entitled “Napoleon’s Orient Complex” which, ultimately, Freud did not encourage and so nothing came of it (Freud, 1993, pp. 111–113). Or, when Jones complained around 1924 about the difficulties in extracting financial figures from his Jewish colleague Otto Rank, because, in his own words, “Rank’s general way of conducting business was distinctly Oriental” (Freud, 2012, p. 168; Maddox, 2006, p. 176). This particular choice of words resulted in a heated epistolary exchange and serious accusations of (Orientalist) anti-Semitism by the other five Jewish members of the Secret Committee. Overall, as Boyarin reminds us, Jones was particularly instrumental in Freud’s suppression of Jewishness (read: Orientalness) (1988, p. 34).

James Strachey, on the other hand, was born and raised in a distinctly Orientalist environment. His “distinguished Anglo-Indian” family history was laid out by Barbara Caine with the telling title Bombay to Bloomsbury: A Biography of the Strachey Family (2005). The “Frontispiece” shows a photograph of “Pippa Strachey”, James’ older sister, “in a rickshaw in India, surrounded by her (five barefooted but) liveried rickshawmen”. The insightful book portrays an upper-class British family that had made its fortune in the colonial service in India. Caine recounts how Richard Strachey and his wife, Jane Grant, were married in Calcutta in 1859 and how “the Strachey children in turn grew up in a world dominated by India” (2005, p. 3). The author also states that “Lytton and James, the two younger sons, absolutely rejected the idea of Indian or any other form of imperial service” (2005, p. 4) which,
nonetheless, did not prevent them from becoming members of and having frequent lunches at the highly select “Oriental Club” (2005, p. 6). It is, then, no coincidence that James Strachey’s photography appears on the first page of the last volume of the *Standard Edition* (XXIV), the “Indexes and Bibliographies”, showing him posing “in Egypt, 1933.” An excerpt from a letter written by James Strachey to his future wife and co-translator Alix offers some insight into the personal, translational as well as discursive dynamics of the “Glossary Committee”:

I had a very tiresome hour with Jones & Mrs. Riviere from 2 to 3 today. The little beast (if I may venture so to describe him) is really most irritating. However, I hope I preserved my suavity.—One thing I foresee fairly clearly. Our names will be ousted from the title page all right. Mark my words.

They want to call “das Es” “the Id”. I said I thought everyone would say “the Yidd”. So, Jones said there was no such word in English: “There’s ‘Yiddish’, you know. And in German ‘Jude’. But there is no such word as ‘Yidd’”—“Pardon me doctor, Yidd is a current slang word for Jew.”—“Ah! A slang expression. It cannot be in very widespread use then.”—Simply because that l.b. hasn’t ever heard it. (in Meisel & Kendrick, 1985, p. 83)

With these rather crude examples in mind, the total and largely puzzling absence of a discussion of Orientalism and anti-Semitism in Freud, the most influential twentieth century-voice regarding “Western” conceptualisations of the mind, his psychological writings, and their most disseminated translation, the *SE*, must be characterised as a major blind spot in contemporary critical thought. This study will consider, therefore, not only Freud’s original Orientalist discourse, but equally its continued, if repressed, existence in the most widely distributed (English) translation. To navigate the stormy seas of intertextual and, simultaneously, multilingual interpretation dependable coordinates are required. The meticulous insights of hermeneutics, the theory of interpretation (Ricoeur, 1970) and, with it, of translation theory (Ricoeur, 2004; Steiner, 1975), will provide the necessary methodological compass allowing us to pursue a steady course during a demanding textual crossing. What type of interpretative strategy can we call upon to assist us in determining our route?
In the Judeo-Christian world—Freud’s world—we find two major phases in the development of formal interpretative strategies. The first resides with early biblical exegesis, in its Judaic precedent also known as Midrash, which is based on an in-depth approach to analogy, allegory, and symbolic meaning (Neusner, 1988). This early form of textual analysis proceeds by way of a) the lexical and grammatical deciphering of passages of the sacred scripture, meaning a thorough examination of its sentences, words, and letters, including the blank spaces between them; b) its translation into plain or other languages; and finally c) its contextual and historical explication to arrive at a particular understanding. After Baruch Spinoza (1993) had succeeded to free exegetical work from its sacred referent, the way was open to a more scientific version of what, before him, had been a purely theological path to understanding (interpretatio naturae). The second phase, philosophical hermeneutics, as conceptualised by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1963) in the early nineteenth century, discards the translational element in order to universalise itself. It concentrates instead on grammatical and lexical implications combined with historical and contextual readings to reach its interpretative conclusions. As a result, the “critical interpretation” that is being practised by many Western academics today, leaves behind both the focus on lexical and grammatical study of the text at hand and its translational dimension to dedicate itself exclusively to a streamlined interpretative process unhampered by too many rules. A critical re-evaluation of the development of the theory of understanding from biblical exegesis to philosophical hermeneutics to critical interpretation shows how a severely impoverished notion of textual analysis guides the work of contemporary commentators. Hence, my book proposes to re-emphasise earlier interpretative strategies and, more precisely, to re-integrate the element of translation in the analytical framework.

Any translation begs the question of the principles that determine its procedure. While the art and science of translation commands a long-standing tradition as well as an enormous archive of textual corpus, it stands as a comparatively young discipline little noticed by other linguistic endeavours (Störig, 1963). If the problems that come with the painstaking work of translation have been discussed in a number of ways, two fundamental positions—one particularist, the other universalist—inform the debate to this day. Whereas Martin Luther (1963), by germanising the Bible, brings the text to the reader, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1963), by emphasising the process of understanding
and rejecting Luther’s methods, insists on bringing the reader to the text. Even though Strachey’s translational style situates itself clearly along Lutheran lines, I argue that, in opposition to Luther, Strachey brings Freud into the (British) Empire by operating his own subtle variety of Orientalist discourse. We should, however, remember the fact that Strachey’s particular Translatio Imperii (Bellamy, 1992) was never opposed, but always spurred on by the founder of psychoanalysis. However, psychoanalysis teaches us that it is not enough to consider the conscious linguistic elements of the translational process; the unconscious ones deserve no less attention.

According to Susan Handelman (1981, 1984), psychoanalysis can be understood as a secularised form of Midrash being based on a meticulous process of translation that transposes the distorted language of dreams, symptoms, and neuroses into intelligible, plain text. This tells us that any attempt to translate—to carry over—a text from one language into another, is complicated not only by linguistic problems, but invariably accompanied by what Freud so astutely recognised as the “transference”, meaning the actualisation of unconscious wishes, here on the side of the translator. If Freud’s concept was coined in the context of a clinical situation, it also refers to a more general mode of displacement of affect from one idea or figure to another. Then again, given that James Strachey underwent almost daily psychoanalytical sessions and training with Freud between 1920 and 1922, the term seems appropriate. Overall, the transferential element in Strachey’s translations has been largely ignored, both by his followers, such as the French (Le Lay, 1924) and Danish (Boisen, 1965) translators, and his psychoanalytically informed critics (Bettelheim, 1984; Ornston, 1992). It is in this transferential sense that the long overdue “psychoanalysis of Strachey’s Freud”, as repeatedly called for by Patrick Mahony (1996, 1986), enters the framework of this book.
CHAPTER ONE

Oriental(ist) scenes

This chapter sets out on the horizon of the “Freudian Orient” with the objective to produce a first generic map of its narrative landscapes and their conceptual properties. To form an idea of the varied character of the subject, this chapter will examine various psychoanalytical aspects of an apparently endless proliferation of Orient/s in connection with an equally fast-growing sprawl of literatures around it. The full extent of Freud’s references to the Orient includes other worthy grounds besides his strictly psychological works. For expository purposes, Freud’s personal writings are divided into three parts: first, the early letters (1871–1889), from adolescent to adult; second, the mature correspondence which is increasingly marked by psychoanalytic considerations (1896–1939); and third, two specimen in the form of a) an obituary (1933) and b) a short entry in his late diaries (1939).

We should note that not all of Freud’s published letters are accessible in English today. Be this because of censorship by his heirs, editorial decisions by his publishers, or copyright issues involving his translators, there is a significant gap of published letters in English and German. For example, Freud’s Reisebriefe (Travel Letters) appeared 2002 in the German original, soon followed by Minna Bernays’ letters to and from her brother-in-law (Freud, 2005), and the letters to his
children, Unterdeß halten wir zusammen (Freud, 2010). These sources have remained without translation so far. Or take the letters that were “left out” by editors Anna and Ernst Freud of their father’s exchanges with Fliess (Freud, 1954) and Zweig (Freud, 1968). In order to negotiate the disparity in accessibility between English and German editions of Freud’s correspondence, this study will provide translations of several passages that have not been published in English as yet.

Early letters from the Morgenland

The exact extent of Sigmund Freud’s extraordinarily voluminous correspondence is still to be determined. It has been estimated that he wrote about “10,000–15,000 letters” (Grubrich-Simitis, 1993), which places him in the select company of other octogenarian and uncommonly prolific letter writers such as Voltaire or Goethe. Approximately half of Freud’s letters are kept under lock and key in various institutional and private archives of which around 3,000 have been published so far. The largest single compilation of unpublished letters is safeguarded in the Sigmund Freud Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. to be opened to public scrutiny only after the year 2032. Our familiarisation with the remaining and available correspondence seems indispensable if we are to make any claims for a comprehensive documentation of the “Freudian Orient”. Freud’s early letters are also his earliest writings and, therefore, of distinct significance for our enquiry. There are three small and yet quite substantial collections of Freud’s early letters which are accessible to us today: (1) those he exchanged with his friend and co-student Eduard Silberstein between 1871 and 1881; (2) those he penned down for Emil Fluss, a friend from his native Freiberg, 1872 to 1874; and (3) those he wrote to his fiancée and later wife Martha Bernays between 1882 and 1886. Together they cover the period from Freud’s fifteenth to his thirtieth year. In what follows, we will examine several brief extracts found in Freud’s early letters, which include direct and indirect references to the Orient. The sheer amount of materials makes it necessary to select from among the most characteristic examples. Our immediate objective is to assess the wider horizon this particular cultural landscape occupied in the imaginary geography of Freud’s emerging representational universe. The world we enter with his early letters offers unexpected literary treasures and, more importantly, the rare opportunity to read Freud as adolescent and to observe him in the
process of crafting a self and an identity. This process of playful/painful self-invention is perceptible in the passage where Freud confesses his hesitance to approach a young woman, Gisela Fluss, he had fallen in love with during the first summer vacation he spent in his birthplace Freiberg in 1871. From early August to mid September 1872, Freud stayed once more in Freiberg as a guest of the Fluss family. On August 17, in a letter to Eduard Silberstein, Freud makes his first reference to the Orient—in Spanish:

Knowing my character, Your Honor will rightly think that instead of approaching her I have held back, and nobody, not even she, knows anymore about it than His Majesty, the king of the Turks. (Freud, 1990, p. 12)

(...), Vm, considerando mi carácter propio, se imaginará con razon que en vez de avicinarme me he alejado de ella y nadie, ni ella misma siquiera, sabe de eso mas que su majestad el Rey de los Turcos. (Freud, 1989, p. 17)

Freud’s words depict Gisela Fluss, the true muse behind his “Screen Memories” (1899a), as an unsuspecting young woman, and caricature the Ottoman Sultan as too far and removed from all knowledge. Only he, Sigmund, knows what Gisela and “the king of the Turks” must ignore. But there is more than youthful narcissism. In this instance Freud combines two images, the desirable (Gisela) and the once threatening now turned comical (king of Turks). It is of major psychoanalytical interest that this earliest Oriental scene already exhibits both erotic and aggressive traits. At the same time, we should remember that the Turks stood for centuries as Austro-Hungary’s immediate neighbour and imperial rival. The deep imprint Ottoman armies left on the Austrian imagination, in particular the siege of Vienna (1529) and the battle that took place on its outskirts (1683) add Turkish flavour to Freud’s literary crusade. Popular eighteenth-century Austrian representations of “Turks” often carry this sense of ambivalence that found sublime expression in Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s 1789-opera The Abduction from the Serail. Mozart was perceptive enough to see through the contradictory pleasures of an audience entertained by comical and disparaging images of Turks. Taking the Austrians and their Emperor by complete surprise, Mozart reverses the old stereotype of the Oriental despot in his liberal portrayal of Selim Pasha and delivers a striking anti-imperialist
critique in the Sultan’s display of benevolence (Head, 2000, p. 35; see also Grosrichard, 1979).

Not long after his return from the summer vacations in Moravia, Sigmund Freud entered a brief and sporadic exchange of letters with Emil Fluss, Gisela’s older brother. Writing in a humorous tone, Freud airs his complaints about Gisela’s “masquerade”, her playfully fencing off his youthful affection, and how the whole affair was made of more irony, and even mocking, then anything else. In his letter of September 28, 1872, Freud demands Emil to reveal his sister’s “jokes” in disguise to Freiberg’s upper classes. This is followed by a highly problematic juxtaposition:

Lift the veil of secrecy over the 8–16 Russians, Turks, and Tartars and show the high society of Freiberg our familiar faces. (Freud, 1970a, p. 772 [translated for this edition])

Lüften Sie den geheimnisvollen Schleier, der über den 8–16 Russen, Türken, und Tartaren ruht und zeigen Sie der Crème von Freiberg unsere bekannten Gesichter. (Freud, 1970a, p. 772)

The constitutive elements of Freud’s tragicomically comparison pose, on the one hand, questions about identity, in terms of both class and ethnicity. On the other hand, these become enmeshed in his line-up of Orientals which, interestingly, includes not only Ottoman but Russian subjects as well. More specifically, the desire to “unveil” has long been a basic feature in western imaginings of an eroticised, forbidden Orient, which must be visually penetrated and pan-optically dominated (Alloula, 1986). Freud’s approximate grouping of “8–16 Russian, Turks, and Tartars” suggests an ethnic and racial distinction, if not a bold face-off, between the alien (Orientals) and the known (Freibergers), between assumed Eastern Orientals and alleged Western Jews. Context for this puzzling line, or at least a hint thereof, is found in an earlier letter where Freud speaks in veiled anti-Semitic terms of a Jewish mother—“Madame Jewess”—and her children whom he encountered on his return trip to Vienna (Freud, 1969; for letter excerpt see Appendix 5). Freud’s anti-Semitic streak suggests a conflict of ambivalence and points to the phenomenon of “Jewish self-hatred”, a topic Sander Gilman (1986) has discussed at length.

A third sample, embedded in a fast-running account that includes Freud’s review of the staging of Shakespeares’ Othello, Schiller’s
Die Räuber, and Wilbrandt’s Grachus, der Volkstribun as well as other official events taking place in Vienna at the time, shows him inserting another reference to an Oriental monarch in his letter of August 2, 1873:

The Shah arrived yesterday, but he is a boring brute and leaves me indifferent. (Freud, 1990, p. 29)

Der Schah ist gestern angekommen, allein er ist eine langweilige Bestie und mir ganz gleichgültig. (Freud, 1989, p. 36)

Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar, the Shah of Persia (1831–1896), arrived in Vienna on August 1, 1873, to visit the “Weltausstellung” (Universal Exhibition) that had opened in May (Çelik, 1992, p. 36). Yet, for how demonstratively Freud is professing his indifference to the dictatorial ruler, his sister Anna’s memoires tell a somewhat different and more involved story in which the concerns of the Exhibition and visiting foreigners are brought right into the Freud household. Commenting in her Erinnerungen (Reminiscences) on the world fair, she recounts how in the days running up to the anticipated event the city of Vienna asked its citizens to rent out their apartments and houses to foreign visitors. This is what Freud’s father Jacob soon undertook with the intention to generate some extra income and, what was even more enticing, to get the whole family to the country side for the remainder of the summer. Anna Freud-Bernays clearly remembered the day when an “oriental potentate” arrived so as to take a look at the Freud apartment and, immediately enthusiastic about its “tidy” appearance, decided to rent it (2004, pp. 217–218). But things took a different turn. In mid-May, the Vienna Stock Exchange crashed, resulting in immediate economic hardship and raging anti-Semitism. In June, parts of the town were flooded by the Danube and by the month of July a serious cholera epidemic had taken hold of the Austrian capital. In all, the expected invasion of visitors from abroad did not materialise and the Vienna Universal Exhibition ended in large debt. That year, the Freuds did not go to the country side and Sigmund spent a hot, humid, and dangerously unhealthy summer in the city of Vienna instead of enjoying himself walking up to “paradise” in Hochwald, or meeting the “Ichtosaurus” (nickname for Gisela Fluss) in Freiberg.

More than a year and a half later and still centred on his fateful encounter with Gisela Fluss, Freud writes a letter in which he is dismissive of “her charms”. He makes an attempt at de-dramatising the
profound impact the young woman had on his libidinal economy and, in a literary allusion of January 17, 1875, compares Gisela negatively to a fictional character from the Orient:

Strip her of her lures, her artifices, her serpentine wiles, and her charms; she is still far from being Armida. (Freud, 1990, p. 83)

“Armida” is the stunning, if pitiful, beauty caught between Muslim and Christian worlds in Torquato Tasso’s 1574-epic *Gerusalemme Liberata* (Jerusalem Delivered). The enchanting daughter of Arbilan, Caliph of Damascus, Armida was so well endowed by nature, “she surpassed the most beautiful women of the East”. She was brought up by her uncle, a learned but evil man who made her into a powerful sorceress. On the First Crusade, launched in 1095 by Pope Urbano II, the crusaders laid siege to the city of Jerusalem. Armida, who made a formidable foe, was sent to the camp of the Christians to bring into disarray their plans for the attack and conquest of the city. Although dispatched to assist the Saracens in their battle against the crusaders, she converts to the Christian faith when she falls in love with a Christian knight (Segler-Messner, 2008). Freud is right: Gisela is no “Armida”. She is Jewish, she did not convert to the Christian faith, and in the summer of 1872 she did not fall in love with a Christian—or a Jewish—knight. Freud’s comical and pejorative representations are, again, merely different incarnations of the same erotic and aggressive traits we have noticed earlier.

These rather evident uses of Oriental rulers and peoples aside, I want to return to a less evident aspect of the Freud-Silberstein correspondence: the “Spanish”. Most notably, of the seventy letters Freud wrote to Silberstein, thirteen are partially, and twenty-two entirely, in Spanish. Sigmund and Eduard had secretly resolved to learn Spanish together and, thus inspired, maintained a vivid Castilian correspondence reminiscent of some of the characteristics of sixteenth century Spanish literature and, especially, of its perhaps most complex representative, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (1547–1616). In creating their own *Academia Castellana* they took on the roles of two conversing dogs in the hospital of Valladolid and from there on signed their respective correspondence with “Berganza” (Silberstein) and “Cipion” (Freud)—protagonists of *El Coloquio de los perros* in the concluding episode of Cervantes’
Novelas Ejemplares (1994). It has been pointed out that the Academia was a precursor to the Mittwochs-Gesellschaft (Wednesday Society) Freud founded several decades later (Gedo & Wolf, 1970, p. 787). Others have remarked how the canine colloquium, Cipion’s active and even interventionist listening to Braganza’s life-story, anticipates the nucleus of the psychoanalytical enterprise and can, therefore, be understood as “Braganza’s case story” (Vranich, 1976, p. 75; see also Riley, 1993; Grinberg & Rodriguez, 1988; Timms, 1983).

No less significant than these close, if embryonic, connections is a broader aspect of Freud’s passionate reception of Cervantes, which apparently has gone unnoticed so far. This study suggests that learning Spanish, reading Cervantes, and exploring the world of Moorish Spain allowed Freud and Silberstein to locate positive models for the making of an empowered Jewish self-image in times of ever more aggressive expressions of anti-Semitism surrounding them. Constructing their own “private mythology” resided then not only in identifying with two Spanish “dogs”, members of a distinct under-class, but also in furnishing their epistolary day-dreams with Cervantine sensibilities. Moorish Spain becomes vehicle for the mythical account of one of the most successful episodes in the history of the Jewish Diaspora, the Sefardies. In his Orientalism and the Jews of the Mediterranean, Michael Schröter (1994) explains how, after French Revolution and Emancipation, Sephardic (“Spanish”) Jews were idealised by “Western Jews” as more aristocratic than Ashkenazi (“German”) Jews. Their imputed aristocracy being based on the idea of an age-old, highly successful Jewish Diaspora with networks extending all across the Mediterranean; they lived under tolerant Arab-Muslim regimes as independent and self-ruled communities, fully integrated to their respective cultural environments while at the same time preserving their ethnic and spiritual identity as Jews. It is part of Schröters’ argument that this idealisation of fifteenth century Sephardic Jews by nineteenth century Western Jews went hand in hand with the “Orientalisation” of the former (Schröter, 1994, p. 189) enabling Freud’s and Silberstein’s constructions of a positive Jewry and a pro-Semitic Orient.

One unmistakable indication of Freud’s strong desire to delve into Moorish Spain can be deciphered from his repeatedly signing letters with an erroneous series of sigla, “p.e.e.h.d.S.” (Freud, 1989, p. 119), meaning “perro en el hospital de Sevilla” (dog in the Hospital of Seville; 1990, p. 105). The dogs of Mahudes, however, are talking to each other
in the hospital of Valladolid (Castilla León), located in central Spain, and they are recounting the many owners and adventures Braganza had known in the town of Seville (Andalucia) which is found in southern Spain (Cervantes, 1994, p. 895; see the abbreviated letters visible in the lower part of Sancha’s engraving “FS.GE.VA.”; the last two letters indicate the locality of the hospital in Valladolid). Following Eissler (1971, p. 528), Gedo and Wolf argue the Academia Castellana was “the only symptomatic product” Freud ever created which may “reveal more about his central conflicts than his mature works” (1973, p. 303). And yet, they never make plain to which central conflicts this symptomatic product might pertain and it is thus in their playing down any hint of anti-Jewish attitudes in Freud’s early letters that our suspicions are substantiated. Freud’s learning “Spanish”, his reading of the Quijote, and his “symptomatic products” should be understood in the context of his efforts to develop a positive, empowering Jewish identity in response to his traumatising experiences of anti-Semitism in late nineteenth-century Austria.

An entire decade later, Freud’s passionate embrace of Cervantes still holds, now flowing over into the fast augmenting correspondence with his fiancée Martha Bernays in Hamburg. Demonstrating a less dichotomous and increasingly differentiated awareness, Freud’s Orient appears more complicated than ever. Although he was no postcolonial, in one of many letters bursting with Spanish subject matter he reminds her of Cervantes’ rare abilities in dealing with the Orient. In stark contrast to earlier readings, then, here he provides an element for the literary critique of Orientalist discourse by unfolding a scene of the Quijote.

On August 23, 1883, Sigmund writes to Martha:

This picture is really of a marvelous absurdity and a splendid contribution toward dispelling all the romantic nonsense about chivalry. He succeeds too with the Oriental scenes, the strange and grandiose architecture, also with the harshness of nature in the dark mountains; and he is good wherever the text lends itself to caricature, for instance when the ghosts bewitch the knight and lock him up. (Freud, 1960, p. 46)

Das Bild ist von einer prachtvollen Lächerlichkeit und hilft trefflich mit, den Unsinn der Ritterromantik zu vernichten. Auch die orientalischen Szenen gelingen ihm, das Seltsame und Großartige der Architektonik, auch die Schroffheit der Natur im schwarzen
Freud emphasises that Cervantes retains his mastery even with the more difficult “Oriental scenes” which are handled by most other authors in essentialist and reductive ways. At this point, Freud is suggesting a more mature and clearly more critical reading than the comical and/or disparaging representations we have followed so far. Cervantes’ scrupulous use of the Oriental motif unfolds differently from many of his contemporaries in that it does not fall into “Orientalism proper” to use the words of John MacKenzie (1995, p. 26). It does not pursue the reproduction of clear-cut binaries and evokes the period of peaceful coexistence under the Cordoban Caliphate instead, avoiding in this way “the clash of civilizations of the post-Andalusian Age” (Majid, 2004). In his original essay, E. C. Graf lays out the centrifugal rather than eurocentric character of “Cervantes’ interpellation of early modern Spanish Orientalism” (1999). Julia Kushigian’s pioneering study Orientalism in the Hispanic Literary Tradition even contends that “Hispanic Orientalism” at large, and not just Cervantes alone, involves a blending of oppositions rather than being conceived in strictly binary terms (Kushigian, 1991, p. 3).

Accordingly, Antonio Medina interprets the Quijote as a “symbol of hybridity” and reflects on “Cervantes’ great respect for the Muslim other”, which he acquired during the five years he was held as a prisoner-hostage of Aziz Pasha, the commander of Oran and Algiers (2005, p. 15). At the same time, Michael McGaha identifies an intricate fabric of “hidden Jewish meaning in Don Quijote” and does not ignore the inveterate speculations surrounding the Manchegan knight’s confessional status as “nuevo cristiano” or New Christian, which refer us back to Cervantes’ own Christian pedigree suggesting he was part Jewish as his second last-name “Saavedra” is traced to Sephardic origins (2004, p. 178). Maybe now we can begin to imagine how Freud absorbed Cervantes’ “long lament”, the mournful commentary on the passing of a tolerant, pluralist, and multi-cultural Spain (Madariaga, 1967) in an ever more polarised and anti-Semitic Austro-Hungarian Empire. Not long after the previous letter, Freud addressed his fiancée with a burning question: “What can it be that you want and do not dare to mention?” He bids his “princess” to let him fulfill her wishes, to be
her knight who is crusading for her affection alone. And on September 8, 1883, he asks Martha:

What on earth can it be, then? A tooth out of the Caliph’s jaw, a jewel from Queen Victoria’s Crown, a giant’s autograph, or something equally fantastic which would mean putting on my armor at once and setting out for the Orient? (Freud, 1960, p. 55; my emphasis)

Was kann es denn sein? Ein Zahn aus dem Kiefer des Kalifen, ein Kleinod aus der Krone der Königin Viktoria, ein Autograph eines Riesen, oder sonst was Phantastisches, was meine sofortige Bewaffnung und Abreise nach dem Morgenland nach sich ziehen muß?

(Freud, 1968a, p. 61)

Although Freud’s days of adolescence were long gone, we instantly recognise the erotic/aggressive signature in pulling a tooth from the Caliph’s jaw (castration), wresting a jewel from Queen Victoria’s crown (defloration), and “putting on his armor” (narcissism) in preparation for his “setting out for the Orient” in the fashion of crusaders (aggression). Clad in perfect irony, Freud employs the term “Morgenland”, older German usage for the Orient, meaning “land of the morning” (rising sun). The word was first introduced in 1543 by Martin Luther’s Bible translation. Luther renders “anatolon” (ἀνατολῶν, the Greek term for “Eastern regions”), taken from a passage in Matthew II: 1, as “The Wise Men from the Orient” (Die Weisen aus dem Morgenland). “Morgenland” also operates as the antonym of “Abendland”, or “land of the evening” (setting sun), which is another name for the West. In German, “Morgenland” designates an Orient incessantly appropriated by so many Western adventurers, from intrepid crusaders to ambitious Orientalists (Goer, 2007). Mirroring the founding of “Oriental Societies” in London, Paris, Calcutta, and elsewhere, the German Empire inaugurated its Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft (DMG) in 1847.

In spite of Freud’s frequent excursions into “Ottoman”, “Spanish”, “German”, or otherwise “fantastic” landscapes, his concept of the Orient was not just literary as we will see. The postcard he sent Eduard Silberstein on January 23, 1879, from his second call to military exercises with the K.u.K. army, this time in the recently occupied, and formerly Ottoman-controlled, Balkan-province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, confirms this. Surprisingly, both his most noted biographers Ernest Jones (1981), who had direct access to Freud, as well as Peter Gay (1988), who knew of
the Freud-Silberstein-correspondence, make no mention of the military expedition to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Were it not for the shortest postcard in the Freud-Silberstein correspondence we might never have come to know about Freud’s tour through the Bosnian Orient. Moreover, the omission of this uniquely significant item in the English edition constitutes a veritable lacuna. We, therefore, insert here our own translation of the German text the twenty-three-year-old reservist sent to his friend Silberstein from the Bosnian town of Klevce. Klevce is located close to the Dalmatian (Adriatic) coast and hosted then a large Austro-Hungarian military detachment. Freud maps out his military itinerary in a breath-taking sequence:

I marched across all of Bosnia along the rectangle Brod-Sarajevo- Rogatica, thereafter Sarajevo-Neretva, then the Herzegovina route Konjica-Mostar-Metcovich and vegetate, with exception of a little fever, quite well. (Freud, 1989, pp. 194–195; my translation)


It is winter in difficult, mountainous terrain, the roads are found to be in the worst of conditions and the climate is getting harsher. The North-South route Freud describes from Brod on the Slovenian-Bosnian border to Metcovich on the Herzegovian-Croatian border, including the additional marches that led them further East to Rogatica and along the Neredva-river, covers approximately 750–800 kilometers. In spite of Freud’s youth and general good health this forced march was an extremely demanding, most probably unpleasant and, at times, a rather numbing (“vegetate”) experience. In the rough company of soldiers, rudimentary living, infectious diseases, physical exertion and an unforgiving military discipline young Freud could only endure. While his first military service in the previous year had taken place in Prettau, a peaceful garrison-town by the Drau-river close to Hungary, the second round in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not without real and present danger. International treaties signed at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 resulted in the re-drawing of Austro-Hungarian as well as Ottoman borders. One of the newly drawn maps involved the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, a little further to the South-East, the Sandchak and
Novi Pazar, territories which had for a long time been governed by the Ottoman Empire, to Austro-Hungarian territory. The supposedly uncomplicated take-over proved significantly more difficult than had been anticipated. Austro-Hungarian generals expected to establish control over this part of the Balkans without major incidents only to bring the many advantages of modern Empire to a (supposedly) welcoming population. Conditions in situ, however, soon exposed the seemingly simple change of administration as a military debacle putting into evidence the stiff resistance of Bosnian Muslims under Hadschi Loja and the entirely insufficient preparations made by the Austrian military. Freud’s march through Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of a larger plan intended to provide reinforcements, especially of pioneers and infantry, to severely depleted regular troops (Maciejewski, 2008, pp. 165–173; Boehlich, 1989, pp. 242–244).

The Austro-Hungarian Army, including the 5th Reserve Company in which Freud served, thus brought the Orient home by way of occupation (the annexation followed in 1908). With the markers of Islamic history and Ottoman architecture visible everywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the first time in his life Freud experienced Muslim people and culture—complete with veiled women, turbaned men, mosques and minarets, all of which conserved the “Oriental” character of the region (for a photographic diary of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina see Friedrichsmeier, 1999). While, according to Said, the discourse of Orientalism posits a clear-cut, ontological distinction between East and West, “the discourse of the Balkans”, K. E. Fleming remarks, “is one both of sameness and of difference” (2000, p. 2; for a discussion of the relationship between Orientalism and Balkanism see Todorova, 1997; Bakic-Hayden, 1995; Bakic-Hayden & Hayden, 1992; Bjelic & Savic, 2002). Both self and other, Bosnia-Herzegovina soon came under the sway of what Andre Gingrich, in the specific context of the Austrian-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, quite appropriately coined as “Frontier Orientalism”. He critiques Said’s Orientalism as “too wide and unspecific” and proposes a more differentiated picture by arguing that “the Bosnian serves as a paradigm for the ‘good Muslim (Oriental)’, whereas the Turk is the ‘bad Muslim’ and prototype of the Oriental” (Gingrich, 1996, p. 2). Gingrich’s concept gains even more currency in the attempt to explain Freud’s insistence to identify Bosnian Muslims as “Turks” which he did in The Psychical Mechanism of Forgetfulness (1898b, p. 292) and in The Psychopathology of
Everyday Life (1901b, p. 3). Freud’s repeated mismatch corresponds, in Maciejewski’s perceptive view, to the need for maintaining “a pattern of oriental and ethnic otherness” leading him to ask the postcolonial question of Freud’s own investment in “Orientalism” (2008, p. 167)—yet, and unfortunately, without further engaging in the topic.

This being said, both the experience and the “landscape” of his military service in the Austro-Hungarian campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina must have impressed the young Freud enough to return to the region two decades later, September 1–9, 1898. This time, however, he came as a tourist and now in the company of his wife Martha, as we read in the Reisebriefe (Travel Letters), which are still to be translated into English (Freud, 2002a, pp. 111–115). One rather original attempt at interpretation ties Freud’s military march through Bosnia-Herzegovina (the conquest of two countries) to his bond(s) with Martha and Minna Bernays (the conquest of two sisters), and these in turn to his relationships of love/hate with his mother Amalie Freud and his nanny Resi Wittek (the conquest of two mothers) (Maciejewski, 2008, p. 175). Similarly, imaginative approaches to Freud’s time in the military and his experience of the Bosnian Orient on the ground are of invaluable significance for any insight into the Freudian “Orient” (Heuberger, 2001, pp. 33–38).

Freud’s earliest Orients, as we have shown, are inhabited by Ottoman rulers and peoples, by crusaders and Saracens, by Cervantes’ Moors, Jews, and Christians. We have traced the Germanic Morgenland (Orient) from Martin Luther’s three Magi to the DMG (Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft) and witnessed how Freud toiled though the trenches of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian frontier. Along this uneven, often obstructed path and especially after his early encounter with Cervantes, we followed Freud’s increasingly critical readings of an orientalised Orient and encountered, time and time again, the basic psychological characteristics of Freud’s own Besetzung (occupation): narcissism (self-love), self-hatred, and a fundamental ambivalence.

The cure of the soul and the East

After reading Freud’s letters before psychoanalysis, the present section affords an opportunity to look at his correspondence from 1896 onwards—the year when he coined the term “Psychoanalyse”. The letters Freud wrote to various members of his extended family, to friends and colleagues, not counting the enormous amount of communications
he exchanged over time with a wide variety of individuals and institutions at home and abroad, are of such a large volume that only a minimal perusal can be offered here. The present overview includes samples from Freud’s most enduring and significant epistolary exchanges. We have already gained an impression of the Orient as it unfolds in Freud’s early letters to friends and fiancée. This section will study its ongoing development in the correspondence Freud maintained with several confidants who accompanied the founding of psychoanalysis as Wilhelm Fliess, Karl Abraham, Carl Gustav Jung, Max Eitingon, Sandor Ferenczi, Ernest Jones, and Arnold Zweig.

To begin with, we must inform the reader that the research into Freud’s published letters found evidence not merely of the “Orient” but even more so of its suppression. This study will provide an in-depth analysis of this particular finding further below. Here, we simply want to highlight the fact that publications of Freud’s correspondence edited by his children Anna and Ernst Freud show the marks of strong censorial concerns to protect the anonymity of third persons, the family’s privacy, and their father’s image. They might have been unaware of the fact that their representational politics produced an insistent erasure of the “Orient” which, for whatever reasons, they or their translators regularly replaced with the “East”. This seemingly insignificant shift away from Freud’s cultural-discursive, German “Orient” to the much more geo-strategic, British “East” authorised by his heirs is of no little consequence. They might have been guided by their father’s rather liberal and generous treatment of translators. Whatever the possible motives behind their editorial decisions may have been, these cannot be grasped in isolation from the influence of the “Glossary Committee” which included Ernest Jones, Freud’s “governor” in England, as well as Freud’s translators Joan Riviere and James and Alix Strachey. By reproducing both the English translation and the German original, we can trace the suppression in each instance. We will begin with a letter to Wilhelm Fliess that was included only in a second, extended edition “controversially” rearranged by Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Freud, 1985a) who had formulated some highly critical questions of Anna Freud’s (Freud, 1954) earlier editorial selection.

Wilhelm Fliess (1858–1928), a German otolaryngologist who practised in Berlin, was perhaps Freud’s dearest friend. Irreplaceable interlocutor in the early development of psychoanalysis and direct witness of the writing of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) from 1887 to 1904
he maintained a very intensive friendship and correspondence with the little known Viennese neurologist and later psychoanalyst. They would meet once in a while on self-arranged “congresses” filling their letters in the meantime with scientific projects and mutual affection. On January 24, 1897, Freud announces to Fliess:

I am toying with the idea that in the perversions, of which hysteria is the negative, we may have the remnants of a primitive sexual cult, which in the Semitic east [sic] may once have been a religion. (Moloch, Astarte) … (1954, p. 189)

Ich bin einer Idee nahe, als hätte man in den Perversionen, deren Negativ die Hysterie ist, einen Rest eines uralten Sexalkultus vor sich, der einmal vielleicht noch im semitischen Orient (Moloch, Astarte) Religion war. (1999, p. 240)

Moloch and Astarte are pagan gods of pre-Mosaic antiquity. Moloch, or Molech, whose name is derived from Melech (מלך, Hebrew for “king”) and the interposing vowels of Bosheth (בושת, “shame”) was one of the deities worshipped by idolatrous Israelites. Moloch went by many names including Ba’al, Chemosh, Apis Bull, Golden Calf, or Amun Ra. Baal Moloch was conceived in the form of a calf or an ox or depicted as man with the head of a bull. In the Bible referred to as “the abomination of Ammon” (Kings, 11:7), the primary means of worshipping him appears to have been “child sacrifice” and “passing through fire”. The laws given to Moses by God expressly forbade the Jews to do what was done in Egypt and Canaan: “You shalt not give any of your children to devote them by fire to Moloch, and so profane the name of your God” (Leviticus, 18:21). Astarte (from the Greek Ἀστήρη) is the name of an ancient goddess known from Northwestern Semitic regions. Her widely revered appellation corresponds to both the Mesopotamian Ishtar and, among Phoenicians and Hebrews, to Ashtoreth. Long associated with fertility, sexuality, and war, her symbols were the lion, the sphinx, and a star within a circle indicating the planet Venus. Pictorial representations often show her naked. Herodotus describes in his Histories, Book 1.105 (1998), how the religious community of Aphrodite (Ashtoreth) originated with the Phoenicians who had built the world’s largest temple to “the Queen of Heavens” in one of their cities.

Moloch and Astarte are more than simple requisites for Freud’s learned, scientific Orientalist discourse where they are employed with
the purpose to illustrate a particular aspect of psychoanalytic enquiry. At the same time, to associate a “Semitic Orient” with “the perversions” may in fact reflect the internalisation of a deeper anti-Semitic current especially as this is achieved by considering “the remnants of a primitive sexual cult” in times when anti-Semites in Austria and elsewhere resort again to accusing Jews of ritual “child murder” (Decker, 1991, p. 84; Arkel, 1966, pp. 14–34). Also, the logical implications of Freud’s idea tacitly posit an “Aryan Orient”—which had been located by British and German scholars in India (Ballantyne, 2002; Murti, 2001; Schwab, 1984)—vis-à-vis a “Semitic Orient” resulting in the fateful coupling of Orientalist knowledge with anti-Semitic prejudice (Hess, 2000).

The “best pupil” among Freud’s loyal followers was Karl Abraham (1877–1925) who worked as a psychoanalyst in Berlin. Freud and Abraham shared great interest in the fields of anthropology, archaeology and, increasingly, in the psychoanalytic appropriation of Pharaonic Egypt. The founder of psychoanalysis repeatedly encouraged Abraham to make the connection between recent archaeological revelations from the “ancient Orient” and the revolutionary insights offered by psychoanalysis—then a science in the making. Freud’s orientations found the desired response in Abraham’s 1912-essay *Amenhotep IV (Echnaton) Psychoanalytic Contributions to the Understanding of his Personality and the Monotheistic Aton-Cult* (Psychoanalytische Beiträge zum Verständnis seiner Persönlichkeit und des monotheistischen Aton-Kultes) (1982, pp. 349–379). It was published well before Freud’s first Moses study (1914b) and anticipated fundamental elements of his final work *Moses and Monotheism* (1939a). In his letter of March 1, 1908, Freud is, however, less preoccupied with Egypt or Akhenaten and completely absorbed by the consequential interpretations made by German Assyriologists of Panbabylonian persuasion and their illustrative potential for psychoanalysis:

> But I think you ought to take a good look at the astral meaning of myths, which now, since the discoveries of Winckler (Jeremias, Stucken) about the ancient oriental world system, can no longer be ignored. We were confronted with the same task. Apart from that, I believe there is room for a psychological explanation, because, after all, the ancients only projected their phantasies onto the sky. (Freud, 2002b, p. 30)
Ich meine aber, Sie müßten sich mit der astralen Bedeutung der
Mythen auseinandersetzen, die man heute seit den Aufdeckungen
von Winckler (Jeremias, Stucken) über das altorientalische Welt-
system nicht mehr beiseite lassen kann … Wir fanden dieselbe
Aufgabe vor uns. Ich meine, es ist daneben Raum für eine psy-
chologische Erklärung, denn schließlich haben die Alt [-Oriental]
en doch nur ihre Phantasien an den Himmel projiziert. (Freud,
1980, p. 42)

“Winckler, Jeremias, Stucken” are the names of three German Assyrio-
logists who became the protagonists of a sea change in the way the
“ancient Orient” would be conceptualised after them. Assyriology,
the linguistic, historical and archaeological study of Mesopotamia and
its neighbouring cultures began with the method for correctly deci-
phering a particular form of cuneiform script. Inspired by the sensa-
tional archaeological discovery of a large stele in the acropolis of Susa
(now Iran) inscribed with a Babylonian version of the flood myth that
showed astonishing similarities to the flood myth known from the Old
Testament (Genesis), all three promoted “Panbabylonism”. Panbabyl-
nism was a school of thought within Assyriology and religious studies,
which considered the Hebrew Bible and Judaism as directly derived
from Babylonian culture and mythology (Holloway, 2007; Thompson,
2004; Marchand, 2001; and for specific reference to Freud’s fascination
with Mesopotamian culture and history see Bohrer, 2003).

Hugo Winckler (1863–1913), a German archaeologist and cuneiform
philologist who translated the *Amarna Letters* (1898) and the *Hammurabi
Codex* (1904), discovered the capital of the Hittite Empire in Bogazkale
(now Turkey) in 1906 and is considered as “the founder of Panbaby-
lonism”. Alfred Jeremias (1864–1935), an early Assyriologist who was
known for his expertise in the religions of the Ancient Near East pre-
sented the first German translation of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* in 1891.
He became a strong supporter of Winckler’s work and thereby one
of the most prominent advocates of Panbabylonism. Eduard Stucken
(1865–1936), a German dramatist and author, published a comprehen-
sive scientific treaty entitled *Astralmythen* (Astral Myths) in 1896. It
explored the impact of stellar constellations on the myths of Babylon-
i ans, Hebrews, and Egyptians developing the so-called “astral-mythical
school”. The Star-Myth movement and the Panbabylonists affected
each other mutually. The Star-Myth movement was the earlier of the
two and the Panbabylonian movement arose from within its ranks. Especially Winckler and Jeremias proved highly instrumental in the ongoing battle for the establishment of Panbabylonism and the backing of its most controversial proponent, the German Assyriologist Friedrich Delitzsch (1850–1922), under who both had studied at the University of Leipzig. The contentious lectures Delitzsch delivered in 1902 and 1904, with Emperor Wilhelm II in attendance, unleashed the “Babel-Bible-controversy” which argued, “the Old Testament was little more than transcribed Assyrian wisdom”. Delitzsch, whose Jewish father had converted to Christianity, emphasised the anti-biblical element of Assyriology by adding a blatantly anti-Semitic interpretation (Delitzsch, 1903; see Surburg, 1983 for more on “The Two Delitzsches”, father and son). In spite of its ardent followers, the fundamental tenets of Panbabylonism were eventually dismissed as “pseudoscientific”.

Freud’s strong interest in Assyriology, an anti-biblical Orient, and its undermining (revisionist) potential vis-à-vis biblical studies found expression when he delivered a lecture entitled “Hammurabi, the ancient codifier” to members of the Vienna B’nai B’rith, a Jewish humanist association, in 1904. Hammurabi was king of Babylon; he ruled from 1796 BC to 1750 BC. Discovered in 1901 and housed in the Musée du Louvre, Paris, a black, shiny stele shows dense alignments of cuneiform inscriptions that, taken together, promulgate 282 laws and corresponding punishments. According to one witness, Freud’s talk “elevated Hammurabi at the expense of Moses” and, to the dismay of some, “was entirely in the spirit of Delitzsch” (Grinwald, 2004, pp. 2–3; Yarushelmi, 1991, p. 23; Klein, 1985, pp. 159–160). Unfortunately, the original text of Freud’s lecture has not survived. In spite of the difficulties to corroborate its precise content, it could be argued that the Panbabylonist excursion made it possible for Freud to think of radically different origins for Moses, the Ten Commandments, Judaism, and monotheism, which remained outside of the traditional, biblical explanations. This is then the moment when fundamental ideas that would eventually resurface in his Moses and Monotheism (1939a), Freud’s final word on anti-Semitism and the “Jewish question”, began a thirty-five-year long process of conceptual incubation.

A different kind of Orient, now more biblical than anti-biblical, we encounter in Freud’s correspondence with C. G. Jung. Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961), a young psychiatrist from Küsnacht, Switzerland, appeared to be one of Freud’s most promising students and colleagues.
He combined a perceptive intellectual grasp of psychoanalytical issues with the valuable clinical experience gained at the Burghölzli, a psychiatric hospital near Zurich. Both Freud and Jung were eager to employ archaeological as well as Orientalist materials for the illustration of the workings of psychoanalysis. Later in his career, Jung put increasing emphasis on the “East” for explanatory purposes of his own “Analyse”. He eventually dedicated large part of his time to the psychological study of Oriental wisdom as we read it in his Psychology of the East (1978), which established him as the foremost Orientalist among psychiatrists. This is precisely what Luis Gomez argues in his Oriental Wisdom and the Cure of the Souls: Jung and the Indian East (1995, pp. 195–250), which inspired the title for the present section. Back to the biblical Orient, on January 17, 1909, Freud declares to his designated successor:

We are certainly getting ahead: if I am Moses, then you are Joshua and will take possession of the promised land of psychiatry, which I shall only be able to glimpse from afar. (Freud, 1974, pp. 196–197).

So kommen wir doch unzweifelhaft vorwärts, und Sie werden als Joshua, wenn ich der Moses bin, das gelobte Land der Psychatrie, das ich nur aus der Ferne erschauen darf, in Besitz nehmen. (Freud, 2001, p. 93)

Jung was born into a Lutheran family and from an anti-Semitic and “Orientalist” point of view Freud’s biblical metaphor gave him the role of an orientalised figure from the Old Testament turning him into a Jew called “Joshua”. An additional nuance we should mention was lost in translation. Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull, the English-language translators of The Freud-Jung Letters (1974), reverse the order of appearance that was so discretely chosen by the writer. Their version eliminates Freud’s diplomatic advance and puts Moses first who is then followed by Joshua instead of the other way around which makes the metaphor and its inventor sound decidedly more egocentric. Nevertheless, although Freud had intended to be complementing, it did not prevent their first fall-out six months later when taking a walk in New York’s Central Park where Jung spoke to Freud in regards to “Jews and Aryans” and on the differences that obtain between them (Rosenzweig, 1994, pp. 61–67; for a discussion of the “lingering shadows” of Jung’s anti-Semitism see Maidenbaum & Martin, 1991). The experience must have been all the more disappointing for Freud considering his fears
psychoanalysis might be misconstrued as a “Jewish science”, according to Jung’s coinage, in view of the fact that, at that time, most of his followers and many of his patients were Jewish which, some say, determined Jung’s election as the first president of the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1911 (Yerushelmi, 1991, pp. 48–50; Frosh, 2008, p. 2005).

This is the space in which to ask what “the promised land of psychiatry” meant for Freud. Did he associate it with “a land free of idolatry” as suggested by Timothy Mitchell (2002, p. 194) where no other, lesser gods are admired? And what made him attach Jung’s “psychiatry” to the Promised Land instead of his “Psychoanalyse”? Was it the same kind of tactful caution he had displayed in the order of appearance? Shortly after their break in 1913, Freud used an “animetaphor” in his Wolfman case merely to state that polar bear (psychiatry) and whale (psychoanalysis) cannot wage war because they cannot meet as each remains confined to its own element (1909d, p. 48). Arctic compatibility (between polar bear and whale) and conceptual discrepancies (between psychiatry and psychoanalysis) aside, to “take possession” of the Promised Land leaves little doubt in regards to its inherently colonising intent. Once the Holy Land had been transformed into “a buffer state against a further East” (first by crusaders, later by British troops), according to Bar-Yosef, it resists any clear-cut division between Occident and Orient” (Bar-Yosef, 2005, p. 9). Both similar to and different from Gingrich’s earlier critique of the Said’s Orientalism, Bar-Yosef claims there are many differing and yet converging ideas associated with the “Holy Land” in English culture creating a simultaneous “here and there” (2005, p. 10). If the “there” translates as “Orientalism proper” in Said’s sense for its fixation with (producing) the Other, the “here” by contrast participates in a discourse Bar-Yosef coined “Vernacular Orientalism”, a complex phenomenon of cultural appropriation (i.e. England as the true Promised Land) entirely preoccupied with (inventing) the Self. This complex conceptual simultaneity, Bar Yosef contends, found little space in Said’s binary scheme (2005, pp. 18–60). Freud’s prophesy, borne from the metaphorical use of the Holy (Promised) Land to convey to Jung his perhaps too patriarchic ideas of how to conquer and colonise new psychoanalytic terrain, was not fulfilled.

Max Eitingon’s friendship with Sigmund Freud dates back to 1906, the year they established a correspondence that lasted for thirty-three years. Max Eitingon (1881–1943) began as a medical doctor, underwent training as a psychiatrist, and became a colleague of C. G. Jung at the
Burghölzli. There he heard of Freud’s psychoanalysis, which led him to initiate the substantial exchange of letters that followed. Analyzed and trained by Freud, Eitingon practiced psychoanalysis in Berlin where he co-founded the Psychoanalytical Institute still in existence today. A member of the “Secret Committee” for the defence of psychoanalysis since 1919, he eventually served as the fifth president of the International Psychoanalytical Association, 1925 to 1932. In his letter of June 10, 1912 (hitherto not translated into English), Freud sent Eitingon some clinical advice borrowed from colonial history in the making:

I hope that, when you continue the treatment and from the occupation of coastal towns proceed to conquer the interior (Tripolis!), a complete success is not excluded. (Freud, 2004, p. 74 [translated for this edition])

Ich hoffe, daß, wenn Sie die Behandlung fortsetzen und von der Besetzung der Küstenorte aus die Eroberung des Binnelandes durchführen (Tripolis!), ein voller Erfolg nicht ausgeschlossen ist. (Freud, 2004, p. 74)

The heavy-handed metaphor is less geographic in character than it is strategic in content. Freud’s bracketed reference to “Tripoli” makes it easy to trace his bellicose hint to the Italo-Turkish War of 1911. Also called guerra di Libia, Italian government troops entered the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which together form what eventually became known as Libya, on September 28, 1911. The diplomatic antecedents of the Italo-Turkish conflict are found in discussions begun in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin in which Great Britain, France, and Germany agreed to the Italian occupation of the aforementioned Ottoman provinces. Cyprus had been placed under British rule in 1878 and the French seized Tunisia in 1881, this cleared the path for the Italian invasion of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. In addition, the Italian campaign was the first in history in which air attacks carried out by dirigible airships determined the outcome. Intense Italian bombardments resulted in large numbers of casualties and even though the war officially ended on October 18, 1912, the “pacification” of Libya remained elusive well into the 1930s. The enthusiastic exclamation mark Freud placed after “Tripoli” is a clear sign of his unencumbered support for the invading forces and, at the same time, testimony to his enduring antipathy for the “Sick Man of Europe”, the Ottoman Empire.
The century-old rivalry between Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires had only recently been revived by the former’s occupation of several of the latter’s Balkan provinces. Austro-Hungary interpreted the growing weakness of its Ottoman rival as the main reason behind the fast increasing separatist agitation in the Balkans. In the wake of Italy’s victory in the Italo-Turkish War, the Turkish ruling elite fell from power as the result of a military coup. Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia, the Balkan League, saw this as an opportunity to attack and, in the attempt to free itself from Ottoman rule, initiated the Balkan Wars in 1912, which resulted in heavy Austrian losses (Çirakman, 2002; Turfan, 2002).

Freud’s imperialist remapping of psychoanalytical practice in the context of the Italo-Turkish War predates his second topography of ego, id, and superego by more than a decade and pertains, therefore, to his first topography of consciousness, preconscious, and unconscious (1900a). His “treatment” is equivalent to an aggressive campaign, even a bombardment, with the objective to conquer and thereby expand conscious territory. The “coastal towns” stand for the more easily accessible symptoms of the patient, which, like preconscious outposts, are to be taken and transformed into beach-heads supposedly, and unlike the town of Benghazi, offering little or no resistance. Libya’s vast “interior”, finally, signifies the unconscious—as Orient. The Orient of psychoanalysis is, then, not merely biblical, as we have seen in our discussion of the Freud-Jung correspondence, but essentially colonial. And while “the promised Land of psychiatry” clearly functions as a metaphor, the recommendations of “occupation”, “conquest”, and “complete success” in the letter to Max Eitingon represent a (not so simple) clinical analogy and a sobering instance of Freud’s identification with the Imperial and Royal aggressor.

One of the most curious passages in his mature correspondence is the surprising and entirely uncharacteristic attempt at self-Orientalisation Freud expressed in a letter to Sandor Ferenczi (1873–1933). Ferenczi, one of Freud’s earliest followers, was the first psychoanalyst in Hungary and a highly original theoretician. For many years he had been a confidant, a travel companion, and an indispensible correspondent to Freud. In 1907 he entered Freud’s inner circle, a few years later he was elected as the second president of the International Psychoanalytical Association and eventually he became a member of the “Secret Committee”. His relationship to Freud entered a rather
painful phase, apparently because of conceptual differences, not long before his sudden and untimely death (see my discussion of the obituary Freud wrote on Ferenczi’s passing further below). Keeping in close touch throughout the war years and the even harder times thereafter, on March 30, 1922, Freud confides to Ferenczi:

Strange and secret longings rise up in me, perhaps from a legacy of my forebears, for the Orient and the Mediterranean, and for a life of a completely different kind, belated childish wishes, unfulfillable and maladapted to reality, as if to indicate a loosening of the relationship to it. (Freud, 2000, p. 78)

This surprising act of declaring himself an Oriental—which was quickly equipped with a psychoanalytical disclaimer of infantile regression—poses the question of Freud’s positioning vis-à-vis the “Orient” squarely. But it is difficult to understand the paragraph and its many implications without further context. What did Freud have in mind when setting this strange and secret Orient in the vicinity of a Mediterranean landscape? Did he perhaps associate it with Kedem (כְּדֶמֶן), one of the biblical terms for the “East”? Yet, there are no references to Bible or Holy Land in Freud’s passage and his “Mediterranean” is largely backdrop to “a life of a completely different kind” which opens the doors to a historical “Jewish” Orient. And although Yaron Peleg convincingly argues for a “Jewish Oriental renaissance” between 1900 and 1930, that is, between the First Jewish National Congress in Vienna and the inauguration of a modern Israeli state in the former British protectorate of Palestine (Peleg, 2005), Freud’s rather nostalgic epistolary line may find a fuller explanation much closer to home.

Freud’s identification with a romanticised Orient by way of bringing in his Jewish “forebears” is strongly reminiscent of the pedigreed, proud, and even fierce Orientalism of Benjamin Disraeli, 1st Earl of Beaconsfield (1804–1881). Disraeli’s case is instructive in that it suggests the Orientalism of a self-fashioned Oriental expressed in the form of an ardent pro-Semitism. Anticipating the fundamental tenets
of Orientalism by almost half a century and offering a far more nuanced
critique of Disraeli’s complicated discourse than Said (1978, p. 192),
Boris Segalowitsch published a most insightful study under the title
Benjamin Disraelis Orientalismus in 1930. His conclusion emphasises
the peculiarity of “Orient-Imperialismus” and its relation to what he
labeled “Orient-Sehnsucht” or Orient-“nostalgia” (1930, p. 127). In
this way, Segalowitsch identifies a number of highly intricate connec-
tions between Disraeli’s politics of empire and his politics of desire
assisted by a psychoanalytically informed notion of “psychology”
most contemporary observers lack. More recently, Patrick Brantlinger
summarised the most significant aspects of “Disraeli’s Orientalism” as
“contradictory”, “positive”, and “hybrid” (1998, p. 91; see also Kalmar,
2005, p. 358). It is especially Disraeli’s willed idealisation of a strong
and positive Oriental Jewishness as a strategy of resistance to anti-
Semitism we encounter again in Freud’s letter to Ferenczi. It comes,
then, as no surprise when Disraeli appears both in Freud’s correspond-
ence and in his works. On February 2, 1927, Freud sent a short letter
to James Strachey, his English translator, in which he requests him “to
obtain for me a picture of the young, beardless Disraeli” (in Meisel &
Kendrick, 1985, p. 331). Also, in his Moses and Monotheism (Freud 1939a)
Disraeli appears early on (the second page) where the name “Disraeli”
(Italian for “from Israel”) identifies its owner as an “Italian Jew” which
brings us back to the Mediterranean and, with it, to Sephardic history,
Oriental Jews, and a wider Jewish Orient. Simultaneously, to talk about
a Jewish Orient and, perhaps, even of “Jewish Orientalism” is not
everyone’s dish. Some authors prefer to put it in terms of “The Jews
and Orientalism” (Kalmar & Penslar, 2005) intending to provide the
victim’s perspective. Others insist on including the perpetrator in their
framework and consequently a notion of (Jewish) agency speaking
plainly of “Jewish Orientalism” (Biale, 1999). A third position attempts
to keep both figures in play by referring to “Orientalism” in the context
concept, at least when expressed in German language, brings us to
Freud’s evaluation of the thought of Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) and
Martin Buber (1878–1965).
Freud remained uncommitted to Theodor Herzl’s Zionist ideas
as laid out in The Jewish State (1986) where the author does not hesi-
tate to clarify the colonialist intentions for the Jewish re-settlement of
Palestine. Herzl states: “For Europe we would build there (Israel) a
piece of the wall against Asia, we would serve as an out-post of culture against barbarity” (Für Europa würden wir dort ein Stück des Walles gegen Asien bilden, wir würden den Vorpostendienst der Kultur gegen die Barbarei besorgen) (1996, p. 37). In his letter of February 26, 1930 to Chaim Koffler, Freud leaves little doubt as to his critical view of a Jewish state in Palestine and concedes, “with sorrow that the baseless fanaticism of our people is in part to be blamed for the awakening of Arab distrust. I can raise no sympathy at all for the misdirected piety which transforms a piece of an Herodian wall into a national relic, thus offending the feelings of the natives” (in Yerushalmi, 1991, p. 13). On the other hand, Freud did support the founding of Hebrew University in Jerusalem and assured its president in early 1925 that it was “painful that my ill-health prevents me from being present at the opening festivities” (Freud, 1925c, p. 292). Yet, Freud seemed unconvinced by Martin Buber’s mysticism and his romantic appropriations of the Jew as “Oriental” (1967). Lorenz Wachinger sympathetically comments on the “confrontation” Buber built up with “Jews, Christians and Sigmund Freud”, only to reach a conclusion that resigns itself to the deafening silence between two men of so similar origins and so different (mystic/scientific) views (in Eckert, Goldschmidt, & Wachinger, 1977). In spite of—or perhaps even caused by—his energetic involvement with Zionism, Buber turned to an Orientalising mode of self-affirmation by proclaiming in his On Judaism that “the Jew has remained an Oriental” (der Jude ist ein Orientale geblieben) (1967, p. 75). These strategies translate on the one (Buber) side into an apparent but false reversal of Freud’s positioning as Orientalist which coincides with the founding of psychoanalysis, while on the other (Herzl) side it clearly implied a forceful return to the “Orient”, the colonialist imposition of the “Occident” in the form of the Zionist project, and a revival of the long-held assumption of “the Jew’s historic role” in mediating between the two (Malinovich, 1999, p. 16). If Freud had been able to attend the opening ceremony of Hebrew University in Jerusalem, he might have seen the inscription on its central dome: “Ex Oriente lux ex Occidente lex” (The light comes from the Orient, the law comes from the Occident), which is symbolic of the fact that Jewish Orientalism—like any other Orientalism—is fraught with ambiguities as David Biale (1998) has so eloquently shown.

Freud’s letter to Ferenczi was written in 1922, not long after the forcible end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which had been laid to rest, just like its Ottoman neighbour, by Allied and in particular American
pressures to produce an orderly, controllable series of national entities, the “League of Nations” (see Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1925). Freud’s “longing” for the Orient may therefore have more to do with the demise of Austro-Hungary, the disappearance of a multicultural, multilingual, multiethnic, and multinational state, and the inescapability of a narrow League of Nations after 1922 (see Freud & William C. Bullitt’s psychological study Thomas Woodrow Wilson, 1967; see also Freud’s New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 1933a, pp. 72–73). Hence, Freud’s strange and secretive act of self-Orientalisation is only on the surface reflection of an uncritical internalisation of the anti-Semitic stereotype. It is perhaps best understood in the context of his post-WWI desperation, which was brought to painful exacerbation by the premature death of his daughter Sophie in early 1920 (Weissweiler, 2006, p. 262; Rozenblit, 1998).

In finally turning to The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig (1968), we have to mention some peculiarities in the editorial process surrounding their publication before we can focus in on the text itself. Selected and arranged by Freud’s son Ernst who had been working in close collaboration with Zweig’s son Adam, the Freud-Zweig letters are accompanied by an “editor’s foreword” which makes clear that “even after Zweig had removed a few of the more personal passages of his letters, certain cuts still seemed desirable to me …” (Freud, 1970b, p. vii). The earlier German edition makes its interventionist case in language that is even more forceful where the editor “felt justified to leave out letters and passages of letters which appeared to be of little significance to me without noting this explicitly in the text itself” (Freud, 1968b, p. 195 [translated or this edition]). What Ernst Freud did not mention are the twenty-five letters he “cut” from the original correspondence (Stone, 1995, p. 100). Most interesting for our reading is the fact that the term “Orient” appears not even once in (the published part of) a six-year-long exchange going forth and back between Austria and Palestine. In spite of the rigorous editorial cleansing, in one instance the “Orient” did slip through in the form of an institutional title. In December 1935, and just ahead of Freud’s letter (see below), Arnold Zweig sent his creative interlocutor some “information” on the state of American archaeological excavations in Egypt. For better understanding, here I reproduce part of Zweig’s letter:
Information.

The application of the name Rockefeller Museum to the Institute in Luxor is more or less correct, since Rockefeller is a generous patron, but this is not its proper title. The ‘Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago’ has its headquarters in Luxor, which is the centre for excavation and research.

An enquiry in Luxor would be the best means of ascertaining whether a Professor Smith works there.

I regard it as impossible that tablets belonging to the Tel el Amarna finds should contain lists of the pupils of the Re-Aton temple since these finds, which date back to the 1880s, consisted solely of letters and these are in general from foreign princes and consist exclusively of lists of gifts from these princes. I cannot at the moment ascertain whether other clay tablets were found in Tel el Amarna but this is certainly a possibility. (Freud, 1970, pp. 117–118)

Freud’s fatherly friendship and correspondence with Arnold Zweig (1887–1968) began late in his life. A German journalist, critic, and novelist, Zweig was profoundly engaged in the struggle with anti-Semitism. In the attempt to gain at least some sympathy for the plight of his “Eastern” brethren among German Jews, he put a face to the much maligned Ostjuden (Eastern Jew) in his 1920-book Das ostjüdische Antlitz (The Face of the East European Jew). His correspondence with Freud started the day he sent a copy of his 1927 novel The Case of Sergeant Grisha, which Freud warmly acknowledged. Zweig was a socialist and a Zionist. When the NSDAP under Adolf Hitler took power in 1933, Zweig, as Max Eitingon before him, emigrated to Palestine where, together with Else Laske-Schüler and Hermann Hesse, he became a contributor to the exile journal “Orient” (in regards to Orientalism in Laske-Schüler and Hesse see Berman, 1997). Eitingon’s and Zweig’s moves to Palestine provided Freud with a steady flow of news from the Holy Land which took on heightened significance in the mid-1930s when he began to assemble materials in preparation for his Moses and Monotheism (1939a; see also Freud’s letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé of January 6, 1935, in which he offers the most succinct abstract of his Moses project, 1972, pp. 204–205). As part of his response to Zweig’s earlier piece of “information”, on January 20, 1936, Freud replies:
Luxor exists, Rockefeller subsidies exist, and so even does Prof. Smith. But one point which occurred to me later and which invalidates all our expectations is the following: if such a list of the pupils of the Sun Temple of On (?) was found in Amarna, it could not possibly be in cuneiform on a clay tablet. It would have to be hieroglyphics on papyrus. Cuneiform was used only for correspondence with foreign countries. (Freud, 1970, p. 119)


The “Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago” was established in 1919 and soon opened a “house” in Luxor, Egypt. Its ambitious archaeological digs in Egypt were generously funded by the Rockefellers and spear-headed by the American Orientalist and archaeologist James Henry Breasted who is, ironically, far better known for his discovery of the tomb of King Tutankhamun than for his expertise in cuneiform script. Roughly two hundred miles north of Luxor, we encounter Amarna (often incorrectly spelled Tel-el-Amarna), the city that was built as the new capital of the Pharaoh Akhenaten. Akhenaten reigned from 1364 BC to 1346 BC and introduced his people to a new, monotheistic religion. He was to serve as a model for Freud’s Moses. In constructing his Moses with the help of the Pharaoh Akhenaten, the Amarna Letters, a collection of close to 400 clay tablets with cuneiform inscriptions dating from the fourteenth century BC (Goren, Finkelstein, & Na’aman, 2004; see also Moran, 1992), emerge as the foundation for an all-important issue of periodisation. Egyptian chronology and, in particular, the Amarna Letters would prove crucial for the making of Freud’s “historical” Moses in that they offer the earliest evidence of “Habiru” (Hebrew) tribes entering the land of Canaan. The advanced knowledge of Assyriology Freud displayed in connection with a Mesopotamian anomaly found in the seemingly unlimited wealth of materials coming out of Egypt must have impressed Arnold Zweig who was entirely new to this kind of psychoanalytical interdisciplinarity.
If much of Freud’s correspondence with Zweig is dominated by the Moses theme we should not ignore that Egypt is not only home to Freud’s Akhenaten/Moses, it was also grand théâtre to the fateful exploits of another law-giver, Napoleon Bonaparte. In his letter of November 29, 1936, to the German novelist and Nobel Prize laureate Thomas Mann (1875–1955), Freud refers to the latter’s Joseph novel (1983), which is modelled on the biblical Joseph, reminding him that it was this figure which stood behind Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign. In agreement with Said’s periodisation of the beginnings of modern Orientalism, Freud points out “It was this campaign, by the way, that marked the beginning of Egypt’s rediscovery” (Mit diesem Zug Napoleons nimmt übrigens die Wiederentdeckung Ägyptens ihren Anfang) (Freud, 1960, p. 433; 1968, p. 449).

Much has been written on the subject of Napoleon’s “Oriental Dream”, from Al-Jabarti’s Chronicle of the French Occupation (2006), a highly critical eyewitness account compiled in 1789, to the more recent and much less scrutinising work by Murat and Weill, L’expédition d’Egypte. Le rêve oriental de Bonaparte (1998), to Henry Laurens’s meticulous Orientales (2004), which reflects the Saidian view (see Harten, 2003, pp. 33–46). In this context we should not forget to mention a letter written more than two decades earlier, on July 13, 1911, by Ernest Jones to Sigmund Freud in which the former requests the latter “to reserve for me the subject of Napoleon that is provided no one else is thinking of working at it. It has occurred to me to take it up from the point of view of his Oriental complex” (1993, p. 111). Although Freud assured Jones little later, in his response of August 9, that he “will make everyone respect your claim of priority” (Freud, 1993, p. 113), it turned out that he never actively supported Jones’ project. On the contrary, the project became “a perennial work in progress” which Jones eventually abandoned only to be written and delivered by Ludwig Jekels at the meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society of April 22, 1914 (Nunberg & Federn, 1981, p. 248). In stark contrast to Jones’s “Oriental” inspiration, Jekels discussed the case of Napoleon I. with references to both biblical Joseph and “Oedipus complex” as Freud had envisioned (Jekels, 1914, pp. 313–381). Notwithstanding his own uses of the “Orient”, Freud had never surrendered his critical views of Orientalism, but whereas Jones’ intuition corresponds to “Orientalism proper” in Said’s sense, Freud’s was pro-Semitic employing the weapons of the enemy. Michael Schröter’s insightful thoughts are helpful in reaching a conclusion:
“Jews in a sense had even more at stake in Orientalism than non-Jews, since their own cultural roots were seen as being rooted in the Oriental past, something that was seized upon negatively by influential anti-Semitic Orientalists …” (1994, p. 189).

This selective overview of Freud’s correspondence allows for several conclusions. Most importantly, the founding and development of psychoanalytic theories and methods is accompanied by Freud’s constant references to the Orient. The endless proliferation of Orients, from “Semitic” to “Assyrian” to “biblical” to “psychoanalytical” to “Jewish” to “Egyptian and archaeological”, ushers regularly in Freud’s response to the anti-Semitic stereotype. In other words, Freud’s Orients, as they unfold in his mature correspondence, are traversed by two recurring and interwoven themes: Jewish identity and the “anti-Semitic challenge”.

Late diaries on the Orient Express

There are two peculiar specimens of Freud’s Orient that pertain neither to his letters, nor to his psychological works. Two truly surprising items, the first consists of one dense paragraph, the second of no more than a compound word. The paragraph in question is part of the obituary Freud wrote in May 1933, on the occurrence of Sandor Ferenczi’s passing, and opens with an Oriental scene:

We have learnt by experience that wishing costs little; so we generously present one another with the best and warmest of wishes. And of these the foremost is for a long life. A well-known Eastern [sic] tale reveals the double-sidedness of precisely this wish. The Sultan had his horoscope cast by two wise men “Thy lot is happy, master!” said one of them. “It was written in the stars that thou shalt see all thy kinsmen die before thee.” This prophet was executed. “Thy lot is happy!”, said the other too, “for I read in the stars that thou shalt outlive all thy kinsmen.” This one was richly rewarded. Both had given expression to the fulfillment of the same wish. (Freud, 1933c, p. 227)

Wir haben die Erfahrung gemacht, daß Wünschen wohlfeil ist, und darum beschenken wir einander freigebig mit den besten und wärmsten Wünschen, unter denen der eines langen Lebens voransteht. Die Zwiewertigkeit gerade dieses Wunsches wird in einer bekannten orientalischen Anekdothe aufgedeckt. Der Sultan hat
It is not hard to guess who cast himself in the role of the “Sultan” and who stands for the two “wise men” one of which is not so wise and “executed” while the other, wiser wise man is “rewarded”. An indication rests with the paragraph immediately following Freud’s “Eastern tale”—and well before he even mentions Ferenczi’s name—where he recalls: “It fell to me in January 1926, to write an obituary of our unforgettable friend, Karl Abraham” (Freud, 1933c, p. 227). Abraham, as we have pointed out previously, had been one of Freud’s most loyal disciples, and he was effectively rewarded by the father of psychoanalysis with enduring recognition and friendship. The differing and diverging Ferenczi, by contrast, whom Freud had already bestowed with the title of “my … secret Grand Vizier” [meinem … geheimen Großwesir] in a letter of 1929 (Freud, 2000, p. 374; 2005a, p. 218), saw his friendship rejected, or “executed”, by the sultan himself when their relationship took a sad and distressing turn only a few months before Ferenczi’s death (Rudnytsky, 2002, pp. 107–126; see also Roazen, 1976, p. 363). It is certainly noteworthy that the three protagonists, Freud, Ferenczi, and Abraham—all of whom were Jewish—are dressed up as Orientals providing a further instance of (self-)Orientalisation similar to the passage in the Freud-Ferenczi correspondence we noted earlier. Not to be forgotten, and as we have come to expect, Freud’s “Oriental anecdote” (orientalischen Anekdoten) was replaced by Strachey with a much deflated “Eastern tale” exhibiting the translator’s ongoing and seemingly compulsive habit to erase Freud’s “Orient”.

The model or rather models for Freud’s sultan and two wise men are found in the works of some of the most popular early Persian and Arab poets. To name only two of them, Abu al-Hassan Ali Al-Masudi (896–956) authored The Meadows of Gold (1989) and Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Balkhi-Rumi (1207–1273) composed The Works of Shams of Tabriz (1996). Both collections include detailed accounts of the fifth and most eminent Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad, Harun al-Rashid (763–809), who
has become world-famous owing to the many magnificent stories he inspired in *The Book of One Thousand and One Nights*, better known to English readers as *The Arabian Nights* (2007; see Clot, 1989). *The Arabian Nights* occupy a central place in the western imagination and are of fundamental importance to anyone studying the history and development of Orientalism (Said, 1978, pp. 193–196; see also Yamanaka & Nishio, 2006; Irwin, 1993). To this day, it remains a puzzling reality in the “West” that Shahrazad’s fateful story-telling, densely layered with sublime sensuality as well as murderous violence, is directed mainly at children. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to read that the gifts Freud brought his eight-year-old grandson Lucien (son of Ernst Freud and a much admired painter) included “Brueghel prints and a storybook of ‘The Arabian Nights’ (*Arabische Nächte. Erzählungen aus 1001 Nacht*; 1999 [1914]) illustrated with Dulac watercolors” (Pfefferman, 2003, p. 2).

A psychoanalytic reading of Freud’s little known—and apparently unexamined—paragraph would discern three main characteristics. First, the deeply narcissistic nature of his Oriental anecdote; second, the ambiguity of two wise men split into good and bad opposites; and third, as pointed out earlier, the Orientalisation of all three Jewish actors staged as the Persian sultan and his Zoroastrian astrologers. In particular, Freud’s central concern with “outliving” those around him betrays a sure indication of narcissistic libido, which would in part explain the unforgiving way his affectively charged relationship to Ferenczi entered its final stage. The profound and highly complex connections between narcissism and death are discussed with great insight by André Green who lays bare the Janus-faced character of narcissism in its constructive (creativity) as well as destructive (regression) expressions (2001, pp. 196–198; see also Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985). The sultan’s power over the life and death of his subjects, here the astrologers, reflects this oscillation. As we learn from Freud’s innovative papers *On Narcissim: An Introduction* (1914c) and *Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense* (1940e), ambivalence and ego-defence mechanisms such as splitting the object into good/bad opposites go hand in hand. Both Freud’s early as well as mature correspondence were equally marked by this ambiguous positioning in the context of his Jewishness and his repeated impulses at self-Orientalisation which are perhaps best understood as expressions of a dramatic pull-and-push between narcissism and self-hatred. And yet, commentators have largely focused on only one of the
two elements while ignoring the interplay between them (Gilman, 1986, pp. 4–5, see also Loewenberg, 1971, pp. 363–369).

The second item comes in the form of a short entry in Freud’s late diaries (1929–1939) to record his taking the “Orient Express”. On his very last voyage, which ended in London, England, his final exile, Freud travelled with the Orient Express along the route Vienna—Munich—Kehl—Strasbourg—Paris. For the day of June 13, 1938, he noted the departure from Vienna—the city he had called his home for almost eight decades which the Nazis allowed him to leave only after intense hardship and substantial payments—in three words and three numerals: “Abreise 3h25. Orient. Express” (Freud, 1996, pp. 64, 65, 424; 1992c, pp. 36, 37, 237). The entry was no spontaneous idea. In the letter he sent his sister-in-law, Minna Bernays, one month earlier, on May 14, 1938, he informed her that “the plan is now to take the Orientexpress to Paris” (Der Plan ist jetzt mit dem Orientexpress nach Paris zu fahren) (Freud, 2005b, p. 310 [translated for this edition]). If we examine Freud’s entry according to psychoanalytic practice in which the process of interpretation reads the patient’s narrative as “sacred script”, attentive to both the letters and the white space between them, we will notice not just his spelling but, more significantly, the uncommon punctuation that accompanies it. In his letter to Minna Bernays Freud makes use of the German language form, that is, of one long double-word (Orientexpress), whereas in his diaries he wrote it the French way employing two separate terms (Orient Express) which were adopted when the luxurious train first travelled from Paris to Constantinople on October 4, 1883 (Sölch, 1998). If this articulates Freud’s adaptation of the proverbial When in Rome do as the Romans do, it is not clear why Christfried Tögel, the translator of the German edition of Freud’s Diary, inserted a hyphen between the two words which turns both German as well as French versions into their English equivalent (1996, p. 427). What is more, looking at the original manuscript, a copy of which appears parallel to the typescript, poses the question what to make of this particular “Orient” Freud terminated by way of an apparently rushed period (“.”) before going on to the “Express”? Was it just an error, a slip, a textually bungled action?

In the attempt to find an answer to an apparently pedantic enquiry we have to go further back in time (thirty-three years, to be precise) and return to the moment when the “Orientexpresszug” (Orient-Express-Train) runs through Freud’s psychological writings for the very first
time. In discussing the constituting factors of unconscious functioning in his *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905c), the legendary train enters the text by way of citation:

Karl Kraus was responsible for another successful condensation with slight modification. He wrote of a certain yellow-press journalist that he had travelled to one of the Balkan States by “Orient-presszug”. There is no doubt that this word combines two others: “Orientexpresszug [Orient-Express-Train]” and “Erpressung [blackmail]”. Owing to the context, the element “Erpressung” emerges only as a modification of the “Orientexpresszug”—a word called for by the verb [“travelled”]. (Freud, 1905c, p. 27)


Karl Kraus (1874–1936), a well-known Austrian journalist, satirist, and essayist, made his witty point by changing a single letter—no more than “a slight modification”—turning the “x” into an “r” with the result of successfully producing this condensation of “Orient-Express-Train” and “blackmail”. It would be no exaggeration to assert that Freud was blackmailed by the Nazis before travelling to Paris with the Orient Express (Train). Could we, then, read Freud’s “.,” between Orient and Express as a slight modification not in the service of condensation but, in this case, of displacement? At this point, we should remember the profound irony inherent in Freud’s taking the Orient Express forced by the racist politics of Adolf Hitler and his murderous hordes whose anti-Semitism built on the entrenched stereotype of the “Jew-as-Oriental”. It is this anti-Semitic “Orient”, I suggest, Freud leaves behind the “.” allowing him at the same time to “Express” a fateful return. The out-of-place period is informed both by what he assumed to be his family romance as well as certain political discourses attached to the Orient Express. On the one hand, the final voyage to Paris and London continues the exiles of Freud’s “father’s family” and, in crossing the Rhine-bridge at
Kehl, closes the circle that was begun when his paternal forebears, as he recounts in his *Autobiographical Study*, left Cologne on the Rhine in the fourteenth or fifteenth century fleeing from anti-Semitic persecution (Freud, 1925d, pp. 8–9). On the other hand, the new Simplon-Orient-Express operated since the end of WWI as the so-called “train of the (Western) victors” (Sölch, 1998, p. 43), alluding to the military defeats of German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires at the hands of France, Britain and the USA (for specific references to the uses of the Orient Express in times of the Habsburg Monarchy see Samsinger, 2007, 2006). Sigmund Freud’s departure from Vienna with the Orient Express, therefore, resumes the exiles of a past as Eastern others and, simultaneously, ensures him and his family a future as Western subjects. Both examples, the “Sultan” and the “Orient Express”, thus demonstrate Freud’s double-edged and, thus, highly ambivalent employment/deployment of the Orient, both essentialising and deconstructive, recurrent symptom and willed resistance.

In summarising, both Freud’s early and mature correspondence, as well as the excerpts from Orientalist obituary and Orient Express diary, provide ample evidence for all three of our overarching “doubled” concepts: (1) Orientalism proper or the narcissism of eurocentric difference; (2) Orientalist binaries or West-Eastern splitting in the process of defence, and (3) self-Orientalisation or identification with the Imperial and Royal aggressor. It has also become clear that these doubled concepts never appear in neat sequential order but rather come entangled with each other, similar to the neuroses where, for example, elements of hysteria, obsession, and paranoia often appear side by side.
The archaeological sphere of imagination

The archaeological sphere of imagination that pervades the pages of Sigmund Freud has had a lasting effect on the conceptualisation, both professional and popular, of psychoanalytical discourse. From his earliest writings such as the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d) to his last major work *Moses and Monotheism* (1939a), the formation of psychoanalytic knowledge appears eloquently expressed with Freud’s almost proverbial “archaeology of the soul” and, in due course, in the notion of “depth psychology.” Where the archaeological metaphor reveals itself as the *Via Regia* to Freud’s understanding of psychoanalysis as universal, “Western” science, there is the passionate pursuit of archaeology in texts, sites, and objects *porta Orientis* to his complicated appropriation and reproduction of Orientalist discourse. Orientalism and archaeology have—at least since Napoleon—long been part of western-style colonialism and its hierarchical constructions of self and otherness (Reid, 2002; Marchand, 1996; Said, 1978). It is, however, the “anti-Semitic challenge” (Freud, 2006, p. 226; compare Underwood with Strachey’s mistranslation, see also Brill’s translation of 1910; 1913 p. 178) which complicates an otherwise seamless configuration of archaeological metaphor and Orientalist discourse. To critically revisit these imaginary spheres in the writings of Freud at the intersection
of psychoanalytical enquiry and postcolonial critique promises fresh insight into the textual founding of psychoanalysis. This chapter will thus engage Freud’s “archaeological” sphere of imagination, the “Orient” that emerges on its horizon, and how these intersecting discursive terrains were part of the grounds on which the early theoretical elaboration of psychoanalytical concepts took place.

If the nineteenth century saw the birth of modern archaeological Orientalism in the sense of Edward Said’s (1978) original critique, the twentieth century witnessed the unraveling of European colonial pretensions on an unprecedented scale. Seen in this context, Freud’s Orientalist discourse mirrors not just European ambitions abroad. In an atmosphere of growing nationalist fragmentation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and accompanied by the massive influx of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, Freud’s Orient becomes the stage for a mise-en-scene of the “Occidental” self. This enactment of the Western self is Freud’s response to a rampant anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse and to the dreaded figure of the Eastern Jew (Ostjude). It comes to little surprise that Freud’s references to archaeology lean on binary oppositions such as modern vs. traditional or progress vs. backwardness. Freud’s particular “archaeOrientalist” discourse similarly presupposes essentialist assumptions of both Occident and Orient in which the latter helps to define the former “as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (Said, 1978, p. 2). And whereas Said defines the Orient as “one of (Europe’s) deepest and most recurring images of the Other” and Orientalism as “a Western style for dominating and (…) having authority over the Orient” (1978, pp. 1, 5), almost two centuries earlier, G. W. F. Hegel’s “master-slave dialectic” made clear that the struggle between self and other, as well as the duplicity of their mutual existence, is about “staking one’s independence, die, or be enslaved” (O’Neill, 1996, p. 8). With this in mind, here we shall argue that Freud’s self-construction in terms of heterosexual Jewish male, as a scientist and, in particular, as an Orientalist, clearly opposes and, in its reversal, strongly resists anti-Semitic notions of “the feminized Jew as Oriental” (Le Rider, 1991a, p. 110). This particular anti-Semitic stereotype was, then, a common topic within and outside the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The binary opposition between Orientalist and “Oriental” also feeds into the one surrounding the notion of science (archaeology) as a “rational” versus dogma (religion) as an “irrational” Weltanschauung. Both Orientalist binaries collaborate in the construction of Freud’s “Western” self.
and in the founding of psychoanalysis as an interpretative ("Western") science which suggests that the *leitmotiv*-like presence of the archaeological metaphor as well as the *blind*-spotted deployment of Orientalist discourse in Freud’s writings are inextricably tied to each other.

From the insertion of Turkish imaginings in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a) to the employment of Babylonian etymologies in *Character and Anal Erotism* (1908b) to the staging of Pharaonic Egypt in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939a), there is a multitude of “Oriental” textualities in the form of anecdotes, dreams, metaphors and other references, which combine to (re)produce a pervasive Orientalist presence. The same survey equally conveys how these texts are constantly traversed by allusions to and metaphorical uses of “Archäologie”. Freud’s vivid and lifelong interest in this field was strongly reflected in his extensive library stocked with “more archaeology than psychology” (Brückner, 1975; Rohrwasser, 2005) and found tangible expression in the museum-like interiors of his consulting room and study in Vienna’s Berggasse 19, which was captured for posterity by the photographer Edmund Engelmann (1993). In these rooms the patients were met by an overwhelming collection of archaeological artifacts (from Hungary to Egypt to China) while Oriental rugs covered the floor and the “Diwan”—Freud’s psychoanalytical couch (Marinelli, 1998; Dimock, 1994; Ransohoff, 1975). It is not without interest to enquire into the curious fact of how Freud’s “Diwan” (1895d, p. 100) was re-modelled into an “analytical couch”. When James and Alix Strachey translated the term in 1933 as “sofa”, from the Arabic *suffa* (a long padded seat), they stayed within the realm of the “Oriental”, but had, at the same time, erased its central meaning, which from Persian into Arabic into Turkish—*divān*—means either a collection of papers (as in Goethe’s *West-Eastern Divan*) or, more important to us, the “seat of government” (Nandy & Nandy, 1972, pp. 305–306; Gudерян, 2004). In contrast, the term “couch” (substitute for *sofa* in English) is derived from the French word for “to sleep” (*coucher*). The translational erasure is, once again, as this study argues, part of the Glossary Committee’s campaign to de- “Orient”alise Freud and his writings. Library and furniture aside, there is more.

We have detailed records of his travels or “fieldtrips” to Mediterranean regions, which open a further dimension of Freud’s interest in spaces of self/otherness and, by extension, in his search for archaeological knowledge and artifacts (Simmons, 2006; Ucko, 2001; Galvagno, 1998; Haddad & Haddad, 1995; Tögel, 1989). Surprisingly, even though
today we can find an entire literature on “Freud and archaeology”, no comprehensive analysis of archaeological references and metaphors in Freud’s writings has been made available. Likewise, no study exists that would examine Freud’s “Orient”, and much less one that would clarify the relationship between archaeological metaphor and Orientalist discourse. This chapter will explore precisely this privileged and yet inaccurately—if at all—mapped province in the conceptual geography of Freud’s works. It is divided into five sections to provide a comprehensive overview of the use of archaeological references and Orientalist discourse in the writings of Sigmund Freud. The first section (1895–1905) offers early examples of archaeological metaphor and Orientalist representation that are discussed in relation to issues raised by feminist critics. In this way, we enter Freud’s archaeOrientalist world to meet with the modern heroes of archaeological excavation, that is, Schliemann and Evans. We will survey this particular imaginative sphere at the height of European colonialism abroad and in the light of ever more aggressive anti-Semitism at home by discussing Freud’s response to C. G. Jung’s “racial prejudice”. In the second section (1907–1915) we will explore Freud’s archaeological “Orient” with special attention to a) its influence on foundational ideas in psychoanalytical thought, and b) Freud’s concept of “the splitting of the ego in the process of defence”. Guided by Ricoeur’s interpretative approach, section three (1909–1926) offers a critical reflection on the presence of West-Eastern binaries, pairs, dichotomies, dualities and their indelible imprint(s) on Freud’s texts. Section four (1927–1936) will attempt to uncover the psycho-periodicity (affirmation—repression—negation) governing the rise and fall of Freud’s archaeological references and their fateful involvement with Orientalist discourse. Finally, the fifth section (1937–1939) will offer a reading of Freud’s Moses and Monotheism in terms of its archaeOrientalist form, its historicOccidentalist content, and the ways in which these are reflective of his strategic reversals of anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse.

ArchaeOrientalism

In 1930, Sigmund Freud was awarded the Goethe Prize in recognition of his extraordinary intellectual achievement. In fact, Freud’s writings were prized not just for their conceptual brilliance, clinical insight, and therapeutic value, but at least as much for their literary qualities.
These qualities are reflected, among other things, in the rich array of metaphors Freud used to help visualise and explain hitherto unknown concepts of the “apparatus of the soul.” The analogies Freud liked to work with were taken from fields as diverse as (1) painting, sculpture, architecture, the archive, geology, and archaeology; (2) finance, surgery, detective work, mechanics, (train) travel, government, as well as military action; (3) anatomy, chemistry, physics, biology and hydraulics, to name but a few.

One such metaphor enjoyed Freud’s particular fondness and, when compared to all others, forcefully emerges as what we want to understand as his “arch-metaphor”. This arch-metaphor is based, first, on the instrumentalisation of archaeological knowledge for the description of hidden, that is, unconscious psychological processes. Second, the root arch- stands here not so much to point to its -aeological outcome as to connote the “archaic” (from ancient Greek arkh beginning) in the sense of Freud’s passionate interest in and constant pursuit of archaeology as a space in which to enact his own Orientalist discourse of cultural and racial difference. Third, there is its extended semi-circle (arch) as a reminder of the enduring, if interrupted and changing, presence of the archaeological theme in Freud’s works.

The very first instance in which the arch-metaphor appears in Freud’s works is found in an early paragraph from the urbook. This “Urbuch”, as coined by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis a century later (1995), is none else than the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), which was originally written in collaboration with Joseph Breuer. In it, Freud lays out the case of Fräulein Elisabeth v. R. in psycho-archaeological terms:

Thus it came about that in this, the first full-length analysis of a hysteria undertaken by me, I arrived at a procedure, which I later developed into a regular method and employed deliberately. This procedure was one of clearing away the pathogenic psychical material layer by layer, and we liked to compare it with the technique of excavating a buried city. (Freud, 1895d, p. 139)

So gelangte ich bei dieser ersten vollständigen Analyse einer Hysterie, die ich unternahm, zu einem Verfahren, das ich später zu einer Methode erhob und zielbewusst einleitete, zu einem Verfahren der schichtweisen Ausräumung des pathogenen psychischen Materials, welches wir gerne mit der Technik der Ausgrabung einer verschütteten Stadt zu vergleichen pflegen. (Freud, 1895d, p. 201)
There are two parts to the passage. The first resides in Freud’s scientific discourse and the second complements the first by furnishing the elements for his archaeological analogy. First, the psychoanalyst is represented as an enterprising personality driven by his *undertaking (unternehmen)* to uncover what is buried (the repressed); second, his project is *raised (erhoben)*—unlike the translator’s rather flat “developed”—to the level of scientific methodology. Thus, Freud’s early psychoanalysis opens the archaeological sphere of imagination by emphasising a “procedure (which) was one of clearing away the pathogenic psychical material layer by layer”. We can only guess that “the technique of excavating a buried city” points to Troy. Judith Van Herik reads Freud’s discourse of “science” as a privileged male space (1982), Sabina Hake goes as far as to suggest it was “the problem of femininity” which forced Freud to turn to another discipline (archaeology) in his struggle for discursive mastery (Hake, 1993, p. 148). Complicating the case even further is Sander Gilman’s perceptive decoding of Freud’s “scientific” discourse of the female patient as resisting the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the feminised male Jew” (1993b, p. 206). At least since Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt we know that archaeology is not only “male” business, it was also thought to be “white” man’s prerogative. With these non-articulated discourses of race and gender in mind, Freud’s archæOrientalism must be seen as what Ann Pellegrini has coined “Whiteface Performances” (1997, p. 108).

Suzanne Cassirer-Bernfeld’s (1951) innovative and insightful study was the first to offer a closer examination of Freud’s archaeological interests, thereby opening up a new field of research that attracted not only Freud-biographers. Her psychoanalytical interpretation found its (Freudian) clues in Freud’s childhood, grounding her account in the trauma undergone by the three-year-old when his family moved to Vienna and the subsequent loss he experienced when his home town (object) Freiberg was left behind. There is Freud’s copy of the *Philippsonsche Bibel* (1858) a bilingual (German/Hebrew) version of the Old Testament filled with illustrations from Egypt and the Holy Lands, which is mentioned as an early and important stimulus for Freud’s later archaeological “appetites” (Niederland, 1988; Grubrich-Simitis, 1994). Likewise, it has been pointed out that the heroic figure of Heinrich Schliemann, the self-styled German archaeologist and excavator of the treasures at Troy, was a significant source of identification for the young Freud (Flem, 2003; Kaus, 1992). However, none of these
authors looked into the relation between psychoanalysis, archaeology and Orientalism and, in this context, they all ignore the potential discursive intricacies at work.

Only a year after the Studies, Freud published The Aetiology of Hysteria (1896c) in which the archaeological metaphor comes to occupy a much more substantial space, one where old stones are made to speak:

Imagine that an explorer arrives in a little-known region where his interest is aroused by an expanse of ruins, with remains of walls, fragments of columns, and tablets with half-effaced and unreadable inscriptions. He may content himself with inspecting what lies exposed to view, with questioning the inhabitants—perhaps semi-barbaric people—who live in the vicinity, about what tradition tells them of the history and meaning of these archaeological remains, and with noting down what they tell him and he may then proceed on his journey. But he may act differently. He may have brought picks, shovels and spades with him, and he may set the inhabitants to work with these implements. Together with them he may start upon the ruins, clear away the rubbish, and, beginning from the visible remains, uncover what is buried. If his work is crowned with success, the discoveries are self-explanatory: the ruined walls are part of the ramparts of a palace or a treasure-house; the fragments of columns can be filled out into the temple; the numerous inscriptions, which, by good luck, may be bilingual, reveal an alphabet and a language, and, when they have been deciphered and translated, yield undreamed-of information about the events of the remote past, to commemorate which the monuments were built. Saxa Loquuntur! (Freud, 1896c, p. 192)

Nehmen Sie an, ein reisender Forscher käme in eine wenig bekannte Gegend, in welcher ein Trümmerfeld mit Mauerresten, Bruchstücken von Säulen, von Tafeln mit verwischten und unlesbaren Schriftzeichen sein Interesse erwecke. Er kann sich damit beginnen zu beschauen, was frei zutage liegt, dann die in der Nähe hausenden, etwa halbbarbarischen Einwohner ausfragen, was ihnen die Tradition über die Geschichte und Bedeutung jener monumentalen Reste kundgegeben hat, ihre Auskünfte aufzeichnen und—weiterreisen. Es kann aber auch anders vorgehen, er kann Hacken, Schaufeln und Spaten mitgebracht haben, die Anwohner für die Arbeit mit diesen Werkzeugen bestimmen,
mit ihnen das Trümmerfeld in Angriff nehmen, den Schutt wegsschaffen und von den sichtbaren Resten aus das Vergrabene aufdecken. Lohnt der Erfolg seine Arbeit, so erläutern die Funde sich selbst; die Mauerreste gehören zur Umwallung eines Palastes oder Schatzhauses, aus den Säulentrümmern ergänzt sich ein Tempel, die zahlreich gefundenen, im glücklichen Falle bilinguen Inschriften enthüllen ein Alphabet und eine Sprache, und deren Entzifferung und Übersetzung ergibt ungeahnte Aufschlüsse über die Ereignisse der Vorzeit, zu deren Gedächtnis jene Monumente erbaut worden sind. Saxa loquuntur! (Freud, 1896c, pp. 426–427)

Note to begin with the seemingly natural confluence of archaeological and travel metaphors in which the explorer/excavator turns myth into history. Not content with what “lays exposed to view”, or what “semi-barbaric people” may have to say about it, this resolute individual eventually opts for directing, or bestimmen, these to go armed with “pickles, shovels and spades” on the attack, as in Angriff, to conquer a field of rubble (ruins). However, the translator choose to dilute and thus to omit these incisive terms by turning, on the one hand, the word bestimmen, emphasising the determination and resolve of its actor, into the much blander “to set the inhabitants to work” and, on the other, the expression in Angriff nehmen, which indicates readiness to attack, to tackle, to struggle with, into the much more inoffensive to “start upon”. By and large, Freud’s original terminology is considerably more determined and forceful than its English translation would like to admit. But instead of looking for early and possibly premature conclusions, let us return once more to the archaeOrientalist site where the task at hand was to clear away the rubbish and begin from its visible remainders to “un-cover” what is buried beneath the surface.

Almost unavoidably, Heinrich Schliemann comes to mind. Clearly a figure that had greatly impressed the young Freud (who was seventeen years old when Schliemann unearthed the legendary city of Troy) and with whom he much liked to identify. If, in effect, Freud’s intrepid “Forscher” (explorer) is modelled on the no less intrepid Heinrich Schliemann we may with some justification assume that the aforemen-tioned “semi-barbaric people” must in reality be Turks from the region of Hisarlik (Troy). In other words, they are subjects of the Ottoman Empire, that is, “Orientals” who, seen from a nineteenth century Austro-Hungarian perspective, are considered not entirely “savage”, but not
“civilised” either, and who are therefore labeled as “semi-barbarians”. Moreover, while for Freud the archaeOrientalist these faceless, voiceless Ottoman others do not talk, their stones (“saxa loquuntur”) do. This sheds light on the process of othering involved in the practice of archaeology, and by extension of Orientalism, which operates in part by pushing the other back in time and thereby denying a present that is occupied by the self (Fabian 1983). Not unlike Freud’s procedure in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), Schliemann’s life/work combined biography and science, fiction and fact. It has been noted how the story of this German business-man, amateur-archaeologist, and cultural conqueror positions itself at the intersection of three myths: the myth of Homerian Troy, the myth of a *self*-made-career, and the myth of the birth of modern archaeology (Zintzen, 1998; see Schrott, 2008). Conversely, this triple mythical unfolding of the archaeological hero Schliemann finds its mirror image in Freud’s own *splendid isolation*, his “single-minded” discovery, development, and practice of psychoanalysis and following from there the publication of his seminal *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a). Nonetheless, while the archaeological metaphor provides a clever element in the rhetorical strategies of early psychoanalysis, it remains at the same time a symptomatic expression of the deepest fears and highest ambitions of its inventor.

In times of growing anti-Semitic politics and sentiment, it is Freud’s Jewishness which threatens not just his immediate professional career, but also the acceptance of psychoanalysis as an interpretative science. Motivated by fears psychoanalysis could be tainted a “Jewish science”, as a result of the “racial” origins of its founder and many early followers, Freud felt the need to secure non-Jewish allies for its ongoing development and ultimate preservation. When Carl Gustav Jung, son of a Swiss Reformed pastor who worked as assistant to the renowned psychotherapist Eugen Bleuler in Zürich, came to join the ranks of Freud’s supporters in 1906, the timing seemed perfect. In their intense and turbulent “psychoanalytical” relationship, three dramatically enmeshed themes come to the fore: anti-Semitism, Orientalism, and archaeology. There is Freud’s hope for a “gentile heir” to psychoanalysis and Jung’s “racial prejudice” toward Jews; then we have their shared interest in Orientalist analogies and distinctions, and their mutual literary incursions into “the archaeological sphere of imagination”.

In the early development of psychoanalysis the “Jewish Question” found a dramatic stage in the encounter between Freud and Jung
involving, on the one hand, Freud’s determined response to anti-Semitism and, on the other, Jung’s positioning towards/against it (or both). Whereas Freud entered certain alliances to resist the racist onslaught and thereby protect psychoanalysis, Jung, who initially seemed unprejudiced enough to oppose or at least to avoid anti-Semitic statements, eventually made common cause with the Nazi-regime by assuming the presidency of the German General Medical Society for Psychotherapy in 1933 (Martin in Maidenbaum & Martin, 1991). Although Jung tried to defend himself from accusations of anti-Semitism, his collaboration with, if not open affinity to, the Nazi-regime left “lingering shadows.” Following the protracted break between them in 1913–14, in his On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement (1914d) Freud publicly related Jung’s repudiation of the fundamental (sexual) tenets of psychoanalysis to “racial prejudice”. Adding to earlier comments Freud had made in his correspondence with Karl Abraham (2009), Sandor Ferenczi (2003), and Ernest Jones (1993) on the subject of Jung’s “Rassenvorurteile” (race prejudice), in 1914 he noted:

I felt the need of transferring this authority to a younger man, who would then as a matter of course take my place after my death. This man could only be C. G. Jung, since Bleuler was my contemporary in age; in favor of Jung were his exceptional talents, the contributions he had already made to psychoanalysis, his independent position and the impression of assured energy which his personality conveyed. In addition to this, he seemed ready to enter into a friendly relationship with me and for my sake to give up certain racial prejudices which he had previously permitted himself. (1914d, p. 43 [my italics])

Es lag mir also daran, diese Autorität auf einen jüngeren Mann zu übertragen, der nach meinem Ausscheiden wie selbstverständlich mein Ersatz werden sollte. Dies konnte nur C. G. Jung sein, denn Bleuler war mein Altersgenosse, für Jung sprechen aber seine hervorragende Begabung, die Beiträge zur Analyse, die er bereits geleistet hatte, sein unabhängige Stellung und der Eindruck von sicherer Energie, den sein Wesen machte. Er schien überdies bereit, in freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu mir zu treten und mir zuliebe Rassenvorurteile aufzugeben, die er sich bis dahin gestattet hatte. (Freud, 1914d, p. 85)
Carl Gustav Jung’s anti-Semitic leanings show clear signs of Orientalist outlook when, in an article written in late 1933, he emphasises “differences between German and Jewish psychologies” by comparing Jews to “nomads” and “women” thereby embracing and re-enforcing then popular racist stereotypes of the “wandering Jew” as “feminised Oriental”. Today, there is little doubt in regards to the “predatory” Orientalism implicated in the making of Jung’s speculative psychology (Gomez, 1995). C. G. Jung’s notion of the “collective unconscious” (1927) as well as his development of “archetypes” (1934) find their origins in a “sphere of archaeological imagination” which is inspired by the one that traverses also the writings of Sigmund Freud. This is corroborated by Jung’s own archaeological visualisation of the deeper layers of the psyche, which found expression in a dream he remembered to have dreamt just previous to the breakdown of his relationship with Freud. It is the dream of a “house” in which the (“rococo”) upper story represents consciousness, the (“medieval”) ground floor represents the first level of the (pre)-unconscious, followed by a (“Roman times”) cellar and finally by a (“primitive”) stone cave providing further levels for the location of the individual and collective unconscious (Jung, 1989, pp. 160–162). In the way we read it in his memoirs, it is a simplistic, if stratified, vision of domestic archaeology—from “primitive” to “rococo”—which is laid out in an evolutionary and uncharacteristically linear fashion. Although Jung confesses in the same volume how, in his early student years, he “would have liked best to be an archaeologist”, his house-dream proposes an art-historic hierarchy rather than conveying the archaeological complexities of unconscious layers of self and other. Nonetheless, we should not forget the high degree to which Jung’s archaeological inquisitiveness influenced Freud’s on several occasions. Be it in the area of psycho-archaeology, such as in his intriguing analysis of Jensen’s Gradiva (Freud, 1907a), or in the field of religious and national(ist) mythologies, as treated with great effect in Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1912–13), Jung often led the way to Freud’s archaeOrientalist excursions. It is instructive, then, to compare Jung’s and Freud’s archaeOrientalisms. Whereas Jung’s version is often anti-Semitic and always along colonial lines of “Orientalism proper”; Freud’s is marked by contradiction—from acceptance to resistance—and with decidedly pro-Semitic outlook.

Freud’s fears of failing to make psychoanalysis into a “universal” science and his ambition, in spite of all obstacles, to become himself one
of those great men who are determined and, at the same time, lucky enough to succeed and realise their childhood-dreams, is reflected in his *Fragments of an Analysis of Hysteria* (1905e). Turning once again to his predilection for the archaeological metaphor, Freud writes:

> In the face of the incompleteness of my analytic results, I had no choice but to follow the example of those discoverers whose good fortune it is to bring to the light of day after their long burial the priceless though mutilated relics of antiquity. I have restored what is missing, taking the best models known to me from other analyses; but, like a conscientious archaeologist, I have not omitted to mention in each case where the authentic part ends and my construction begins. (Freud, 1905e, pp. 12–13)

Angesichts der Unvollständigkeit meiner analytischen Ergebnisse blieb mir nichts übrig, als dem Beispiel jener Forscher zu folgen, welche so glücklich sind, die unschätzbaren wenn auch verstümmelten Reste des Altertums aus langer Begrabenheit an den Tag zu bringen. Ich habe das Unvollständige nach den besten mir von anderen Analysen her bekannten Mustern ergänzt, aber ebensowenig wie ein gewissenhafter Archäologe in jedem Falle anzugeben versäumt, wo meine Konstruktion an das Authentische ansetzt. (Freud, 1905e, pp. 169–170)

The passage involves more than an increasingly sophisticated analogy to modern archaeological techniques in distinguishing “authentic” from “constructed” elements. It is thinkable that something more personal than professional is at play. In other words, Freud’s obvious and at times clearly romantic desire to tie his own proceedings not just to the rigors of archaeological methods, but also to the personae of those “discoverers” (note the plural), must be of great interest to us. Although they are not explicitly named here, two of the most outstanding archaeological “conquistadors” come together in these lines charged with transferential import. As we mentioned above, there is Heinrich Schliemann who, richly endowed with “good fortune”, is now joined by the no less fortunate, but arguably more professional and “conscientious” un-coverer of the *Palace of Minos at Knossos*, the widely acclaimed British archaeologist Sir Arthur Evans.

It is perhaps not insignificant that Evans’ preparations began in the late 1890s near Iraklion, Isle of Crete, Greece (which obtained formal
independence from Ottoman rule in 1898), that is, at about the same time when Freud was writing *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a). Although not unhampered by rivalries with other, competing European archaeologists and their governments, Evans’ initial inspiration, thorough expertise, and exemplary persistence eventually built up a monumental project whose heroic privilege it was to “discover” the Minoan culture (Evans, 1964; see Preziosi & Hitchcock, 1999). If Schliemann’s generation had preceded Freud’s, Evans’ coincided with such simultaneity that the spectacular Minoan excavations came to light parallel to the discovery of psychoanalysis. There is abundant evidence in Freud’s letters that he followed the charismatic developments of Evans’ undertaking very closely for its entire duration up until the mid-1930s. Evans’ findings included two paradigmatic premises. First, the realisation that the Mycenaean culture (the one dug up by Schliemann) was in fact an impoverished form of the Minoan one—an interpretation Freud put to astonishing use in his 1931-paper on female sexuality (D’Agata, 1994). Second, Evans presented evidence for the Phoenician and Egyptian colonisation of Crete, which had serious implications for “Aryan” racial theories based on assumptions of classic Greece as the origin of (Western) European civilisation (Bernal, 1987). Once again, we find the themes of anti-Semitism, Orientalism, and archaeology side-by-side, this time emerging from Evans’ Minoan dig. As it becomes clear how endlessly entangled these strands are with the development of psychoanalytical concepts, it is not without interest to know more about the Freudian Orient/s.

*Layers of self and other*

Two fundamental and intimately related concepts of psychoanalytical thought are the workings of “the unconscious” and the dynamics of “repression”, topics to which Freud dedicated two seminal papers in 1915. Several years later, in 1922, the well-known Viennese writer Hugo von Hofmannsthal proposed “a secretive and mystical Orient” to represent the “Empire of the Unconscious” (1979, p. 195 [translated for this edition]; Le Rider, 1991b). What he did not mention and what is even more striking, however, is the precision of the correspondences between Freud’s psychoanalytical definition of the unconscious, the system Ucs., and late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century literary and conventional Austrian ideas of the “Orient”. Here, we will cite a
key passage from one of the above-mentioned papers, The Unconscious, which offers an impressively concise definition:

To sum up: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process […], timelessness, and replacement of external reality by psychical reality—these are the characteristics which we may expect to find in processes belonging to the system Ucs. (Freud, 1915e, pp. 186–187)

Fassen wir zusammen: Widerspruchslosigkeit, Primärvorgang […], Zeitlosigkeit und Ersetzung der äußeren Realität durch die psychische sind die Charaktere, die wir an zum System Ubw gehörigen Vorgängen zu finden erwarten dürfen. (Freud, 1915e, pp. 285–286)

These same characteristics—timelessness, no contradiction, no negation—which Freud identified in the “deeper” strata of the human psyche, have long been associated with stereotypical representations of the “Orient” in the West, or rather, have become part and parcel of the very process of Orientalising and thus of (re)producing the Orient (Said, 1978, p. 19). Whereas the exemption from mutual contradiction corresponds to the idea of the “irrational” Orient; Freud’s reminder that we are dealing with a primary process of (libidinal) presences and absences invites similarly obsessive Western imaginings of the Orient in terms of the “Despot” ( politic) and the “Harem” ( domestic); furthermore, the notion of timelessness—and here we are facing perhaps its most incisive characteristic—is stereotypically employed to evoke a static, frozen, unchanging, “eternal” Orient; and last but not least, the replacement of external reality by psychical reality opens the gates to an essentialist, secularist, Western day-dream of a realm of spirituality from where the wisdom of the “mystic” Orient is thought to emanate (ex Oriente lux). However, a fifth element, the influence the unconscious has on somatic processes, only found articulation two years later in a letter to Georg Groddeck (Freud, 1985b, p. 20 [translated for this edition]). If the linking of disease and Orient typically betrays modernist anxieties, it also responds to more entrenched Western representations of “Oriental degeneracy.” Overall, Freud’s concept of the unconscious is clearly distinguishable as a space of radical otherness and as the quintessential “Orient”.

To re-make the connection to the field of archaeology and to take up the second part of our earlier concern—the dynamics of repression—we
will briefly discuss Freud’s psychoarchaeological work *par excellence*, “Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s *Gradiva*” (1907a). Effectively, it examines a piece of then popular literature by entering and exiting an “archaeological sphere of imagination”, a privileged space of excavation which comes to dominate the entire text. Staged around the most prominent of nineteenth century European archaeological tourist destinations, Pompeii, Italy, Freud’s idea of “repression” is here explained along psychoarchaeological faultlines:

> There is, in fact, no better analogy for repression, by which something in the mind is at once inaccessible and preserved, than burial of the sort to which Pompeii fell a victim and from which it could emerge once more through the work of spades. (Freud, 1915d, p. 40)

> Es gibt wirklich keine bessere Analogie für die Verdrängung, die etwas Seelisches zugleich unzugänglich macht und konserviert, als die Verschüttung, wie sie Pompeji zum Schicksal geworden ist, und aus der die Stadt durch die Arbeit des Spatens wieder erstehen konnte. (Freud, 1915d, p. 65)

Nicholas Rand and Maria Torok (1997) discussed the *Gradiva* in much detail and not without psychoanalytical insight into Freud’s unconscious. In their attempt to unearth some of Freud’s own repressed strata of the soul, beneath his elaboration of Jensen’s “Pompeian Fancy” they locate an unspoken family-trauma which, according to them, ultimately informed Freud’s way of conceptualising psychoanalysis. The authors describe it as “a trauma of inaccessibility” originating with the conviction of Freud’s uncle Josef by the Austrian Imperial Court in 1866 for circulating counterfeit money. The case also incriminated Freud’s father Jacob, his two older half-brothers, Emanuel and Phillip, and was repeatedly reported in the Austrian press. Rand and Torok’s main point is that young Freud’s inability to break through the family-silence profoundly affected his subsequent psychoanalytic research (1997, pp. 145–155). Rand and Torok’s reading of *Gradiva* highlights the way in which Freud’s need to fit his model of sexual repression in the Pompeian mould led him to overlook a major contradiction. They identified “two incompatible ideas” in Freud’s attempt to link a) the protagonist who “suffers from sexual repression” to b) a discussion of the mechanism of repression based on “the fate of the ancient Pompeii” (Rand & Torok, 1997, pp. 77–78). Thus, if we define repression in terms of a *dynamic* concept, that is, as a continuous struggle between two
opposing forces involving censorship on the one hand and the return of the repressed on the other, then the Pompeian analogy must fall apart. Most significant to our discussion remains the fact that Rand and Torok reject Freud’s statement of there being “no better analogy for repression” by clarifying why Pompeii, “at once inaccessible and preserved”, cannot hold as an explanatory image for the dynamics of repression (1979, p. 79; see also Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 393).

As we will see, Freud felt the need to reach the Orient and the Sphinx to “solve” the problem/riddle. Thus, in the *ante bellum* summer of 1914, only weeks before the July crisis and the subsequent outbreak of WWI, Freud added a crucial footnote to *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), in which he turned to an exotic and unequivocally Orientalist travel-metaphor so as to illustrate the workings of the unconscious and, in particular, the dynamics of repression (we find the same footnote inserted into the 1915 edition of his *Three Essays on Sexuality*). Here, Freud’s analogy centres on Egypt and the historical and archaeological uniqueness of the Great Pyramid of Giza as seen through the eyes of the tourist:

In any account of the theory of repression, it would have to be laid down that a thought becomes repressed as a result of the combined influence upon it of two factors. It is pushed from the one side (by the censorship of the Cs.) and pulled from the other (by the Ucs.), in the same kind of way in which people are conveyed to the top of the Great Pyramid. (Freud, 1900a, p. 547)

In einer Darstellung der Lehre von der Verdrängung wäre auszuführen, daß ein Gedanke durch das Zusammenwirken zweier ihn beeinflussenden Momente in die Verdrängung gerät. Er wird von der einen Seite (der Zensur des Bw) weggestoßen, von der anderen (dem Ubw) angezogen, also ähnlich wie man auf die Spitze der großen Pyramide gelangt. (Freud, 1900a, p. 553)

It should be remembered that Freud’s tourist metaphor is almost identical to a passage in Gerard de Nerval’s 1851 *Voyage en Orient* in which the Great Pyramid is again demoted from royal burial site to panoptic viewing platform as “teams of Bedouins” were organised “to heave and push the writer or tourist to the top, where two more Bedouins would carry the European on their shoulders to all four corners, to observe the view” (in Mitchell, 1991, p. 24). Tourist attractions aside, the tense atmosphere of colonial domination that unfolds
in the foregoing passage is completely ignored. Instead, together with his admiring references to “hieroglyphics” and other uncounted treasures of the land of the Nile—the cradle of civilisation—these decidedly positive representations remain inextricably linked to their flipside, that is, to a set of demeaning images of the Orient. Indeed, we find in Freud’s writings numerous references to “Turkey” which is always identified with the Ottoman Empire and always framed in negative ways.

In the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* we are told: “These Turks place a higher value on sexual enjoyment than on anything else, and in the event of sexual disorders they are plunged in a despair which contrasts strangely with their resignation towards the threat of death” (Freud, 1901b, p. 3). In a brief but prominent exchange of letters with Albert Einstein on the topic of *Why War?* Freud wrote: “It is impossible to make any sweeping judgment upon war of conquest. Some, such as those waged by the Mongols and Turks, have brought nothing but evil.” (1933b, p. 207) Sustained by a number of similar instances, there can be little doubt, “Turkey” is treated by the author of *The Ego and the Id* rather harshly and represented in terms of backwardness and cruelty, which reflects the general tone that comes to the fore whenever he refers to Austro-Hungary’s immediate (imperialist) neighbour, the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Freud’s Egypt, where the Jewish people left slavery behind to find perhaps one of their greatest moments of self-making, is consistently idealised, whereas Turkey, seen as the persistence of barbarism, despotic rule and bondage, is constantly devalued.

There can be little doubt that Freud’s Orientalist discourse is characterised by its double oppositionality (Occident/Orient; positive/negative Orient/s) and thus complicated by its operations of West-Eastern splitting in the process of defence. After focusing on the development of psychoanalysis through the lens of Freud’s Orientalist discursive practices, we have reached a propitious moment for reversal and should attempt to look at Orientalism from a psychoanalytical perspective. In the course of reviewing Freud’s Orientalist leanings, we have witnessed not only the production and polarisation of Occident and Orient, but also the unfolding of a dual Orient: there is, on the one hand, a good/noble Orient (Egypt) and juxtaposed to it, on the other, a bad/miserable Orient (Turkey). This dividing of the Oriental object into benign and malign opposites betrays an archaic defence mechanism. While good and bad components will have relatively distinct roles in

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THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL SPHERE OF IMAGINATION

53
the interplay of introjections and projections within each individual, it becomes plausible to transpose our psychoanalytical insight in regards to the splitting of the ego in the process of defence onto Freud’s own Orient/s, his Orientalist discursive practices and, finally, his turning these against the threats—imagined or real—of both “Eastern” Jewry and “Western” anti-Semitism.

**West-Eastern binaries**

There are a number of binaries in Freud’s writings similar to those we discussed earlier (Occident/Orient). These include the unconscious and consciousness systems as well as Freud’s notions of the hidden and the exposed. This all-encompassing dualism is equally expressed in the continued pervasiveness of “Pompeii” as a *locus classicus* for the archaeological metaphor that gave it a special place in Freud’s “archaeological sphere of imagination.” Hence, there are several instances in which “Pompeii” and all that is associated with it (the rain of ashes and instant death, the floods of lava and its—Pharaoh-like—burial as preservation) appears in Freud’s texts. Thus, just two years after his discussion of Jensen’s *Gradiva* Freud returned to the site in his *Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis* (1909d):

I then made some short observations upon the psychological differences between the conscious and the unconscious, and upon the fact that everything conscious was subject to a process of wearing away, while what was unconscious was relatively unchangeable; and I illustrated my remarks by pointing to antiquities standing about in my room. They were in fact, I said, only objects found in a tomb, and their burial had been their preservation: the destruction of Pompeii was only beginning now that it had been dug up. (Freud, 1909d, pp. 176–177)

Ich erläuterte meine kurzen Angaben über die psychologischen Unterschiede des Bewußten vom Unbewußten, über die Usur, der alles Bewußte unterliegt, während das Unbewußte relativ unveränderlich ist, durch einen Hinweis auf die in meinen Zimmer aufgestellten Antiquitäten. Es seien eigentlich nur Grabfunde, die Verschüttung habe für sie die Erhaltung bedeutet. Pompeji gehe erst jetzt zugrunde, seitdem es aufgedeckt sei. (Freud, 1909d, pp. 400–401)
Freud begins by making an important distinction, characterising the unconscious as “relatively unchangeable” and describing all that pertains to consciousness as being “subject to a process of wearing away”. The distinction conveys both psychoanalytical (temporal, i.e. psychobiographical) as well as archaeological (spatial, i.e. multi-layered) dimensions and it does so by employing an opposition (“unchangeable” vs. changeable). If, surprisingly, the unconscious and consciousness systems are here represented as one genuine dichotomy, we should remind ourselves that Freud’s first topography originally included a third agency, the “pre-conscious”, to mediate between the two poles of the system. This meant giving the Ucs. (unconscious system) no access to the Cs. (conscious system) “except via” the Pcs. (preconscious system) (1900a, p. 541). With the preconscious left out, the corresponding Pompeian dimensions in which the Ucs. stands for the buried past (hidden) and where the Cs. takes the place of the past laid bare (exposed), strongly reinforce the operating psycho-archaeological binaries.

In spite of Freud’s persistent efforts to break down false and rigid oppositions, such as pathological vs. non-pathological, his view of the formation of the psyche is based on “a fundamental division between the outside or society and the inside or the interior emotional and mental life of the individual” (Anderson, 1996, p. 125). Ricoeur has traced Freud’s polar oppositions only to find that, indeed, they pervade his entire structure of the psyche (1970, p. 234). The same Freudian distinction between “internal” and “external” worlds is reflected in the dichotomous economies of both first and second topographies: (1) the unconscious vs. consciousness systems, and (2) in the conceptual sequence of ego/id, ego/superego, ego/world. Similar polarities traverse also Freud’s understanding of the instincts which are aligned in oppositional terms such as sexual (or libido) instincts vs. ego-instincts; object-libido vs. ego-libido; life instincts vs. death instincts which are, furthermore, accompanied by “meaningful pairs” like voyeurism/exhibitionism or sadism/masochism. It is in his *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes* (1915c) where Freud explains how “the apparatus of the soul” is dominated by three polarities: “subject (I)—object (external world); pleasure—pain; active—passive” (1915c, p. 133). Freud’s perspective finds its origins in an Enlightenment model in which the subject is juxtaposed to the object, where the secular (law) is placed in opposition to the religious (commandment) and scientific modernities (Occident) to spiritual traditions (Orient). Just like the rows of pillars in the architecture
of vast buildings, so are Freud’s psycho-archaeological polarities put in place to support larger conceptual structures.

Back to our quotation, a last battle is being fought in the concluding sentence: “Pompeii is only going down now” (Pompeji gehe erst jetzt zugrund) in the sense of losing its past-ness and its object-ness “since it is uncovered” (seitdem es aufgedeckt sei) which means that the act of un-covering now implies the total or partial destruction of the uncovered in good Schliemannian tradition. Note how this differs from the heroism that permeated Freud’s earlier use of “Pompeii” and how it has been exchanged for a much more critical perspective in which the archaeological enterprise comes to be associated with the potential undoing of its object. As a result, we have two Pompeii(s), one is associated with heroic achievement (Schliemann’s Troy and Evans’s Crete) and the other is traversed by fear of death (tomb, burial, destruction), which provides us with a perfect illustration of how there are always two names—Oedipus as love/hate or the world as Orient/Occident—and two valences attached to the deployment of binary oppositions.

Although different, yet another example for this ambivalence can be found in Freud’s last archaeologically grounded and most Orientalist inspired text. Still written before he entered a period of protracted (archaeological) silence beginning with WWI, this little known piece picks up in the Ottoman “Orient” during the final days of the Sultanate of Abdulhamid II. The Austrian excavations at Ephesus (Efes, Turkey) began in 1895 under the direction of Otto Benndorf and Rudolf Heberdey. The first spectacular artifacts, brought back from the Ephesian site with the help of the Austrian Navy, were prepared for the public between 1896 and 1901 and their first exposition took place in 1902 in Vienna’s Theseustempel. In 1905, after undergoing further restoration by the sculptor Zumbusch, the Ephesus collection found its new home in the Unteren Bellvedere. Moreover, the Academy of Sciences of Vienna began in 1906 with the publication of a series of volumes, the Forschungen in Ephesos (Explorations in Ephesus), which narrate the archaeological research and recovery process. Between 1909 and 1910, the site was closed down as a direct result of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—an intervention that greatly upset Ottoman authorities. Although during the years 1911–1913 excavations had resumed, they were interrupted again in 1914 when the struggle between European empires and nations shifted to another (battle-)ground altogether and “Austrian archaeology” in Ephesus was halted until 1925 (see Le Rider, 2002, p. 220).
True, Freud the avid traveller never saw modern Turkey for himself, however, the archaeological undertaking that was initiated by the Austrian government around the turn of the century in that region appears to have inspired him to publish a two-page article under the heading of “Great is the Diana of the Ephesians” (Freud, 1911f). The title will be familiar to Goethe readers as it was borrowed from a poem the German writer dedicated in 1812 to the former Greek town. A century later, Freud’s article, as he acknowledges in the only footnote, is heavily based on the tour-guide-style account of Felix Sartiaux’ *Villes mortes d’Asie mineure* which had been published in 1911. Sartiaux liked to present Ephesus as an exotic, Orientalised “Cité de Femmes”, a city of women, complete with “amazones” and “eunuques”. The guiding thread for Freud’s “Great is the Diana of the Ephesians” is found in the notion of immortality and the continued spiritual as well as commercial investment in one place of worship—even though each time exacted by a different goddess, or combination of goddesses. Local legend claims it was from times immemorial that Ephesus had been inhabited and dominated by “the oriental mother goddess ... Oupis”; later, under Ionnian influence, she was called “Artemis”; the Romans changed her name to “Diana” and, arriving with Paulus the apostle, eventually she was re-baptised “Maria”, the quintessential Christian mother figure.

While resisting the idea of simplistic succession, Sartiaux insists—not un-Goethe-like—on Ephesus as a place for the encounter between Occidental and Oriental worlds, while their (re)union is typically expressed in the “hybrid” cult associated with the goddess(es) Artemis/Diana. The two-page text dedicated to the “Ephesians” represents a telling instance in which Freud’s references to “archaeology” as fundamentally scientific and to the “Orient” as essentially spiritual coincide with great impact. In fact, we are facing much more significant a coincidence here than Wallace’s review of the article as “purely a piece of recreation in Freud’s beloved archaeology” (Wallace, 1983, p. 51) would have us believe. A more perceptive interpretation was put forth by Jacques Le Rider’s (2002), who proposes an anthropological reading in counterpoint of “Great is the Diana of the Ephesians” (1911f) with *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13). If, he suggests, in *Totem and Taboo* Freud makes the primal horde, the primitive father, and the father’s death as well as his commemoration constitutive moments of a “genealogy of morals” dominated by masculine power; then, in stark contrast, “Great is the Diana of the Ephesians” evokes the permanence of the maternal
goddess and of “Oriental” civilisation through Ionian colonization to Christian age. According to Le Rider, for Freud this *magna mater*, constantly dying and being born again, is profoundly linked to the image of the mother in the unconscious and to her signifying life and death, while the transmission of the law is reserved to the father figure (2002, p. 226).

Similar to Freud’s *Gradiva*, “Great is the Diana of the Ephesians” (1911f) can also be read as one long archaeological metaphor. Yet, in the stricter sense of an illustration of the workings of the mind in archaeological terms there is no archaeological metaphor to be had here. The major themes of the article, that is, the underlying imperialist and nationalist aspects of “Austrian archaeological research”, the tour-guided anthropological observations surrounding the “temple dedicated to [Oupis] Artemis (Diana) [Maria]”, and its “Orientalism proper” which is, in a far less literary then mundane fashion, framed in geopolitical terms—“Asia Minor”—, are laid out in Freud’s opening sentence:

The ancient Greek city of Ephesus in Asia Minor, for the exploration of whose ruins, incidentally, our Austrian archaeology has to be thanked, was especially celebrated in antiquity for its splendid temple dedicated to Artemis (Diana). (Freud, 1911f, pp. 342–343)

Die alte Griechenstadt Ephesos in Kleinasien, um deren Ruinen sich gerade die österreichische archäologische Forschung verdient gemacht hat, war im Altertum vor allem berühmt durch ihren grossartigen, der Artemis (Diana) geweihten Tempel. (Freud, 1911f, pp. 361–362)

The profound ambivalence of Freud’s archaeological excavations resurfaces as a splitting of the ego in the process of defence. First, with two complementing versions of “Pompeii”, one heroic, the other in fear of death, and second, in an “archaeological” article in which several archaic mother figures are described with recourse to Orientalist discourse as “life-giving/death-spreading” goddesses and where—as if with *eyes closed*—all “interpretation remains in suspense” (Le Rider, 2002, p. 238). Also, it should not be ignored how until now Freud’s arch-metaphor had played itself out on, geographically speaking, neutral grounds (remember: the closest we got to an actual archaeological site was “a little-known region” which had aroused the interest of the “explorer” in the *Aetiology of Hysteria*). Yet, with the place-naming of “Pompeii” and
“Ephesus” Freud is referring to existing, that is, to historically, politically and therefore discursively charged spaces. In this sense, we can detect an ever more self-confident handling and expression in Freud’s use of archaeological metaphors and references. Whatever the reasons are, the unavoidable question arises: why did Freud avoid employing the archaeological metaphor after 1912 and until 1927?

The depth of psychology

The temporary and yet significant disappearance of Sigmund Freud’s beloved archaeological metaphor between 1912 and 1927 raises a number of questions: why was the archaeological metaphor, and with it all other references to archaeology, suddenly banned? Why did all psycho-archaeological analogies disappear for the time span of fifteen years? How did the archaeology metaphor eventually make its way back into Freud’s writings? While there is no single explanation for the fifteen-year absence of the archaeological theme, several reasons could be considered. There is “the rise of interest in the structural vs. topographical model; WWI and its immediate aftermath, which was overall not one of Freud’s most productive periods; and growing attention he dedicated to meta-psychology” (O’Donoghue, 2002, personal communication). To contextualise the unexpected reappearance of the arch-metaphor a decade and a half after its premature demise, we should keep in mind that Freud’s interest in archaeology had never waned. On the contrary, he had extended his readings in the field and references to archaeology continue to abound in his letters and diaries. Likewise, Freud’s collection of antiquities grew steadily even during the difficult war years and, as we know from later works, he continued to follow the development of particular excavations and never renounced the study of archaeological sites, objects, and their interpretations. It is certainly not too far from the truth to consider Freud’s turning away from the archaeological metaphor in relation to his breaking up with and distancing himself from C. G. Jung, the man who had contributed so much to his archaeOrientalism.

Once archaeology is discarded, a further question arises: did Freud replace the archaeological metaphor with another, different or similar rhetorical device during the fifteen-year period in question? Noteworthy, and as indexed in both the Gesammelte Werke (1999) as well as the Standard Edition (1981), the one term that had become available after
1910 and which resembled the archaeological metaphor at least on the surface was Eugen Bleuler’s newly coined term “Tiefenpsychology” (depth psychology) (1910; see also Hell, 2001). The German edition of Freud’s collected works, the Gesammelte Werke (1999), includes in its last volume (XVIII) a Gesamtregister, or general index, showing both terms: Archäologie (archaeology) and Tiefenpsychologie (depth psychology). The term Archäologie (archaeology) is listed twice, first as analogy for psychoanalysis (Freud, 1999, pp. 45–47), then as comparison to religion (1999, p. 357). A further entry serves to distinguish Freud’s Archäologisches Symbol (archaeological symbol) for repression as seen in “Pompeii” (1999, p. 65). The term Tiefenpsychologie (depth psychology) is listed with eight sub-entries and a total of twelve citations, thus a very substantial entry. Then there are two more related references: Tiefen-dimension (dimension of depth) and Tiefen-analyse (in-depth analysis). If the first is in place to emphasise the idea of Tiefe (depth), the second proposes a more stratified understanding of doing analysis.

Similarly, the final volume (XXIV) of the Standard Edition (1981) contains a variety of indexes and bibliographies. Although these show no entry for “archaeology” in its General Subject Index, there is one for “Depth-psychology” (1981, p. 41). Yet, in its List of Analogies we find three entries referring to archaeology: “Archaeological excavation”, “Archaeological restoration”, and “Archaeological site”. Unfortunately, both Gesammelte Werke (1999) and Standard Edition (1981) fail to provide accurate indexing of Freud’s references to Archäologie (archaeology) and Tiefenpsychologie (depth psychology). Assisted by both German and English indexes, references from the pertinent literature and hints from friends and colleagues as well as from my own readings, in regards to “archaeology” in Freud, covering the time between 1895 and 1939, I found eleven works with a total of twenty citations. As far as “depth psychology” is concerned, for the period from 1913 to 1938, we counted a total of seventeen instances in which the term appears in Freud’s works. Research focusing on the years between 1913 and 1926 specifically, when the archaeological metaphor lay buried, indicates that the term Tiefenpsychologie (depth psychology) had been employed by Freud on fourteen occasions. Overall, no cases were found where both archaeological metaphor and reference to depth psychology would coincide; in other words, they never appear side by side, or even within the same text.

Initially invented as a more German-sounding alternative to the Philhellenic Psychoanalyse, Bleuler’s “depth psychology”, this study
argues, replaced Freud’s archaeological metaphor in the years between 1912 and 1927, entering a period of curious coexistence thereafter. That Freud would barter his highly complex, multi-layered and extremely productive archaeological metaphor for Bleuler’s rather simplistic distinction between surface and depth seems surprising to say the least. What had happened during the war years (1914–1918) and/or the inter-war years (1919–1939) to provoke this incisive change in Freud’s writing strategy? What made a simple German-language label all a sudden so preferable to a most intriguing archaeological metaphor? Interestingly, some of the answers to our questions are found in the only one of Freud’s more substantial works that never made it entirely into the Gesammelte Werke (1999) or the Standard Edition (1981).

In the year following the publication of the Standard Edition and after thirty-five years of self-imposed delay (the original English-language manuscript had been finalised in 1932) appeared Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt’s Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study (1967). One of his lesser known texts, Freud opens with a stunning statement of how “the figure of the American President, as it rose above the horizon of the Europeans, was from the beginning unsympathetic to me, and that this aversion increased in the course of years the more I learned about him and the more severely we suffered from the consequences of his intrusion into our destiny” (p. xi, my italics). In fact, the Great War brought on a twofold disaster for Austrian Jews. It entailed on the one hand an upsurge of anti-Semitic hatred (Brenner, 1998) and resulted, on the other, in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919, which sealed the dismemberment of both Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires (Rozenblit, 1998; Rodrigue, 1990). Is this what O’Donoghue had in mind when she reminded us of “WWI and its immediate aftermath”? While both Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires were traditionally inhabited by multinational, multi-ethnic, multilingual, multicultural populations of varying status (Müge Göçek, 2002; Rozenblit, 1998), Wilson’s peace treaty was designed to turn these comprehensive, confusing entities—empires of yesteryear—into single, modern nation states to better serve as fitting members in the “League of Nations”. Soon, the new German Austria, just as the new Turkey, saw formerly available spaces for engaging in multiple loyalties being erased so as to privilege and promote its recently acquired “national” identity instead. This fundamentally changed the destiny of Euro-Asian Jewry formerly governed by Habsburg and Ottoman rulers (see Brenner, 1996). Together with the
Austro-Hungarian Empire disappeared a world where one could be, just like Freud himself, “Jewish by birth, German by culture, and Austrian by nationality”. And Freud’s archaeology as metaphor eventually vanished in the same way, for it had always depended on the self-confidence of the (“Western”) KuK empire and its colonial adventures of dominance. When the archaeological metaphor finally came back it showed the unavoidable marks of its banishment as its repressed existence would allow for no return other then in the form of over-determination.

Sigmund Freud’s seventieth birthday in 1926 found him with not only fame and congratulatory notes from all over the world, but also marked by cancer (since 1923) and a serious heart condition called stenocardia. His lifestyle had changed dramatically. He had curtailed his travels, was often forced to abstain from smoking, spent much time (in pain) resting, and eventually returned to writing “archaeology”. From the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d) to “Great is the Diana of the Ephesians” (1911f) the archaeological metaphor had found steady employment in Freud’s literary production. Finally, and after a prolonged absence of fifteen years, the arch-metaphor made its double comeback in one of Freud’s most “controversial” essays. *The Future of an Illusion* (1927c) represents Freud’s fiercest critique of religion yet. The following citation consists of two separate passages. The first offers an analogy between religious illusions and dreamwork, the second proposes a further analogy, this time between the analysis of religious illusions and the dangers of archaeological excavation:

The sleeper maybe seized with a presentiment of death, which threatens to place him in the grave. But the dream-work knows how to select a condition that will turn even that dreaded event into a wish-fulfillment: the dreamer sees himself in an ancient Etruscan grave which he has climbed down into, happy to find his archaeological interests satisfied. (Freud, 1927c, p. 17)

Eine Todesahnung befällt den Schlafenden, will ihn in das Grab versetzen, aber die Traumarbeit weiß die Bedingung auszuwählen, unter der auch dies gefürchtete Ereignis zur Wunscherfüllung wird; der Träumer sieht sich in einem alten Etruskergrab, in das er selig über die Befriedigung seiner archäologischen Interessen hinabgestiegen war. (Freud, 1927c, pp. 338–339)

But now the loud voice of our opponent brings us to a halt. We are called to account for our wrong-doing. “Archaeological
interests are no doubt most praiseworthy, but no one undertakes an excavation if by doing so he is going to undermine the habitations of the living so that they collapse and bury people under their ruins”. (Freud, 1927c, p. 35)

Die laute Stimme unseres Gegners gebietet uns nun halt. Wir werden zur Rechenschaft gezogen ob unseres verbotenen Tuns. Er sagt uns: “Archäologische Interessen sind ja ganz lobenswert, aber man stellt keine Ausgrabung an, wenn man durch sie die Wohnungen der Lebenden untergräbt, so daß sie einstürzen und die Menschen unter ihren Trümmern verschüttten”. (Freud, 1927c, pp. 338–339)

The Etruscan grave scene goes back to one of Freud’s early travels to Italy and is reflected in a dream he recounts in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). Typically, the scene is interpreted at the oedipal level, that is, as an instance in which “children may perhaps achieve what their father has failed to …” (Freud, 1900a, p. 455). According to Alexander Grinstein (1968, pp. 414–415), Freud is pointing here to his own professional and intellectual, in one word: “scientific”, achievements, but may, in my view, just as well be alluding to his having reached Orvieto (not far from Rome)—as he did only a few years later when he arrived for the first time in Athens—and having seen Etruscan archaeology for himself. Deborah Margolis’ reading gives reason to pause in order to consider “what the ego defended against expressing, even in a dream: the wish to return to the mother’s womb (grave = coffin = womb)” (1996, pp. 146–147). In the first analogy, then, the theme of archaeology cannot be reduced to its (Etruscan) exteriority to illustrate the dream-work, showing the traces of Freud’s own Oedipal struggles.

The second analogy, in contrast, opens with a conflictive situation in which loud “opponents” are intent on bringing the archaeologist/psychoanalyst “to account for our wrong-doing” (in practising archaeology or in questioning religion). Parts of the scene described in the passage conform—and increasingly so in our days—to ordinary events in the life of cities like Milan, Florence, Rome, or Naples, where “archaeological interests” frequently clash with the growing infrastructural demands of “the living.” And yet, to imagine a site where the archaeologists in charge come to “undermine” neighbouring “habitations” only to see these “collapse” and eventually “bury people under their ruins” is as reminiscent of Pompeii’s catastrophe as it is of the horrors
of WWI. As we have seen earlier, if Freud had admitted at one time (1909d) the possibility that the process of archaeological recovery may actually entail the total or partial destruction of its object, he had never gone so far as to envision the (accidental) death of adjacent inhabitants caused by the work of archaeology. Whatever the circumstances and associations may have been, Freud’s archaeological metaphor appears in this instance alienated from earlier and decidedly more positivistic days. Is Freud here negating the archaeological metaphor? Did it thus undergo a higher form of repression and, perhaps as the result of previous, unsuccessful attempts in the application of “after-pressure” (nachdrängen), did it finally reach consciousness in the form of its negation? In other words, where archaeology had earlier been used in terms of a “constructive” analogy, through the process of negation the same metaphor is now disclosed as “destructive” element.

The best known and most often cited of Freud’s archaeological metaphors is the dramatic, multi-dimensional picture he draws of the “Eternal City” Rome in Civilization and its Discontents (1930a). Developing a simultaneous view of the architectural remains and reconstructions from several of Rome’s historic epochs, Freud clearly attempts to “do more than present-day archaeology does”. Thus, he brings together Etruscan antiquity, Roma Quadrata, the Septimontium, Servian and Aurelian periods, even the Republic, all joining in a surrealistic flight of archaeological imagination. And yet, this fantastic picture allows him to delineate the very limits of archaeological metaphorising in the service of psychoanalytical illustration. Far removed from his earlier uses of the archaeological metaphor, here we read Freud’s cautiously anti-archaeological comment:

If we want to represent historical sequence in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposing in space: the same space cannot have two different contents. Our attempt seems to be an idle game. It has only one justification. It shows us how far we are from mastering the characteristics of mental life by representing them in pictorial terms. (Freud, 1930a, p. 70)

Wenn wir das historische Nacheinander räumlich darstellen wollen, kann es nur durch ein Nebeneinander im Raum geschehen; derselbe Raum verträgt nicht zweierlei Ausfüllung. Unser Versuch scheint eine müßige Spielerei zu sein; er hat nur eine Rechtfertigung; er zeigt uns, wie weit wir davon entfernt sind,
Two of the most imposing and complex displays of the archaeology metaphor in Freud’s writings are impressive exercises in negative rhetoric (the other, Constructions in Analysis, was written in 1937 and will be discussed further below). It is therefore not the reaffirmation of the archaeological metaphor Freud is pursuing here, but, rather, the indication of its impossibility. In other words, apparently put in place for no other reason than to illustrate the indestructibility of unconscious material, the most substantial and perhaps most fascinating reflection of Freud’s “archaeological sphere of imagination” prepares the stage for its own undoing. Stating the redundancy of spatial representations in the attempt to visualise the workings of the unconscious, Freud’s archaeology as metaphor is facing its own extinction. And when he declares “a city is a priori unsuited for a comparison of this sort with a mental organism”, the arch-metaphor seems to have reached the very limits of projection. After a last imaginary trip to Rome, we find Freud’s repressed and negated archaeological metaphor languishing. In one of his most “succinct” papers with the title “Negation” (Verneinung), Freud comments on the interplay between repression and negation: “Thus the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated” (1925h, pp. 235–236). He furthermore explains negation as a way of coming to know the repressed and describes the process in terms of a “lifting” of what has been repressed, yet without removing the mechanism of repression itself. This means that the process of negation actually allows one to come—if only for a brief instant—face to face with the repressed while it does not prevent further repression. In other words, if the previous (Roman) example of Freud’s archaeological metaphor was in the end negated, the subsequent one does not necessarily follow along the same path.

In 1931, not long after the intense metaphorical excursion to Rome and only a few months after the death of his mother, Freud ventured in similarly imaginative fashion to the island of Crete in order to display his favorite metaphor for one last time in the short but explosive paper entitled On Female Sexuality:

Our insight into this early, pre-Oedipus, phase in girls comes to us as a surprise, like the discovery, in another field, of the
Freud’s intriguing use of the complex layers of Minoan-Mycenaean art for being located “behind” instead of the usual beneath “the civilisation of Greece” is explained by the artistic and definitional qualities of Minoan frescos. These had long remained hidden behind walls of later Mycenaean construction and, once uncovered, became instrumental in providing important clues for the description and classification of Minoan-Mycenaean civilisation. Yet, the present example is the last one in which the arch-metaphor operates in the way it had done for so long, that is, illustrating the workings of the unconscious. Entering the final act in the rise and fall of Freud’s archaeological metaphor this study proposes to re-read one of the most intriguing convergences of Orientalist discourse, archaeological reference, and resistance to anti-Semitism in Freud’s Moses (1939a).

Moses unveiled

We know from Freud’s correspondence with the writer Arnold Zweig (1968) how during the last two years of his life, which he spent mostly in exile in London, England, the (primal) father-figure Moses dominated his conversation, his reading, and his writing. Notwithstanding old age and failing health, Freud managed to write on other topics as well. Parallel to the first pages of Moses and Monotheism (1939a) he composed two important papers in 1937. Both are concerned with problems of analytical technique and practice and both appeared soon after completion. The first of these, Analysis Terminable and Interminable (1937c), was written at the beginning of the year and left the printing press in June. A little later, in December, Freud published the second paper under the title Constructions in Analysis (1937d).

In Constructions, Freud compares advantages and difficulties confronting analysts and archaeologists alike. As we follow his sustained comparison, several formulations directly hint at Evans’ excavations of
the Palace of Minos at Knossos. Besides, in early 1931 Freud wrote to Joan Riviere: “I possess Evans’ P. o. Cn. [Palace of Knossos] and am now reading the new, third, volume. (How I regret that it is impossible for me to take the short trip to Crete!) Thank you very much for your offer.” (Freud, 1992b, p. 282; see also Hilda Doolittle’s conversations with Freud about Crete and Evans’ excavations there, 1974, p. 175) Moreover, Freud’s lifelong friendship with the archaeologist Emanuel Löwy is of great interest in this regard. Löwy’s knowledge of Greece and its late archaic art as well as his expertise in dating artifacts and cultural and archaeological periods was appreciated well beyond his home university in Rome. He had been working with Minoan material himself and was a colleague of Federico Halbherr, the leading Italian archaeologist responsible for excavations in Crete. Löwy shared with Freud the latest news from the world stage of archaeological sites, he helped him with the evaluation of certain pieces of his collection of antiquities and gave him important advice on the intricacies of Egyptian chronology (Wolf, 1998, pp. 61–71).

Further into the text, and in reference to the recovery of the analysand’s early childhood history, Freud names the familiar “Pompeii” once more, even if this time dwarfed in the company of the mysterious “Tut’ankhamun.” This impressive list(ing) of archaeological sites, however, did not prevent him from turning for a third time against the archaeological metaphor to delineate the limits of its effectiveness in the illustration of psychoanalytical concepts. Similar then to the passage we read in Civilization and its Discontents (1930a) where the arch-metaphor appeared in perhaps its most complex form only to be negated, here we want to re-open the counter-archaeological conclusion Freud arrives at in Constructions in Analysis (1937d):

But our comparison between the two forms of work can go no further than this; for the main difference between them lies in the fact that for the archaeologist the reconstruction is the aim and end of his endeavours while for analysis the construction is only preliminary labour. (Freud, 1937d, pp. 259–260)

Und nun kommt unser Vergleich der beiden Arbeiten auch zu einem Ende, denn der Hauptunterschied der beiden liegt darin, daß für die Archäologie die Rekonstruktion das Ziel und das Ende der Bemühung ist, für die Analyse aber ist die Konstruktion nur eine Vorarbeit. (Freud, 1937d, pp. 45–47)
The archaeological metaphor as we knew it “can go no further than this”, comes here to its end and finally surrenders to the objections brought on by Freud himself. His conclusion distinguishes “archaeology”, a field where the practice of reconstruction represents “the aim and end of its endeavours” from “analysis”, a process in which “the construction is only preliminary labour”, while the gulf he opens between them puts all comparison to rest. Our assessment of the vicissitudes of the archaeological metaphor is, therefore, not only forced to record one more negation, more importantly, it comes to distinguish three phases in its overall development: affirmation (1895–1912), repression (1913–1926), and negation (1927–1937). This unfolding—in three acts—is of no little significance for our understanding of the concluding appearance of “archaeology” in the Egyptian theater of Freud’s Moses and Monotheism (1939a). Although generously displayed during the first (Fin-de-Siècle to WWI); in the second act (end of empire to nation state) the archaeological metaphor disappears entirely, only to return in the third (national crisis to Finis Austriae) when it is repeatedly negated and finally laid to rest. Almost in concert with the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Freud’s archaeological metaphor exhausts itself in a dramatic finale before the curtain is lowered and then raised once again for an unexpected encore.

Freud’s last major work consisted in a project he had been working on since 1934, if not much earlier (Blum, 1991). It was, effectively, the continuation of a conversation with the highly symbolic Jewish figure Freud had begun in his childhood, in part through oral transmission, in part by being “engrossed” in the reading of Philippson’s Bible. If the Old Testament had deeply impressed young Sigismund as Pfrimmer (1982) concludes, his strong identification with Moses “the liberator, lawgiver and founder of religion” can equally be traced back to his infancy. Associated with the ambition to enter, or at least to view, “the Promised Land” of psychoanalysis, as we have seen, Freud directly engaged the biblical figure in The Interpretation of Dreams in 1900. An engagement he was to consolidate in The Moses of Michelangelo (1914b), extend in his Postscript (1927b), and conclude in Moses and Monotheism (1939a). This sustained focus on Moses begs the question of Freud’s Jewish identity and its impact on the development of psychoanalysis. If he has been defended as a great scientist whose Jewishness was merely incidental (Wittels, 1924; Jones, 1981; Gay, 1978), others argued that he was essentially Jewish which is seen as central to the conceptualisation
of psychoanalysis (Bakan, 1990, Roith, 1987). For a third group, psychoanalysis represents the outcome of a compromise between scientific modernity and Jewish traditionalism (Rieff, 1966; Ricoeur, 1970). Some writers have stressed in this context Freud’s assimilationist leanings (Schorske, 1980; Le Rider, 2002), others have emphasised his Jewishness (Klein, 1980; Rice, 1990; Yerushalmi, 1991). These differences in the perspective of readers are also apparent in the assessment of Freud’s last major work as a growing number of commentaries have become available in recent years. Thus, Freud’s *Moses and Monotheism* is embraced as a “courageous” act of resistance (Loewenberg, 1971) or rejected as an “apologetic” response to anti-Semitism (Bernal, 1987). Furthermore, while the book has been explained as the return to Freud’s “repressed Jewish identity” (Bernstein, 1998; Yarushelmi, 1991; Rice, 1990; Robert, 1977); it was also hailed as his ultimate siding with “Enlightened universalism” (Hegener, 2001; Jonte-Pace, 2001; Assmann, 1998; Grubrich-Simitis, 1994).

An overview of Freud’s main hypotheses advanced in his *Moses and Monotheism* would have to include the following: (1) Moses was an Egyptian; (2) Moses converts the Jews to monotheism; (3) Moses was murdered; (4) his religion of the father (Judaism) is superseded by the religion of the son (Christianity). The first point implies the breakdown of the racist opposition between Jew and non-Jew which is the platform on which anti-Semitism operates. Thus, rather than othering Moses in the Orientalist sense, Freud is busy with selfing or “Westernising” the biblical figure as the (Egyptian) inventor of monotheism. Freud’s move turns all Orientalist discourse on its head and into its other: Occidentalism (Carrier, 1992; 1995). The second point is of no less consequence as Freud prepares the transition from ontogeny to phylogeny and from individual to group psychology. In fact, he undertakes to historicise and thereby to universalise the Jews and their “Egyptian” religion, which is an exercise in Enlightenment ideology with strong Occidentalist connotations. With very much the same objective in mind, in the third point Freud looks at the universal law in psychoanalysis, namely, the Oedipus complex and the parricide which turns Moses into the primal father and picks up the universalist thread Freud had left off in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13). Finally, the fourth point centres on the return of the repressed—somewhat burdened by the addition of phylogenetic theories—in the attempt to explain the transmission of tradition. Among other things, this fundamental psychoanalytical
concept allowed him to ignore traditional hermeneutics and to regain modern psychology, that is, universal, “Western” science (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 246).

Faced by the multitude and complexity of the issues raised in Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, here we will focus on the two aspects most pertinent to this chapter: what does this text reveal in terms of archaeology and Orientalism? To begin with, we have an Orientalist thesis (“Moses was Egyptian”) constructed by way of Orientalist approach (selective use of archaeological, historical, philological “evidence”). However, on closer examination a different picture emerges. Freud’s characterisation of the man Moses as a masculine, dominant father figure, a lawgiver who “founds” religion (monotheism) and “makes” people (Jewish), a wrathful and feared patriarch who enforces a rationalistic religion based on “instinctual renunciation” comes to represent the “true” origins of the West. It has been argued that the model for Freud’s “man” Moses was not borrowed from possible biblical ancestors and much rather taken from then popular images of Germanic masculinity (Boyarin, 1997). Is Freud’s Moses then resembling Hermann, the Teutonic hero who defeated various Roman legions? The German nationalist (ab)uses of the figure of Hermann have been noted by a number of historiographers (Schlüter & Clunn, 2009). Freud’s writing Moses as Hermann can make sense only when read in Pellegrini’s terms of “whiteface performance” (1997) including both the repudiation of Jewish models of masculinity and the identification with the Teutonic aggressor. Moses, here the muscle Jew, the Trotzjude or “defiant Jew” according to Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz (1980), illustrates Freud’s doubledness, both his resistance to and his identification with the aggressor.

On the one hand, Freud masculinises Moses and Occidentalises Judaism while, on the other, he feminises Jesus and Orientalises Christianity in an explosive reversal that responds, once again, to the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the Jew as feminized Oriental” (Le Rider, 1991a, p. 110). Freud’s reversal of anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse in Moses can also be read as an extended comment on Nietzsche’s remarks in Human All Too Human (1999) in which he points to Christianity and the Bible as orientalising the West, whereas Judaism has helped again and again to Occidentalise it in turn. (“Wenn das Christenthum Alles getan hat, um den Occident zu orientalisiren, so hat das Judenthum wesentlich dabei mitgeholfen, ihn immer wieder zu occidentalisieren.”)
(Nietzsche, 1999, pp. 310–311; Chemouni, 1988, pp. 45–46; Pfrimmer, 1982). However, Freud’s strategic reversal represents a pyrrhic victory as it remains enmeshed with the historical assumptions of Orientalism. Effectively, Freud’s Moses appears not as the feminised Oriental but precisely as its opposite, the muscle Jew who, Hermann-like, incarnates the will to power of the “West”. According to Robertson’s scheme, Freud’s Moses and Monotheism is a response that remains caught up in the Orientalist discourse of the anti-Semite.

The moving sands of Empire had swallowed the archaeological metaphor. And yet, unseen in any of his previous works, there are seven archaeological references in Freud’s Moses and Monotheism (1939a) and they all share one underlying strategy radically different from past uses: archaeology is now inserted as scientific “evidence” and, in this case, in support of a chronology that can accommodate a historical man Moses. Tracing the history of the Egyptian founder of monotheism, “Akhenaten”, to be the “Pharaoh of the Exodus”, Freud’s first archaeological reference in Moses and Monotheism directs our attention to the “royal capital”, meanwhile turned into an important “ruined site … now known as Tell el-‘Amarna”. The second, surrounding the question of “where the Jews derived the custom of circumcision from”, is answered by Herodotus who maintains that it “had long been indigenous to Egypt” which was eventually “confirmed by the findings in mummies and indeed by pictures on the walls of tombs”. Again, in the context of dating the Exodus of the people of Israel from Egypt, and thus of linking the Pharaoh (Akhenaten) to his Moses, Freud cites in his third archaeological reference a number of “letters found” 1887 in the archives of “the ruined city of Amarna”. The fourth calls (in a footnote) on “Evans” to back up Freud’s speculations on the origins of the volcano god Yahweh in connection with the general rise of male gods and the fall of mother goddesses in the Eastern Mediterranean and its relation to the possibility that “the final destruction of the Palace of Minos at Knossos too was the consequence of an earth-quake”. Note that for the archaeologist earthquakes provide significant chronological data, which are obtained, for example, by way of dendrochronology, or the counting of tree rings. In the fifth reference we return to Freud’s persistent need to bring his historical Moses and the date of the Exodus together which is supposedly accomplished with the help of the “only fixed point for the chronology (which) is afforded by the stela of (the Pharaoh) Merenptah (1225–15 B.C.) …”. In the sixth reference, Freud
maintains that “with our present psychological insight”, even before “Schliemann and Evans”, we could have successfully inquired into the question “where it was that the Greeks obtained all the legendary material” that was later turned into their own. The seventh and final archaeological reference concludes with Freud’s remark that the Minoan-Mycenaean civilisation “had probably come already to an end on the mainland of Greece before 1250 B.C.” (Freud, 1939a, pp. 23, 26–27, 29, 46 fn, 48, 70: for full citations in English and German see Appendix 2). Overall, Freud’s archaeological “evidence” in Moses and Monotheism is less concerned with artifacts than with chronologies. And the chronologies were of strategic importance in responding to the anti-Semitic stereotype: Moses is unveiled not as the feminised Oriental but as the quintessential Western “man”.

It is useful to hold on to some of the threads we followed in tracing archaeology and Orientalism in the works of Sigmund Freud. The two main objectives of this chapter consisted a) in following the vicissitudes of the archaeological theme while making use of its potential for unlocking Freud’s Orientalist discourse; and (b) in tracing the imprint of nineteenth and twentieth century archaeOrientalism in the development of psychoanalytic theory. We set out with the premise of Freud’s construction of an “Occidental” self as a male-scientist, as a Jew, and as an Orientalist to reverse and thereby to resist the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the feminised Jew as Oriental”. Five points are important to us here: first, we made an early connection between archaeological metaphor, Orientalist discourse, and anti-Semitic stereotypes meeting with the Western (read: white) heroes of archaeology (Schliemann; Evans) and psychoanalysis (Jung). Second, our exploration of Freud’s “Orient/s” showed how deeply engrained archaeOrientalist discourses are in the foundational concepts of psychoanalysis (the unconscious; repression). Third, we clearly demonstrated the doubly duplicitous character (Occident/Orient; good/bad) of West-Eastern splitting in the process of defence. Fourth, following the arch-metaphor from beginning to end, its demise goes hand in hand with the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which exhausts itself in a dramatic finale (affirmation/repression/negation). Fifth, reading Moses and Monotheism led us to Freud’s most “atypical” work employing both Orientalist thesis and methods while advancing universalist claims. Finally, we witnessed how Freud made use of archaeOrientalist themes to enable a strategic reversal that “unveils” a muscular, masculine, and westernised Moses who is to resist a gendered, anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse.
CHAPTER THREE

Travelling the Via Regia*

The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind.

—*Freud, 1900a, p. 608

Die Traumdeutung aber ist die Via regia zur Kenntnis des Unbewußten im Seelenleben.

—*Freud, 1900a, p. 613

The fathomable depths of Sigmund Freud’s classic voice, meaning those instances in which he made use of particular terms or given expressions in Latin or Greek, have not been measured out with accuracy. Even though this apparent lacuna in the exploration of Freud’s works has not gone unnoticed (Steiner, 1988), only little has been written on the subject. Bruno Bettelheim (1984)

*An earlier version of this chapter was presented as an illustrated lecture at the London Freud Museum during the celebrations of the 150th anniversary on May 9th, 2006. This lecture was also given several times along the *Via Regia* in 2005 such as in the *Literarische Salons* of the Sigmund-Freud-Buchhandlung in Frankfurt as well as at the *Europäische Informationzentrum Thüringen* in Erfurt, Germany.

73
initiated a critical reflection on the theme and others took up his lead to contribute to a general discussion of Freud’s usage of Greek and Latin terminologies and their English translations (Ornston, 1992; Gilman, 1991). Starobinsky’s (1999) meticulous examination of Freud’s effective Latin epigram (Flectere Si Nequeo Superos, Acheronta Movebo) pointed the way to more detailed knowledge, but tells only part of the story. Moreover, where not transposed from the original intact, their various translations into modern languages have complicated the matter even further. Such is the case with Freud’s perhaps most paradigmatic use of Latin, the Via Regia (see above). Surprisingly, and in spite of its ongoing and multifaceted existence as the language of ancient Rome, of the Catholic Church, and of entrenched sectors in the academic world, Freud’s insertion of the Latinate Via Regia remains largely unknown to English-language readers for having been translated out of the most disseminated publication of his writings, the English language Standard Edition (1981).

Freud first spoke the Via Regia in his third lecture on psychoanalysis at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, on September 17, 1909, which he gave in German oratio, then still in use as a lingua franca among European and North American scientists. In the English language Freud’s Via Regia is better known as the “royal road” to which it was converted by James and Alix Strachey and a prestigious team of translators (1900a, p. 608). Yet, we ignore whether they chose the royal road to replace Freud’s Via Regia because they fancied the French translational precedent—voie royale—offered by Meyerson in 1921, or because there are no fewer than six royal roads within the limits of the City of London, the place where the Stracheys lived and worked.

Earlier as well as later English translations such as those of Harry Chase (1910), Abraham Brill (1913), and Saul Rosenzweig (1994) kept the Latinate Via Regia intact. A comparative reading of twenty-seven translations of Freud’s Via Regia from three major European language groups (Germanic, Slavic, and Romance) clearly shows how the vast majority of translators kept the Latinate in place (see Appendix 3). But, if Spanish, Icelandic, and Bulgarian translators all endeavoured to stay close to the original, it appears particularly puzzling that Strachey—who made his indelible mark on the emerging international language of psychoanalysis by enforcing a medicalised Latin/Greek vocabulary—would insist on erasing the Via Regia, replacing it not with the biblical “king’s road” but with a much more mundane “royal road”. Whatever the translator’s motivation for this particular choice may have been, in
the attempt to map some of the latent meanings of Freud’s unconscious onto the early history of psychoanalysis the “royal road” reveals itself as an interpretative impasse that resists association with the original Latin form. The objective of this chapter consists, therefore, in reclaiming Freud’s Via Regia from translational oblivion and, simultaneously, in recovering part of its associative and interpretative potential. The task is challenging and promising enough to advance a first premise by reconfiguring Freud’s paradigmatic statement to the following outcome: the Via Regia is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious of the interpretation of dreams (psychoanalysis).

Inspired by three of his great passions—topography, travel, and translation—this chapter explores Freud’s Via Regia as much as possible along its century-old course and in situ. Travelling Europe’s oldest and longest West-Eastern route, the Via Regia offers a multiplicity of unexpected entry points to Freud’s vita and oeuvre. More precisely, our journey will provide additional insight into the complex convergences of Freud’s Jewishness, the daily “anti-Semitic challenge” facing him which acquired ever more aggressive forms of expression in twentieth-century Austro-Hungary, and the vicissitudes of Orientalist discourse Freud engaged as a strategy for reversal. Our itinerary is, then, a tour de force into a semi-Orient where we will meet with the dreaded figure of the Ostjude and Freud’s Eastern Jewish origins.

In America: an Orientation

Susan Sherwin-White published a short and daring article entitled “Freud, the Via regia, and Alexander the Great” (2003, pp. 187–93). Combining her interest in the history of psychoanalysis with her expertise in Hellenistic Near-Eastern studies, Sherwin-White offers an uncommonly imaginative reading. Freud, in emulation of his boyhood idol Alexander the Great, goes to conquer America where he employs the Via Regia for the first time. She then suggests “the via regia is the great royal road of the ancient world, the ancient Persian royal road … the Achaemenid system of royal roads … from India to Turkey, via Babylonia”. It was also along this royal road system that Alexander the Great marched to overthrow the “barbarian Persians”. Shortly after equating the latter with whom she calls “Freud’s barbarian Americans”, Sherwin-White restates and emphasises her claim: “this was the via regia”. 

In pursuing two tracks simultaneously, Sherwin-White has one eye on Freud’s heroic identification with “Alexander the Great” (i.e. young Sigismund’s idealisation of the quintessential “Western” hero whose military exploits in the Orient result in the founding of a new Occidental empire) and the other fixed on the “momentous incursion of psychoanalysis into the New World” (i.e. Freud’s five lectures, which opened to him a new and receptive North American audience). The Alexandrian track clearly points to Sandor Ferenczi’s early concept of “identification with the aggressor” (2004, pp. 303–13), which was later more fully elaborated by Anna Freud (1946a, pp. 117–31; for an insightful overview of its conceptual development see Britzman, 2005, pp. 234–256). Conversely, the “New World” track hints at Freud’s protracted struggle with anti-Semitism in Europe at large and in his hometown Vienna especially (Mitscherlich, 1969; Gay, 1978; Klein, 1985; Gilman, 1993a). Most importantly, the deep ambivalence in identifying with and fending off the aggressor at the same time would have been worth a discussion in psychoanalytical terms. Unfortunately, Sherwin-White shunned the possibilities of a psychoanalytical evaluation of the materials at hand. Still, we can say this much: Freud in the USA appeals to Sherwin-White as the Western hero who takes the East coast by storm, when we should in fact remind ourselves that he also came as a victim, persecuted by the ever more aggressive ravages of twentieth-century anti-Semitism.

The Via Regia runs through Freud’s works in two places. Its first employment occurs in the “intimate” revisions of the second printing of Die Traumdeutung undertaken in the summer of 1909. The next and last such employment followed in November that year in Über Psychoanalyse. Fünf Vorlesungen (1910a), writing up the lectures he had just given at Clark University. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a, p. 608) the “royal road” immediately follows the Latin epigram Freud had borrowed from Virgil’s Aeneid (VII, p. 312), the famous “Flectere Si Nequeo Superos, Acheronta Movebo” (If I cannot bend the Higher powers, I will move the Infernal regions). Jean Starobinski has discussed Virgil’s passage at length. He emphasises its “chiasmatic arrangement” and identifies a double antithesis. One is the opposition between “Higher” powers and lower, “Infernal” regions; the other between the present tense of impotence (nequeo) and the future tense of putting into action (movebo) (1999, p. 20). Less grammatically inclined, Ellenberger commented that these were “Juno’s words when Jupiter refused to prevent
Aeneas from becoming King of Latium”, and that they can be interpreted as “referring to Freud’s failure to obtain academic recognition in his revolutionising the science of the mind” (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 452). Yet, Freud’s “failure”, Ellenberger failed to mention, cannot be fully understood without confronting the anti-Semitic racism of his time.

In Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1910a, p. 33) the “royal road” is found in the third lecture where Freud opens with a painstaking preamble: “It seemed to me almost indecent in a country which is devoted to practical aims to make my appearance as a ‘dream-interpreter’, before you could possibly know the importance that can attach to that antiquated and derided art.” The use of the term “indecent” immediately places Freud and his audience in an ethico-moral arena, a space doubly divided into good and bad spheres. On the one hand we have a “(Western) country devoted to practical aims” and, on the other, Freud’s “(Oriental) appearance as dream-interpreter.” This West-Eastern split replays the then common racist stereotype of “the Jew as Oriental”. The theme of Jew vs. Gentile is subtext also to the second oppositional pair that emerges in the latter half of the sentence. Here, Freud mystifies his modern and self-confident (American) colleagues, “before you could possibly know” (psychoanalysis), you need to understand “the importance that can attach” to (dream interpretation) the art of an “antiquated and derided” (Jewish) people. Our contextual reading of Freud’s Via Regia in both The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and the Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1910a) leads to questions of Jewishness, anti-Semitism, and Orientalist discourse.

Out of Egypt: anti-Semitic antiquities

The earliest appearance of the Via Regia occurs in the Bible’s Old Testament (Torah, Bamidbar, 20:17) (1960). Meaning a road under royal tutelage (via in Regis tutela est), it is the ecclesiastical Latin translation of the Hebrew term derekh hammelekh (the king’s way). In the last pages of A Compulsion for Antiquity: Freud and the Ancient World, Richard Armstrong lays out the biblical antecedents of the Via Regia (2005, pp. 249–251). He explains how derekh hammelekh indicates the old commercial road that runs from the Red Sea (Aqaba) to the Syrian capital (Dimashq), how the Israelites, fleeing Egypt and being led by Moses, tried to make their way to Israel through the kingdom of Edom and along the “king’s high-way” and, finally, how Edom refused them
passage. In a current, bilingual edition of *The Pentateuch and Haftorahs* (Hebrew Bible), Numbers Chapter 20, the narrative reads as follows:

14 And Moses sent messengers from Kadesh unto the king of Edom: “Thus saith thy brother Israel: Thou knowest all the travail that hath befallen us;

15 how our fathers went down into Egypt, and we dwelt in Egypt a long time; and the Egyptians dealt ill with us, and our fathers;

16 and when we cried unto HaShem, He heard our voice, and sent an angel, and brought us forth out of Egypt; and, behold, we are in Kadesh, a city in the uttermost of thy border.

17 Let us pass, I pray thee, through thy land; we will not pass through field or through vineyard, neither will we drink of the water of the wells; we will go along the king’s highway, we will not turn aside to the right hand nor to the left, until we have passed thy border.”

18 And Edom said unto him: “Thou shalt not pass through me, lest I come out with the sword against thee.”

19 And the children of Israel said unto him: “We will go up by the highway; and if we drink of thy water, I and my cattle, then will I give the price thereof; let me only pass through on my feet; there is no hurt.”

20 And he said: “Thou shalt not pass through.” And Edom came out against him with much people, and with a strong hand.

21 Thus Edom refused to give Israel passage through his border; wherefore Israel turned away from him. (1960, p. 657)

The story of “Edom” becomes associated with the “hostile gentile world” at large, refusing passage and knocking off their path Jewish people everywhere. Armstrong is absolutely correct when he comments that the paragraph “describes a historical situation all too familiar to Jews in Freud’s own day” (2005, p. 249; my italics). As a matter of fact, *The Interpretation of Dreams* shows a great number of references to Jewishness and anti-Semitism. At one point, there is a cluster of themes which includes the Promised Land, the *via dolorosa*, an old Jew’s “Konstitution”, Prague, Paris, Rome, Hamilkar Barkas and Hannibal, what it means to belong to an “alien race”, Freud’s high-school years, Massena, and Napoleon (Freud, 1900a, pp. 194–198). In the midst of this complex associative chain, Freud recounts an early experience
of anti-Semitism in an incident involving his father. One Saturday afternoon, as Jacob Freud is walking through the streets of Freiberg, well dressed and with a new fur cap on his head, a Christian came up to him and with one rude blow knocked off the cap into the mud shouting: “Jew, get off the pavement” (1900a, p. 197). Edom, then, is everywhere and the Via Regia was blocked by the anti-Semite turning it into a “via dolorosa” for the Jews.

This being said, it is not the royal road marched by Alexander the Great and his soldatesca, nor the derekh hammelekh pursued by Moses and his people we are intent on travelling. Rather, we are looking at Freud’s nineteenth-century displacement of the biblical antecedent onto “all too familiar” European terrain. The process of displacement works by disintegrating various parts of the whole, which are then reassembled in a different context and another order. Displacement tends to repress the more disagreeable elements by turning them into their opposite. According to this concept of psychic functioning, where Edom stood in for the (bad, castrating) anti-Semitic threat, the new trajectory will follow a (good, empowering) pro-Semitic promise.

The description perfectly fits the early nineteenth-century continental theatre of the Via Regia, Europe’s oldest and longest West-Eastern route. It saw Napoleon and his Grand Armée making their way from France into Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, through Eastern Europe, and into Russia; from Paris to Kyiv (Pawlow, 2001; Stubenvoll, 1990). Battling the conservative forces of Europe, Napoleon brought not just war he also came with a “Konstitution” enshrining, among other things, the emancipation of the Jews. Half a century later, when Sigmund Freud was born, the Via Regia had lost much of its former glory. Pushed aside by rapidly growing railway tracks, it soon became an idiom. Although not much in use any more, its idiomatic relevance is still recognised by German speakers today: for example, when a pupil is rewarded by her teacher for finding the ideal solution to a given problem, that is, for taking the intellectual “high road”, the Via Regia. It appears, in a similar sense, also in Karl Marx’s Capital: Preface to the French Edition, where we are cautioned early: “There is no royal road to science” (1954, p. 30). Be this as it may, road or idiom, our counter-proposal to Sherwin-White’s Alexandrian royal road is Freud’s Napoleonic Via Regia.
ACROSS EUROPE: TENTATIVE TABLEAUX

In order to provide grounding and validation for our argument, we will visit ten localities situated along the *Via Regia* and read them through Freud’s bi(bli)ography. To reach our objective we will re-enter a road that had been closed for three-quarters of a century (from the beginnings of World War I in 1914 to the dismantling of “the Wall” in 1989). And as we move from West to East, we will be making stops in Paris, Frankfurt, Weimar, Leipzig, Kamenz, Wroclaw, Pribor, Krakow, Lviv, and Brody. These ten loci are connected, on one side, by the geographic extension of the *Via Regia* and, on the other, by their being inextricably bound up with Freud’s *vita* and *oeuvre*.

Already early Chinese thinkers held the study of geography in great esteem for its interpretative possibilities. It was especially valued for enhancing one’s understanding of history and the classics (Smith, 1983). Eelco Runia (2006), in a similar vein, reminds us that Giambattista Vico, the Italian philosopher and historian, equally conceived of history as stored in “places” (1977). It is certainly worth to stay a little longer with Runia whose perceptive essay on the question of “presence”, that is, “the unrepresented way the past is present in the present” (2006, p. 1), articulates a conceptual and methodological approach which seems appropriate to our own interdisciplinary
project. Eelco Runia names several past and present authors whose works show a keen awareness of the complex terrain that is opened in his notion of “presence” such as Honoré de Balzac’s *Le colonel Chabert* (2004) or, more recently, Pierre Nora’s *Les Lieux de la Memoire* (1992). To this list we could add Edoardo Galeano’s *Memoria del Fuego* (1982) and Karl Schlögel’s *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit* (2003); all of these works attempt to translate time into space. To come to grips with this “presence”, Runia recommends adopting Vico’s “topical” view of history and brings in two more analytical building blocks. Inspired by Jacobsen’s linguistics and their Lacanian reading, he describes the process of writing as “an oscillation between a metonymic ‘syntagmatic’ pole (which connects language to the pre-linguistic world of events and impressions) and a metaphoric ‘paradigmatic’ pole (which exploits the code of linguistic signs)” (2006, p. 26). He then distinguishes between metaphor as the transfer of meaning and metonymy as the transfer of presence and concludes that metonymy is a “presence in absence” (see also Antze, 2003). Metonymy means the “substitution of a name”, which implies a renaming that is out of place, while metaphor indicates the “application of a name”, or a putting into place (OED, 1999).
In the attempt to do justice to this deeper grammar, Runia calls for an inclusive attitude tackling the problem of the simultaneousness of continuity (metaphor) and discontinuity (metonymy). He then goes on by intertwining both dimensions in his own analysis so as to advance on several “levels” simultaneously, creating at the same time the conditions that will enable us “to walk around our topic” (2006, p. 16). For our own uses of Runia’s spatio-linguistic perspectives, we want to add a few turns to his intertwinement of rhetorical threads by reading Freud’s singular metaphor, the *Via Regia*, through several metonymies, or “places”. These places, with all the convergences and fractures that are attached to them, will then become open to visitation on various planes allowing us literally to experience our *topoi in situ*.

Returning to psychoanalysis, our proposed West-Eastern journey involves a series of regressions. To begin with, regression has a *regredient* character as it is moving backwards from (pre)conscious to unconscious systems. This course is conceived by Freud as one that proceeds from light to dark (1900a, p. 511), which he captured in the famous epigram (*Flectere* …). In the *Aeneid* Aeneas must first return to the father to gain access to knowledge before he can obtain a kingdom (Anzieu, 1959; Starobinski, 1999). This is in perfect accord with the type of regression known from clinical psychoanalysis where the regression to and re-elaboration of infantile materials is necessary before any progress can be made. Another re(tro)gression forces us to advance in counter-chronological fashion. Uncovering first the more recent layers (adulthood and adolescence) to reach the more ancient ones (childhood and infancy) in successive stages means to take up the spade and to dig into Freud’s archaeology of the soul. Finally, in Orientalist terms, as Edward Said (1978) has so eloquently shown, “the West” signifies light, masculinity, reason, progress, and the (dominant) self; while “the East” is made to stand in for the opposite, that is, for darkness, femininity, the irrational, backwardness, and the (subjected) other. As we have discussed earlier, three doubled concepts will assist in our interpretative incursion: (1) Orientalism proper or the narcissism of eurocentric difference, (2) Orientalist binaries or West-Eastern splitting in the process of defence, and (3) self-Orientalisation or identification with the royal and imperial aggressor. With these three “doubled” concepts as our only guide, we begin our journey “into the darkness” of the early history of psychoanalysis in Paris, the city of lights.
In the company of his daughter Anna and her friend Dr. Stroß, the octogenarian Sigmund Freud arrived in Paris, Gare de l’Est, on June 5, 1938. For the previous day his diary shows a slightly ironic entry: “Departure 3h.25 Orient.-Express” (1992c, p. 237; my italics). Austria under Hitler aggressively persecuted its Jews and the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the Jew as Oriental” was written all over Freud’s late exile. Both Western self and Eastern other, Freud was working on a “historical novel”. At its centre there is a masculine figure giving law (monotheism) and making people (Jewish), a historical giant who renounces his instincts—Freud’s Moses, rather than feminised Oriental, turns out to be masculine and “Western”.

Half a century earlier, it was Jean Martin Charcot’s theatre de l’hystérie in the Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital, which had impressed Freud so greatly. When Charcot invited him to his home one evening, Freud found a misé-en-scéne similar to a museum (NB: the birth of psychoanalysis took place, only a decade later, in the museum-like atmosphere of his rooms in Vienna’s Berggasse). When he is not studying, he walks the city. He writes to his fiancée Martha Bernays describing the antiquities wing of the Musée du Louvre. To begin with, he enters the Greek and Roman sections which display “the large number of emperor’s busts”; followed by the Egyptian rooms with their “bas-reliefs decorated in
fiery colors, veritable colossi of kings, real sphinxes, a dreamlike world”; thereafter the oriental chambers where he found “Assyrian kings—tall as trees and holding lions for lapdogs in their arms” (1960, pp. 174–175); finally, the great halls reserved to sculptures, many of them from the Renaissance period. The Musée du Louvre exhibits a ground floor plan (rez-de-chaussée), then as today, which is almost identical to the four developmental stages of Freud’s art-historical and archaeological interests.
On Frankfurt’s oldest square, Am Römer, there is a plaque cemented in the ground. It has engraved the words of the poet Heinrich Heine who cautions “That was only a prelude; where they burn books, they ultimately burn people” (1900, p. 126). Nazi Germany burned the books, including Freud’s, on May 10, 1933. The burning of books was accompanied by “fire speeches” denouncing each author before their works were thrown into the fire. Freud’s was the fourth caller: “Against the soul-fraying over-estimation of the drives; for the nobility of the human soul; I deliver to the flames the writings of Sigmund Freud” (Friedrich, 1983; my translation).

The Goethe Prize is a book prize given to writers, not so often to scientists. However, Goethe himself placed no emphasis on the distinction between the two. On the contrary, in him we find both the scientist and the artist. Awarded by the city of Frankfurt in 1930, Sigmund Freud had to send his daughter Anna to receive it, because of his failing health. The ceremony officially recognised Freud for the first time in the German language space and proceeded in spite of anti-Semitic protests outside the city hall.

Among the few books Freud conserved from his childhood were those of Ludwig Börne (1786–1837). At the age of fourteen, he was
given Börne’s collected works. Börne was the first author Freud would enter in depth. Formerly Juda Löw Baruch, he was the Heinrich Heine of Frankfurt. Not easily categorised and more of a political journalist than a poet, Börne wrote an essay on how to become a writer in three days. He recommends writing down all that comes to mind, applying no “censorship” and thereby prefigured a basic tool of psychoanalytical technique, namely, “free association” (Freud, 1920b, pp. 263–265). Like Freud, Börne was Jewish and like Freud, Börne was born on May 6.
This was the city of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), whose search for origins in Ursprache (archaic language) fuses with the larger current of German romanticism; of Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), whose Sturm und Drang (storm and urge) champions a notion of drives that is primarily spiritual; of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), whose West-Eastern Divan overcomes Europe’s regressive split by declaring Orient and Occident as inseparably one—steadily advancing toward a world literature.

Goethe composed a poem in 1811 entitled Great is the Diana of the Ephesians. Freud responded to Goethe’s poem on its centenary in 1911 and produced an unusual two-page paper with the same title, tracing the continuity of Ephesian religious tradition from the oriental mother-goddess Oupis, to the Greek Artemis, to the Roman Diana, to the Holy Virgin Mary (1911f, pp. 342–344). If Freud makes no reference to psychoanalysis, this brief account of a constructive/destructive matriarch/goddess can be read as a pendant to Totem and Taboo (1912–13) in which he develops the idea of a strong male who violently dominates the primal horde (Le Rider, 2002, pp. 216–238).

In September 1911, Freud travelled to Weimar to attend the Third International Psychoanalytical Congress. There he delivered a paper,
his “Postscript” to the Schreber case, in which he initiates a discussion of “totemic habits of thought” (1912a, p. 81). Those who attended did not know that it was an introduction to *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13). In retrospective, Freud came to regard the Weimar congress as the mid-point between two betrayals. It was preceded by the defections of Adler and Stekel in Vienna and followed by the break-off of the Zürich group including Jung and Bleuler. Or had the father chased away his sons? (Freud, 1925d; Rudnytsky, 2002).
Sigmund Freud’s *The Interpretation of Dreams* was first published in November 1899 by Franz Deuticke Verlag. Deuticke (1850–1919) was born in Leipzig, where he was initiated into the bookshop and publishing trades. Eventually he moved to Vienna where he opened his first bookstore and publishing house (Schottengasse 6) in 1878. The printing, however, was taken care of in a third place, in Brünn (today Brno, Czech Republic), halfway between Leipzig and Vienna.

Freud was very good with maps. Already as a child had he amused himself by tracing the battles of Napoleon or in following the movements of the Prussian army as it advanced against France. In the seventh chapter of *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud cites “the great G[ustav] Th[eodor] Fechner”, founder of experimental psychology at the University of Leipzig, who put forward the idea, that the theatre of dreams may be different to that of conscious thought (1900a, p. 536). Fechner’s great influence on the development of Freud’s threefold topographies (unconscious, pre-conscious, consciousness and id, ego, superego) cannot be overestimated.

Jacob Koloman Freud arrived in Leipzig in May 1859, just in time for the all-important spring fair, in the attempt to secure an income. His wife Amalie and the younger children Sigismund and Anna joined
him there in June. Despite his various petitions, anti-Semitic legislation proved insurmountable in Leipzig and after a brief stay the Freud family was forced to leave. As they departed from Leipzig in early September, they took the night train to Vienna. Freud wrote many years later to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, that this was the night in which he, the three-year-old, had felt his libido awakening for his mother (matrem) when an opportunity arose to see her naked (nudam) (1985, p. 268).
Entering the city of Kamenz, one cannot miss the house of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781). A champion of religious tolerance, Lessing wrote a dramatic poem and now famous theatre-piece called “Nathan the Wise” (1779). Staged in Jerusalem, it tells the story of a Jewish merchant, Nathan (crafted after Moses Mendelsohn, the leading figure of Jewish Enlightenment in Germany) whose wisdom invites us to compare the three religions of the book, that is, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Midway through the tale, Nathan tells the parable in which three sons each receive a ring from their father, the sultan, as inheritance. But who owns the father’s ring? It is said that the one to show him self “the worthiest” must be wearing the genuine ring (1955, p. 76).

After a series of defections and break-offs, six of Freud’s closest followers came together in 1912 to create a “Secret Committee” for the defence and promotion of psychoanalysis. Freud gave a sealed ring each to Karl Abraham, Sandor Ferenczi, Ernest Jones, Max Eitingon, Hanns Sachs, and Otto Rank. Rank defected to America in 1924, Abraham died suddenly in 1925, and Ferenczi passed away in 1933. This only left three (sons) of whom no one was ever made prince
In the end, Freud’s daughter Anna became the guardian of his inheritance.

In the earliest letters to his fiancée Martha Bernays, Freud hails Lessing as his favorite German thinker. On July 12, 1883, he wrote “Then I thought of one who has nearer, older rights over me, and can direct us on this earth instead of leading us beyond it. I thought how refreshing it would be, now, to read a page of our Lessing, and I am resolved to set up a statue to him in our future home, wherever it may be, and to keep his works in a prominent place” (Freud in L. Freud, 1985, p. 96).
The *Studies on Hysteria* include an early reference to travel phobia: “She complained, for instance, of an inability to make journeys of any length by train ... I began to suspect ... that the secret purpose of her railway inhibition was to prevent her making a fresh journey” (Freud, 1895d, p. 64). This was no different from the symptoms the examining doctor had long been suffering from. On December 13, 1897, Freud wrote to his friend Wilhelm Fliess with whom he regularly met on self-arranged “congresses”: “I envisage our Breslau trip, on my part, as follows: that I shall leave Saturday morning at 8:00 in order to arrive at 2:30. I don’t believe a good night connection can be found. Moreover, travelling at night in an overheated compartment will certainly cost me a (clear) head for the next day” (1985, pp. 85–86).

In the early summer of 1859, the Freud family left Freiberg for good. The first to leave were the elder sons from an earlier marriage, Emanuel and Phillip. In the spring of that year, they moved to Manchester, England. After fifteen years of residency in Freiberg, Jacob Koloman Freud sold all his commercial assets and went to Germany for possible business prospects. This was the first journey for Sigismund Freud. He had never been away from Freiberg, his home, and his larger family. They covered the 30 kilometres from Freiberg to Ostrau by
horsecart. From there, the odyssey continued by rail. First they travelled north to Breslau, then west to Leipzig, and finally south and east to Dresden, Prague, and Vienna where they arrived in early September. When the Freuds entered Breslau’s brand-new railway station (which had just been built in 1857, in “English Gothic”) the three-year-old Sigismund was in fear of the foul-smelling gas lamps that made him think of “spirits burning in hell” (Freud, 1985, p. 49).
In Freud’s *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*, better known as the “Wolfman”, we read his description of the primal scene and the *coitus a tergo*: “What sprang into activity that night out of the chaos of the dreamer’s unconscious memory traces was the picture of copulation between his parents, copulation in circumstances which were not entirely usual and were especially favorable for observation” (1918b, p. 36). Sigismund Freud was born in Freiberg (today Pribor, Czech Republic), a small town in the Austro-Hungarian province of Moravia. The Freud home consisted then of one room on the upper floor of Schlossergasse 117 (“locksmith alley”). For the first three years of his life, young Sigismund slept, ate, and played here, in the immediate presence of his parents.

Non-observant, his Jewish parents were liberal enough to employ a Catholic nanny, Resi Wittek, who liked taking the little boy to the local churches. He saw Moses sitting under the richly decorated ceiling of Freiberg’s St. Valentine’s church and pointing to the second commandment (“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image”). Two of the four towering figures that guard the entrance to Mary’s Nativity church are Saint Cyril and his brother Methodius. St. Cyril is the patron saint of Slavic people. He brought the Christian faith to Eastern Europe
and produced an entirely new—Cyrillic—alphabet. He is also well known for his detailed, horrifying descriptions of hell written to inspire “holy fear”. Here he holds a shield depicting the threefold division of Christian afterlife. In the upper third, there is Jesus Christ embracing the cross (paradise); in the middle section we see the archangel Michael holding the balance (purgatory), and finally, in the lower third, we find St. John the Baptist with St. Mary and St. Anne watching bad souls or evil spirits burning in hell.
As a student at Krakow’s Jagellonian University, Mikolaj Kopernigg (1473–1543) began to use the Latin version of his name, Nicolaus Copernicus. In his *Introductory Lectures to Psycho-analysis* Freud notes that the naïve self-love of men has had to submit to several major blows at the hands of science. The first was when we learned from Copernicus that the earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of unimaginable proportions. The second blow was delivered by Darwin who showed that humans occupy no privileged place in the dawn of creation, but are rather part of the animal kingdom. The third and most wounding blow we suffered from psychoanalysis which states that “the ego is not master in its own house” (1916–17, pp. 284–285). In the first of three versions this is the accomplishment of “psychological research of the present time”; in the second, “Schopenhauer” is named as its author (1917a, p. 143); and finally, in the third version, it is “the present writer as a Jew” (Freud, 1925e, p. 222).

Krakow is a city of two names. On the East-bank of the Wavel river it is called Cracovia, on the West-bank of the same river it is called Casimyrs. After the sixteenth century, the Christians lived mainly in Cracovia, the Jews in Casimyrs. It is also the city of kings. A long line
of Jagellonian monarchs have found their graves within the walls of the castle by the Wavel river (Zamek na Wavelu). The earliest was king Sigismund I., or Zygmunt Stary, who was widely respected for having built a multiethnic kingdom where tolerance of religious faith was an everyday reality. Freud’s father had chosen the name Sigismund for his son so as to honour this (Polish) history of benevolence. In 1873, preparing to enter Vienna University, Sigismund Schlomo Freud dropped one first name and changed the other to the more German-sounding Sigmund.
Freud’s father, Jacob Koloman Freud (1815–1896) was born in Tysmenitz/Tysmienica, near Stanislav (today IvanoFrankivsk, Ukraine), eighty kilometres south of Lemberg/Lviv. His father, Schlomo Freud (c.1788–1856), had moved here in 1805 from Buchach/Bucacz, another sixty kilometres to the east, where four generations of his family were resting on the same Jewish cemetery. Despite the longtime domination of rabbinic orthodoxy, in the nineteenth century Lemberg, Brody, and Tysmenitz became centres of Haskala, the Jewish Enlightenment movement, in Eastern Galicia.

Jacob Freud travelled for the first time to Freiberg in the company of his father Schlomo Freud and his father-in-law Siskind Hoffman. In times of radical socio-economic changes, the dynamic commerce between Galicia and Moravia had only accelerated the process of assimilation. Jacob Freud moved from Tysmenitz to Freiberg in 1844, leaving behind the traditional Galician “stetl” (small town) to gain entry into the modern world of the “gojim” (gentiles).

In 1787, Austro-Hungarian government officials began to enforce the use of last names among the Jewish population of its recently acquired province of Galicia. Freud/e is the German equivalent for the Hebrew word/name Simcha (joy). The Yiddish pronunciation of Freud/e is
Freud/e. At this point, the paternal lineage of the Freud family tree is lost in the (last)namelessness of pre-Habsburg times only to reappear under the Romans. In a brief autobiographical sketch written in 1925, Freud narrates the history of his forefathers: “I have reason to believe that my father’s family were settled for a long time on the Rhine (at Cologne), that, as a result of a persecution of the Jews in the fourteenth or fifteenth century, they fled eastwards, and that in the course of the nineteenth century, they migrated back from Lithuania through Galicia into German Austria” (1925d, pp. 7–8; my italics).
In *Family Romances* Freud describes the infant’s perception of his parents: “When presently the child comes to know the difference in the parts played by fathers and mothers in their sexual relations, and realises that ‘pater semper incertus est’, while the mother is ‘certissima’, the family romance undergoes a curious curtailment: it contents itself with exalting the child’s father, but no longer casts any doubts on his maternal origin, which is regarded as something unalterable” (1909c, p. 239).

Sigmund Freud says little about his mother, Amalie Freud, née Nathanson (1835–1930). Born into a family of fairly successful merchants living in Brody, Galicia, she grew up in Odessa, a town on the Black Sea, in the southwestern corner of the Russian Empire. All her life she spoke Galician Yiddish. Eventually, she moved to Vienna with her family. When she married the forty-year-old Jacob Koloman Freud in 1855, she counted not twenty years of age. If she had been idealised by her eldest son, others described her as “resolute”, even as a “tyrant”. Amalie Freud, also called Malka, a mother of seven, was ninety-five years old when she died. Sigmund Freud did not attend her funeral (Margolis, 1996; Gay, 1988).

In nineteenth century Vienna, many Jewish immigrants arrived from Galicia. They were called *Ostjuden* (Eastern Jews). After the first partition
of Polish territory in 1772, Galicia fell to the Habsburg monarchy. Brody, or Prode (Polish), was then turned into a border town at the edge of two Empires, Austro-Hungarian and Russian. The border barrier, typically striped in black and yellow, could now be seen just outside Brody, which, by way of its geo-political realignment, had become the easternmost town in Austro-Hungary. This, then, is the “navel” of Sigmund Freud’s family romance, where all strands of familiarity are lost “in the dark” of the unknowable.

*Mapping Freud: a Bible-ography*

Looking back on our thousand-mile journey along the *Via Regia*, we have toured parts of France, Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, and the Ukraine, (re)visited as topoi in our effort to map Freud’s *vita* and *oeuvre*. It is time to recapitulate the main insights and identify those elements which reappeared in certain places or which even ran the entire course. Four powerful streams, all of them delta-like flowing into each other, dominated the scenery. First, there is Freud’s *Jewishness* and his identification with the biblical Moses; second, *anti-Semitism* and what it actually meant to belong to an “alien race”; third, Freud’s particular brand of *Orientalism*, here understood as a strategic reversal to resist anti-Semitic Orientalism; and finally, his early and lasting concern with imagery and textuality, with representation and interpretation, as first gleaned from the *Bible*.

References to Freud’s Jewishness as identification were found almost everywhere we halted on the *Via Regia*. They constitute one of two layers (the other is anti-Semitism) that stretched all the way (*Paris—Brody*) and which remain both visibly inscribed and deeply encrypted in his writings. Most scholars agree that the Moses-figure plays a key-role in Freud’s positive identification as a Jew (Rey-Flaud, 2006; Grubrich-Simitis, 1994; Yerushalmi, 1991). This decidedly positive identification is easily traceable as it reaches from his earliest impressions of Christian icons to his last major work and “testamentary” opus, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939a). Moses, as we know, is the protagonist of the biblical *Via Regia*-incident. He appears twice on our route, once as the Western hero who renounces his instincts (*Paris*) and, then again, as the iconoclast who, in his rage, broke the God-given tablets (*Freiberg*). Moses embodies Freud’s Jewishness as identification, his resistance to anti-Semitism, his overriding Orientalist with universalist discourse,
as well as the inscription of biblical reference into his works. Back on the road, we should take note of Freud’s early reading of Jewish German authors such as Ludwig Börne (Frankfurt); his inventive and transferential transformation of Nathan’s Oriental parable into the ringed reality of the Secret Committee (Kamenz); or, finally, his insistence to inscribe himself into his own texts “as a Jew” (Krakow), all of which are expressions of Freud’s positive Jewish identifications.

At the same time, there is also evidence for making the case that Freud did not always identify so unambivalently with his Jewish origins (Gilman, 1986). Along the Via Regia we observed the early name change (Krakow), when Freud erased one of his first-names, Schlomo, and cut two letters of the one most used, Sig/is/mund, only to strip off a benevolent Polish past in exchange for a resounding German presence. We listened to Freud’s late narrative of his forefather’s fate (Tysmienica) where he turns the question of his Jewish origins into one of east and west. Effectively, his ancestor’s odyssey began in the west (in Cologne on the Rhine), continued from there to the northeast (Lithuania), thereafter in southeastern direction (Galicia), and eventually, in the nineteenth century, they came back to the west (“German” Austria). This circumvention as family history replays the travels undertaken by his immediate family in 1859 (Wroclaw) with the one difference that it went clockwise and over much greater distances in time and space. Taken as a whole, these instances of ambivalence, both the Polish/German name change and the West-Eastern family romance, strongly suggest that Freud was engaged in an ongoing struggle with, on the one hand, his Jewish identity and, on the other, his tendency to identify with the imperial and royal aggressor (Austro-Hungary).

Inextricably woven into the texture of Freud’s experience of Jewishness are the ever-present threads and threats of anti-Semitism. The traumatic traces of being construed as part of an “alien race” spanned the whole length of Freud’s Via Regia (Paris—Brody). Leaving particular marks in particular places (Frankfurt, Leipzig), it charted a history of life under anti-Semitism. From the earliest letters to his fiancée Martha Bernays (1882) to his last major work Moses and Monotheism (1939a), Freud’s response to anti-Semitism was one of staunch resistance. When Freud’s Moses (Paris) emerges as a masculine and commanding figure who gives law (monotheism) and makes people (Jewish), it is also in the attempt to throw back the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the feminized Jew as Oriental” (Le Rider, 1991a; see also Boyarin, 1997). Or, thinking
of Lessing, the embattled defender of religious tolerance (*Kamenz*), when Freud wants to set up a statue to him and keep his works in a prominent place, it is also in an act of resistance to anti-Semitism. In contrast, Freud’s lifelong interest in art and art-history and, more specifically, his strong attraction to Christian icons (*Breslau, Freiberg*) opens an alternative space where representations of self and other, of Jews and Christians (i.e. Moses and Jesus), can be reflected upon in secular and eventually psychoanalytical terms.

Moreover, the circumvention as family history (*Tysmienica*) we touched on in our discussion of Freud’s Jewishness can be re-examined in the light of anti-Semitism. Most noteworthy in its itinerary is the geo-symbolical mirroring of Freud’s 1859 family move from Freiberg to Vienna, which did not pass without anti-Semitic slight (*Leipzig*) either. Reconsidered in the historical and personal context of the “persecution of Jews”, Freud’s mirroring suggests, perhaps, a much more complex relationship than hitherto assumed between the narrative of his forefather’s escape and the memory of his own early move (or should we say flight?) from Freiberg to Vienna. Here, then, we may state again, as we did following our reading of its biblical antecedents, that Freud’s *Via Regia* leads to and through an “all too familiar” history of anti-Semitism. However, it seems impossible to grasp the complex connections between Freud’s Jewish identity, the impact anti-Semitism had on his life and thought and, as we will see, the profound influence the Philippson Bible had on his intellectual development, without taking into account another shared dimension: Orientalism.

Had it not been in the Oriental chambers of the Musée du Louvre (*Paris*) where Freud was overcome by Assyrian reliefs and Mesopotamian stelae and, a little deeper into this French fortress of exotic treasures, where he came eye-to-eye with Egyptomania? Then again, nowhere in his writings is the entwinement of Orientalism and archaeology, as well as the collapse of race and gender, more obvious than in his *Great is the Diana of the Ephesians* (*Weimar*). Unfolding an evolutionary scheme reaching from the Oriental goddess Oupis’ matriarchy to the Holy Virgin Mary’s submission to father and son, the subjected feminine position and the inferior Orient (Kleinasien) fuse in the simultaneous production of Western, rational self and Eastern, mystical other. Another example emerges from Freud’s early fascination with religious iconography (*Freiberg*), which seems caught
between two opposing forces. It is pushed ahead by his memory of and rebellion to Jewish prohibition and pulled back by the Orientalising appropriations of Christian art and hegemony (Kalmar & Penslar, 2005). And is not “Nathan”, the Wise, (Kamenz) actor on an Oriental stage casting the entrepreneurial, that is, the stereotypical Jew in the historical role of mediator between crusader and sultan, between Christian and Muslim, between East and West? (Horsch, 2004; Malinovich, 1999).

Not to be forgotten, Freud’s paternal family romance recorded much more than an individual memory of persecution in that it seeks to reconstruct a geo-symbolic itinerary and, ultimately, a racial pedigree. Freud’s narrative of his Jewish origins is, effectively, informed by an Orientalist distinction of Ostjuden (Eastern Jews) vs. Westjuden (Western Jews) and we know who, in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Austro-Hungary, was the more desirable of the two (Rozenblit, 1998). Most importantly, Orientalism merges race and gender into one convoluted discourse. Freud’s supposedly Western (Jewish) origins are highlighted, effectively, on the father’s side of the family, in Cologne (Tysmenitzia), whereas the mother’s origins are identified with the East (Brody) and silenced (Gilman, 1991; Margolis, 1996). By and large, we should remember that Freud’s Via Regia is itself based on an Orientalist construction par excellence in that it is made to operate, instead of bridging, an essentialist distinction between Napoleon’s Western, supposedly modern, progressive, and “liberal” and the Tsar’s Eastern, supposedly more traditional, backward, and “despotic” Europe (Grosrichard, 1979; Wolff, 1994).

In returning once more to Freud’s circumvention(s) as family history, the West-Eastern “via dolorosa” of Freud’s paternal forefathers (Tysmenitz) as well as the central-European odyssey of his immediate family (Freiberg), we will find the blueprint, that is, their earliest mappings, in the book of books, the Bible. Had not Edom refused passage to Moses and his people, forcing them to take the long and arduous route through the desert to reach the Promised Land? John O’Neill’s musing that the Bible is the unconscious of psychoanalysis (2004, personal communication) may not be too far from the truth after all. Generally speaking, surprisingly few works have been written on the complex subject of Freud and the Bible. David Bakan’s early attempt essentially reduced psychoanalysis to a rewrite of Jewish mystical tradition (1990) and it took time before Susan Handelman (1984, 1981) developed a significantly
more sophisticated approach, showing the intricate affinities that exist between midrash (Bible interpretation) and psychoanalysis (dream interpretation). Had not Freud himself underlined the parallels between psychoanalytical interpretation and the interpretation of “Holy Script”? 

Freud recalled his earliest reading of the Bible in the following words: “My deep engrossment in the Bible story (almost as soon as I had learnt the art of reading) had, as I recognised much later, an enduring effect upon the direction of my interest” (1925d, p. 8). We already commented on the biblical origins of the Via Regia in the Numbers chapter. Let us consider, if only briefly, the Bible edition which the seven-year-old Sigismund was engrossed in reading. Die Israelitische Bibel (1848) is a bilingual, Hebrew-German version of the Torah/Old Testament. Translated and edited by Ludwig Philippson, it soon became the Bible of the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala) in nineteenth-century Germany. What made this edition so special were its many artistic and archaeological illustrations that came accompanied by the editor’s running “scientific” commentary. This was the Bible Freud’s father had given him—once more—in 1891, on his thirty-fifth birthday. Most revealing for us is the Hebrew dedication Jacob Freud wrote to his son five years before his death and the birth of psychoanalysis.

Mortimer Ostow’s exegetical reading found it to be structured by symmetrically arranged Bible-citations that, he argues, amount to an “original Midrash” (1989, p. 487). If these citations are derived from a variety of chapters such as Jeremiah, Judges, Psalms, Deuteronomy, and Isaiah, only one chapter is cited several times. Jacob Freud refers to the Numbers chapter on four occasions. The first citation (21:18) speaks of (drinking from) the fountain of knowledge and enlightenment, using it as a metaphor for (reading from) the Torah. In his second and third citations (24:4, 16), he draws parallels between his son’s having discarded the Bible and Moses’ shattering the original tablets. Finally, in his fourth citation (21:17), he relates his son to the heathen prophet Balaam who is intent on cursing Israel and who ends up blessing her (see also: intermittent Numbers Chapters Twenty Two and Twenty three). Ostow concludes that Jacob Freud was disappointed by his son’s abandoning the reading of the Bible that he had begun to teach to him in childhood. Through the gift of the old book in new binding, and now inscribed with an exhortative dedication, the father expresses his hopes that the son would soon “renew his interest in the tradition”
While we agree with Ostow’s assessment, we want to take it a step further.

A closer reading of the Numbers chapters in question (21; 24) shows that, on the one hand, Freud’s father’s first and fourth citations (21:18, 17) lead us directly to the only other mentioning of the “king’s high-way” (Via Regia) in the Bible while, on the other, both his second and third citations (24:4, 16) return us to the Israelites’ struggle with the “Edomites” who refused them passage (anti-Semitism). In all, Freud’s father clearly points to the Via Regia (21:22) and to anti-Semitism (24:18) in the citations he used for the Bible dedicatio to his son. But there is more. Jacob Freud’s reference to the “king’s way” is not a mere echo from an earlier chapter (20:17). It is, on the contrary, an entirely different situation in which we are faced by a complete reversal. Here, the Israelites come on to the Amorites who also refused them passage just as the Edomites had done. Yet, in this instance, the Israelites take no painful detour through the desert. This time around, they go to battle with the Amorites and beat them. On this day, then, Edom (i.e. the Amorites) is not circumvented but possessed.

Jacob Kolloman Freud may have found his fur cap in the mud when knocked off by an anti-Semitic “Christian” one Saturday afternoon in Freiberg, but he never lost the ways of the book (interpretation) and increasingly immersed himself in the lecture of the Torah as he grew older. Here, we want to suggest that Jacob Freud’s dedication inscribed in the family Bible which he gave to his son on the day he reached maturity contains an encrypted testament. Sigmund Freud’s copy of the Philippson Bible includes not just his father’s exhortation to return to the tradition and the book, but, more importantly, in the four citations from the Numbers chapters Jacob calls on his son to resist Edom (anti-Semitism), to insist on taking the king’s highway (the intellectual Via Regia), and to conquer the Gentiles (the non-Jewish world). More than the proverbial eye for an eye, in this instance Jacob Freud directed his son to resistance and to reversal.

Sigmund Freud came very close to the Via Regia when, in January 1909, he was involved in a lively correspondence with C. G. Jung about their planned trip to the USA. In between the many questions occupied with “the Americans”, Freud suddenly opens up to make a prophetic revelation to his younger colleague: “We are certainly getting ahead; if I am Moses, then you are Joshua and will take possession of the promised land of psychiatry, which I shall only be able to glimpse from a far” (1974, p. 489).
The line refers to the Bible’s Numbers Chapter Twenty. That is, to Moses’ disobedience in the wilderness and to God’s punishment thereof, namely, that Moses will see the Promised Land only from afar without ever entering it. In the midst of the biblical narrative, between Moses’ sin that occurs when the Israelites camp in Kadesh and their punishment that is decided in the wilderness, the *Via Regia* incident occurs.

On that sunny Thursday morning of September 9th, 1909, in a small, provincial town called Worcester, deep in the northeastern hinterland of the state of Massachusetts, Sigmund Freud went on a walk through the Clark University Park in the company of his friend and colleague Sandor Ferenczi to decide on the content of the day’s lecture. Just before 11.00 am he arrived at the Art Room on the third (top) floor of the University Library building to give the third of his famous five lectures. As he elaborated on dreams, Freud spoke the *Via Regia* for the very first time and in doing so fulfilled his father’s dedication. In what Theo Pfrimmer would undoubtedly have interpreted as a further sign of Freud’s “deferred obedience to his father” (1982, p. 68), the founder of psychoanalysis had resisted the anti-Semites in Europe (even though he had sided with the Orientalists in America on at least one occasion), he had taken the “high road” of science and interpretation, and he had “conquered” the western world.

Our “field trip” along an extended West-Eastern tangent through the early history of psychoanalysis and, along its course, to her unconscious, unfolded in three distinct étapes. We started out with a discussion of Sherwin-White’s article to open up a larger panorama and an overview of our topoi. In other words, we obtained a first impression of the lay of the land and, with it, some early leads on recurring themes such as Freud’s Jewishness or his response to anti-Semitism. We then undertook a systematic exploration by reading Freud’s metaphor, the *Via Regia*, through ten metonymies, or places, dotting its course. Our tentative tableaux (re)produced a number of biographical and bibliographical materials facilitating our particular assemblage of Freud’s *Via Regia*. Finally, we began a systematic reading of the main themes we encountered on our path which led to the conclusion that Freud’s *Via Regia* is characterised by four major streams of unconsciousness, confirming two we had identified earlier and adding two more that remain attached to them: Jewishness, anti-Semitism, Orientalist discourse, and the Bible. The view from psychoanalysis allowed us to conceptualise these in terms of a) identification (Jewishness), b) ambivalence (anti-Semitism),
c) splitting (Orientalist discourse), and d) the Oedipus complex (the Bible). Our first conclusion is clear: the Via Regia offers a solid path to an understanding of Freud’s unconscious and, by extension, of psychoanalysis at large. Freud’s classic voice, and this is our second conclusion, remains extremely charged and over-determined (Flectere …; pater sempre incertus est, mater certissima). Latin appears to provide Freud with a safe space where thoughts and ideas, otherwise too traumatic or socially unacceptable (matrem nudam; coitus a tergo), can be articulated.

Notes


2. Torah (Hebrew Bible), Numbers Chapter:

   20.17. “Let us pass, I pray thee, through they land; we will not pass through field or through vineyard, neither will we drink of the water of the wells, we will go along the king’s highway, we will not turn aside to the right hand nor to the left, until we have passed thy border.”

   21.17. Then sang Israel this song: Spring up, O well—sing ye unto it—

   21.18. And Edom said unto him: “Thou shalt not pass through me, lest I come out with the sword against thee.”

   21.22. “Let me pass through thy land; we will not turn aside into field, or into vineyard; we will not drink of the water of the wells; we will go by the king’s highway, until we have passed thy border.”

   24.4. The saying of him who heareth the words of God, Who seeth the vision of the Almighty, Fallen down, yet with opened eyes:

   24.16. The saying of him who heareth the words of God, And knoweth the knowledge of the Most High, Who seeth the vision of the Almighty, Fallen down, yet with opened eyes:

   24.18. And Edom shall be a possession, Seir also, even his enemies, shall be a possession; while Israel doeth valiantly.
CONCLUSION

Four theses

The double purpose of this study consisted in exploring both Freud’s Orientalist discourse (the Orientalism of psychoanalysis) from a psychoanalytical point of view (the psychoanalysis of Orientalism) and to unravel in particular those discursive complexities (Freud’s specific uses), which Said could not accommodate in his own framework (the strains of Orientalism). We set out with an initial thesis that ties Freud’s employment of Orientalist discourse to his Jewishness and the “anti-Semitic challenge” in general and to the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the (male) Jew as feminised Oriental” in particular. To better understand the vicissitudes of Orientalist discourse as they play out in Freud’s writings this study proposed and employed three “doubled” concepts bridging postcolonial theory and psychoanalytical thought: Orientalism proper or the narcissism of eurocentric difference; Orientalist binaries or West-Eastern splitting in the process of defence; Self-Orientalisation or identification with the imperial and royal aggressor. These three doubled concepts enabled us to conclude several important points and to formulate four theses.

First, the textual founding of psychoanalysis is marked by recurrent references to the “Orient”. A symptomatic reading of Freud’s literary excursions into this realm of radical otherness exposes his ambivalent
Orientalist discourse as fundamentally narcissistic and as integral to the narrative strategies of early psychoanalysis. These narcissistic inroads into a series of ambivalent Orients regularly lead back to an earlier, traumatic East made of Jewishness and anti-Semitism. Freud’s mise-en-scène of the “Western” self rejects the “Eastern” other, repudiates the dreaded figure of the Ostjude (Eastern Jew), and resists the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the (male) Jew as feminised Oriental”. If the narrative strategy of early psychoanalytical theory is repeatedly enmeshed in Orientalist discourse, it also offers the way out of the essentialising mode through the revolutionary concept of the unstable subject. Moreover, Freud’s Orientalism undergoes scrutiny by the “Glossary Committee” which seeks the de-“Orient” alisation of his writings by erasing its traces (“Orient”, “Diwan”, “Via Regia”) in the Standard Edition.

Second, the term “archaeOrientalism” was coined to name the combination of archeological imagination and Orientalist discourse that dominates Freud’s archeological metaphor. If the archeological metaphor is Via regia to an understanding of Freud’s psychoanalysis as “Western” universalist (male) science, so is the study of Freud’s Jewish identity and response to anti-Semitism porta Orientis to his particular Orientalist discourse. Freud’s Orient/s are typically split into good and bad opposites played out, for example, by Egypt and Turkey. While Freud was capable enough to break down age-old binaries and boundaries between the normal and the pathological, he did not overcome the internalised split between Jews and Gentiles, between Western Jews and Eastern Jews, between Occident and Orient. Rise and fall of the archeological metaphor comes and goes with Freud’s confidence in (KuK) empire. Its final appearance, after affirmation (before WW I), repression (1912–1927), and negation (1927–1937), was in the form of “evidence”, employed to make Moses into a masculine, commanding hero in a stunning reversal of the stereotype of “the (male) Jew as feminised Oriental”.

Third, Freud, the doubled, decolonised subject, both Western self and Eastern other, practises and rejects anti-Semitism; he simultaneously resists and identifies with the imperial and royal aggressor. Travelling the Via Regia opens up a semi-Oriental space where we encounter the dreaded figure of the Ostjude (Eastern Jew). Freud’s Via Regia is characterised by four streams of unconsciousness: Jewishness, anti-Semitism, Orientalist discourse, and the Bible. The view from psychoanalysis allows to conceptualise these in terms of identification (Jewishness),
ambivalence (anti-Semitism), splitting (Orientalist discourse), and the Oedipus complex (the Bible). Not only did Hannibal the Phoenician provide a model for Freud’s response to anti-Semitism, resistance as reversal, but also Freud’s father had pointed in that direction.

Fourth, Freud’s self-construction as heterosexual Jewish male scientist and as Orientalist clearly opposes and, in its reversal, strongly resists the anti-Semitic stereotype of “the (male) Jew as feminised Oriental”. Eventually, Freud develops his particular version of Orientalism as a mode of resistance against anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse. Overburdened by contradiction, his attempts to resist anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse by way of strategic reversal cannot succeed as he is unable to extricate himself from the historical assumptions of that discourse. The meticulous if imperfect erasure of Freud’s “Orient” that is enforced in the English-language *Standard Edition* is not immune to its own subtle version of anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse as it cannot resist the impulse to repress and, ultimately, to omit the (supposed) “Orientalness” of the Jewish founder of psychoanalysis and his writings.

*Four theses*

I. It is the narcissism of eurocentric difference and, in particular, the narcissistic wound of imputed racial and cultural difference, that drive the Freudian Orient(Alism).

II. West-Eastern splitting in the process of defending against the “anti-Semitic challenge” determines the specific manifestations of Freud’s Orientalist discourse.

III. Freud, the doubled subject, both Western self and Eastern other, resists and identifies with the Imperial and Royal aggressor.

IV. Freud resists anti-Semitic Orientalist discourse by way of strategic reversal, that is, by reversing the stereotype of “the (male) Jew as feminised Oriental”.
We left the compartment—but this being my unlucky day I ended up in the company of a most venerable old Jew and his correspondingly old wife with their melancholy languorous darling daughter and cheeky young ‘hopeful’ son. Their company was even more unpalatable. A casual remark I made, red with rage, could not sweeten my boredom. People are not as different as they look and they can easily be divided into definable categories by the way they think and act. [...] Now this Jew talked in the same way as I had heard thousands of others talk before, even in Freiberg. His very face seemed familiar—he was typical. So was the boy, with whom he discussed religion. He was cut from the cloth from which fate makes swindlers when the time is ripe: cunning, mendacious, kept by his adoring relatives in the belief that he has a great talent, but unprincipled and without character. A cook from Bohemia with the most perfect pug-face I have ever seen put the lid on it. I have enough of this lot. In the course of the conversation I learned from Madame Jewess and family hailed from Meseritsch [small town in Moravia]: the proper compost heap for this sort of weed (1969, p. 420).
Freud’s “archaeology” in citation

*From Civilization and its Discontents (1930a)*

We will choose as an example the history of the Eternal City. Historians tell us that the oldest Rome was the *Roma Quadrata*, a fenced settlement on the Palatine. Then followed the phase of the *Septimontium*, a federation of settlements on the different hills; after that came the city bounded by the Servian walls; and later still, after all the transformations during the periods of the republic and the early Caesars, the city which the Emperor Aurelian surrounded with his walls. We will not follow the changes which the city went through any further, but we will ask ourselves how much a visitor, whom we will suppose to be equipped with the most complete historical and topographical knowledge, may still find left of these early stages in the Rome of today. Except for a few gaps, he will see the wall of Aurelian almost unchanged. In some places, he will be able to find sections of the Servian wall where they have been excavated and brought to light. If he knows enough—more than present-day archaeology does—he may perhaps be able to trace out in the plan of the city the whole course of that wall and the outline of the *Roma Quadrata*. Of the buildings which once occupied this ancient area he will find nothing, or only scanty remains, for they
exist no longer. The best information about Rome in the republican era would only enable him at the most to point out the sites where temples and public buildings of that period stood. Their place is now taken by ruins, but no by ruins of themselves but by later restorations made after fires or destruction. It is hardly necessary to remark that all the remains of ancient Rome are found dovetailed into the jumble of a great metropolis which has grown up in the last few centuries since the Renaissance. There is certainly not a little that is ancient still buried in the soil of the city or beneath its modern buildings. This is the manner in which the past is preserved in historical sites like Rome.

Now let us, by flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past—an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one. This would mean that in Rome the palaces of the Caesars and the Septizonium of Septimius Severus would still be rising to their old height on the Palatine and that the castle of S. Angelo would still be carrying on its battlements the beautiful statues which graced it until the siege of the Goths, and so on. But more than this. In the place occupied by the Palazzo Caffarelli would once more stand—without the Palazzo having to be removed—the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus; and this not only in its latest shape, as the Romans of the Empire saw it, but also in its earliest one, when it still showed Etruscan forms and was ornamented with terracotta antefixes. Where the Coliseum now stands we could at the same time admire Nero’s vanished Golden House. On the Piazza of the Pantheon we should find not only the Pantheon of to-day, as it was bequeathed to us by Hadrian, but, on the same site, the original edifice erected by Agrippa; indeed, the same piece of ground would be supporting the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva and the ancient temple over which it was built. And the observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance or his position in order to call up the one view or the other.

There is clearly no point in spinning our phantasy any further, for it leads to things that are unimaginable and even absurd. If we want to represent historical sequence in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposing in space: the same space cannot have two different contents. Our attempt seems to be an idle game. It has only one justification. It shows
us how far we are from mastering the characteristics of mental life by representing them in pictoral terms.

There is one further objection which has to be considered. The question may be raised why we chose precisely the past of a city to compare it to the past of a mind. The assumption that everything past is preserved holds good even in mental life only on condition that the organ of the mind has remained intact and that its tissues have not been damaged by trauma or inflammation. But destructive influences which can be compared to causes of illness like these are never lacking in the history of a city, even if it has had a less chequered past than Rome, and even if, like London, it has hardly ever suffered from the visitations of an enemy. Demolitions and replacement of buildings occur in the course of the most peaceful development of a city. A city is thus a priori unsuited for a comparison of this sort with a mental organism (Freud, 1930a, pp. 69–70).

Wir greifen etwa die Entwicklung der Heiligen Stadt als Beispiel auf. Historiker belehren uns, das älteste Rom war die Roma quadrata, eine umzäunte Ansiedlung auf dem Palatin. Dann folgte die Phase des Septimontium, eine Vereinigung der Niederlassungen auf den einzelnen Hügeln, darauf die Stadt, die durch die Servianische Mauer begrenzt wurde, und noch später, nach all den Umwandlungen der republikanischen und der früheren Kaiserzeit der Stadt, die Kaiser Aurelianus durch seine Mauern umschloß. Wir wollen die Wandlungen der Stadt nicht weiter verfolgen und uns fragen, was ein Besucher, den wir mit den vollkommensten historischen und topografischen Kenntnissen ausgestattet denken, im heutigen Rom von diesen früheren Stadien noch vorfinden mag. Die Aurelianische Mauer wird er bis auf wenige Durchbrüche fast unverändert sehen. An einzelnen Stellen kann er Strecken des Servianischen Walles durch Ausgrabung zutage gefördert finden. Wenn er genug weiß,—mehr als die heutige Archäologie,—kann er vielleicht den ganzen Verlauf dieser Mauer und den Umriß der Roma quadrata ins Stadtbild einzeichnen. Von den Gebäuden, die einst diese alten Rahmen ausgefüllt haben, findet er nichts oder geringe Reste, denn sie bestehen nicht mehr. Das Äußerste, was ihm die beste Kenntnis des Roms der Republik leisten kann, wäre, daß er die Stellen anzugeben weiß, wo die Tempel und öffentlichen Gebäude dieser Zeit gestanden hatten. Was jetzt diese Stellen einnimmt, sind Ruinen, aber nicht ihrer selbst, sondern ihrer Erneuerungen aus späteren Zeiten nach Bränden und Zerstörungen. Es bedarf kaum noch einer besonderen Erwähnung,

Nun machen wir die phantastische Annahme, Rom sei nicht eine menschliche Wohnstätte, sondern ein psychisches Wesen von ähnlicher langer und reichhaltiger Vergangenheit, in dem also nichts, was einmal zustande gekommen war, untergegangen ist, in dem neben der letzten Entwicklungsphase auch alle früheren noch fortbestehen. Das würde für Rom also bedeuten, daß auf dem Palatin die Kaiserpaläste und das Septizonium des Septimius Severus sich noch zur alten Höhe erheben, daß die Engelsburg noch auf ihren Zinnen die schönen Statuen trägt, mit denen sie bis zur Gotenbelagerung geschmückt war, usw. Aber noch mehr: and der Stelle des Palazzo Caffarelli stünde wieder, ohne daß man dieses Gebäude abzutragen brauchte, der Tempel des Kapitolinischen Jupiter, und zwar dieser nicht nur in seiner letzten Gestalt, wie ihn die Römer der Kaiserzeit sahen, sondern auch in seiner frühesten, als er noch etruskische Formen zeigte und mit tönernen Antifixen geziert war. Wo jetzt das Coliseo steht, könnten wir auch die verschwundene Domus aurea des Nero bewundern; auf dem Pantheonsplatz fänden wir nicht nur das heutige Pantheon, wie es uns von Hadrian hinterlassen wurde, sondern auf demselben Grund auch den ursprünglichen Bau des M. Agrippa; ja, derselbe Boden trüge die Kirche Maria sopra Minerva und den alten Tempel, über dem sie gebaut ist. Und dabei brauchte es vielleicht nur eine Änderung der Blickrichtung oder des Standpunktes von seiten des Beobachters, um den einen oder den anderen Anblick hervorzurufen.

Es hat offenbar keinen Sinn, diese Phantasie weiter auszuspinnen, sie führt zu Unvorstellbarem, ja zu Absurdem. Wenn wir das historische Nacheinander räumlich darstellen wollen, kann es nur durch ein Nebeneinander im Raum geschehen; derselbe Raum verträgt nicht zweierlei Ausfüllung. Unser Versuch scheint eine müßige Spielerei zu sein; er hat nur eine Rechtfertigung; er zeigt uns, wie weit wir davon entfernt sind, die Eigentümlichkeiten des seelischen Lebens durch anschauliche Darstellung zu bewältigen.

Zu einem Einwand sollten wir noch Stellung nehmen. Er fragt uns, warum wir gerade die Vergangenheit einer Stadt ausgewählt haben,
um sie mit der seelischen Vergangenheit zu vergleichen. Die Annahme
der Erhaltung alles Vergangenen gilt auch für das Seelenleben nur
unter der Bedingung, daß das Organ der Psyche intact geblieben ist,
daß sein Gewebe nicht durch Trauma oder Entzündung gelitten hat.
Zerstörende Einwirkungen, die man diesen Krankheitsursachen gleich-
stellen könnte, werden aber in der Geschichte keiner Stadt vermißt, auch
wenn sie eine minder bewegte Vergangenheit gehabt hat als Rom, auch
wenn sie, wie London, kaum je von einem Feind heimgesucht wurde.
Die friedlichste Entwicklung einer Stadt schließt Demolierungen und
Ersetzung von Bauwerken ein, und darum ist die Stadt von vornherein
für einen solchen Vergleich mit einem seelischen Organismus ungeeig-
net (Freud, 1930a, pp. 426–429).

*From Constructions in Analysis (1937d)*

His work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction, resem-
bles to a great extent an archaeologist’s excavation of some dwelling
place that has been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice. The
two processes are in fact identical, except that the analyst works under
better conditions and has more material at his command to assist him,
since what he is dealing with is not something destroyed but something
that is still alive—and perhaps for another reason as well. But just as the
archaeologist builds up the walls of the building from the foundations
that have remained standing, determines the number and position of
the columns from depressions in the floor and reconstructs the mural
decorations and paintings from the remains found in the debris, so does
the analyst proceed when he draws his inferences from the fragments of
memories, from the associations and from the behaviour of the subject
of the analysis. Both of them have an undisputed right to reconstruct by
means of supplementing and combining the surviving remains. Both of
them, moreover, are subject to many of the same difficulties and sources
of error. One of the most ticklish problems that confronts the archae-
ologist is notoriously the determination of the relative age of his finds;
and if an object makes its appearance in some particular level, it often
remains to be decided whether it belongs to that level or whether it
was carried down to that level owing to some subsequent disturbance.
It is easy to imagine the corresponding doubts that arise in the case of
analytic constructions.
The analyst, as we have said, works under more favourable conditions than the archaeologist since he has at his disposal material which can have no counterpart in excavations, such as repetitions of reactions dating from infancy and all that is indicated by the transference in connection with these repetitions. But in addition to this, it must be borne in mind that the excavator is dealing with destroyed objects of which large and important portions have quite certainly been lost, by mechanical violence, by fire and by plundering. No amount of effort can result in their discovery and lead to their being united with the surviving remains. The one and only course open is that of reconstruction, which for this reason can often reach only a certain degree of probability. But it is different with the psychical object whose early history the analyst is seeking to recover. Here we are regularly met by a situation which with the archaeological object occurs only in such rare circumstances as those of Pompeii or of the tomb of Tut’ankhamun. All of the essentials are preserved; even things that seem completely forgotten are present somehow and somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to the subject. Indeed, it may, as we know, be doubted whether any psychical structure can really be the victim of total destruction. It depends only upon analytic technique whether we shall succeed in bringing what is concealed completely to light. There are only two other facts that weigh against the extraordinary advantage which is thus enjoyed by the work of analysis: namely, that psychical objects are incomparably more complicated than the excavator’s material ones and that we have insufficient knowledge of what we may expect to find, since their finer structure contains so much that is still mysterious. But our comparison between the two forms of work can go no further than this; for the main difference between them lies in the fact that for the archaeologist the reconstruction is the aim and end of his endeavours while for analysis the construction is only preliminary labour (Freud, 1937d, pp. 259–260).

Seine Arbeit der Konstruktion oder, wenn man es so lieber hört, der Rekonstruktion, zeigt eine weitgehende Übereinstimmung mit der des Archäologen, der eine zerstörte und verschüttete Wohnstätte oder ein Bauwerk der Vergangenheit ausgräbt. Sie ist eigentlich damit identisch, nur daß der Analytiker unter besseren Bedingungen arbeitet, über mehr Hilfsmaterial verfügt, weil er sich um etwas noch Lebendes bemüht, nicht um ein zerstörtes Objekt, und vielleicht auch noch aus einem

Wir haben gesagt, der Analytiker arbeite unter günstigeren Verhältnissen als der Archäolog, weil er auch über Material verfügt, zu dem die Ausgrabungen kein Gegenstück bringen können, z. B. die Wiederholungen von aus der Frühzeit stammenden Reaktionen und alles was durch die Übertragung an solchen Wiederholungen aufgezeigt wird. Außerdem kommt aber in Betracht, daß der Ausgräber es mit zerstörten Objekten zu tun hat, von denen große und wichtige Stücke ganz gewiß verloren gegangen sind, durch mechanische Gewalt, Feuer und Plünderung. Keiner Bemühung kann es gelingen, sie aufzufinden, um sie mit den erhaltenen Resten zusammenzusetzen. Man ist einzig und allein auf die Rekonstruktion angewiesen, die sich darum oft genug nicht über eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit erheben kann. Anders ist es mit dem psychischen Objekt, dessen Vorgeschichte der Analytiker erheben will. Hier trifft regelmäßig zu, was sich beim archäologischen Objekt nur in glücklichen Ausnahmefällen ereignet hat wie in Pompeji und mit dem Grab des Tutankhamen. Alles Wesentliche ist erhalten, selbst was vollkommen vergessen scheint, ist noch irgendwie und irgendwo vorhanden, nur ver-schüttet, der Verfügung des Individuums unzugänglich gemacht. Man darf ja bekanntlich bezweifeln, ob irgendeine psychische Bildung wirklich voller Zerstörung anheimfällt. Es ist nur eine Frage der analytischen Technik, ob es gelingen wird, das Verborgene vollständig zum Vorschein zu bringen. Dieser außerordentlichen Bevorzugung der analytischen Arbeit stehen nur
zwei andere Tatsachen entgegen, nämlich daß das psychische Objekt unvergleichlich komplizierter ist als das materielle des Ausgräbers und daß unsere Kenntnis nicht genügend vorbereitet ist auf das, was wir finden sollen, da dessen intime Struktur noch so viel Geheimnisvolles birgt. Und nun kommt unser Vergleich der beiden Arbeiten auch zu einem Ende, denn der Hauptunterschied der beiden liegt darin, daß für die Archäologie die Rekonstruktion das Ziel und das Ende der Bemühung ist, für die Analyse aber ist die Konstruktion nur eine Vorarbeit (Freud, 1937d, pp. 45–47).

_From Moses and Monotheism (1939a)_

Soon after changing his name Akhenaten abandoned the Amun-dominated city of Thebes and built himself a new royal capital lower down the river, which he named Akhetaten (the horizon of Aten). Its ruined site is now known as Tell el-‘Amarna.

The fact remains that there is only one answer to the question of where the Jews derived the custom of circumcision from—namely, from Egypt. Herodotus, the ‘father of history’ tells us that the custom of circumcision had long been indigenous in Egypt, and his statements are confirmed by the findings in mummies and indeed by pictures on the walls of tombs.

We learn of these warriors from the letters found in 1887 in the ruined city of Amarna.

Evans assumes that the final destruction of the palace of Minos at Knossos too was the consequence of an earthquake.

The next (but also the only) fixed point for the chronology is afforded by the stela of [the Pharaoh] Merenptah (1225–15 BC), which boasts of his victory over Isiraal (Israel) and the laying waste of her seed (?).

With our present psychological insight we could, long before Schliemann and Evans, have raised the question of where it was that the Greeks obtained all the legendary material which was worked over by Homer and the great Attic dramatists in their masterpieces.

The archaeological researches of our days have now confirmed this suspicion, which in the past would certainly have been pronounced too daring. These researches have uncovered the evidences of the impressive Minoan-Mycenaean civilisation, which had probably already come to an end on the mainland of Greece before 1250 BC (Freud, 1939a, pp. 23, 26–27, 29, 46 fn, 48, 70).
Bald nach der Namesänderung verließ Ikhnaton das von Amon beherrschte Theben und erbaute sich stromabwärts eine neue Residenz, die er Akhetaton (Horizont des Aton) nannte. Ihre Trümmerstätte heist heute Tell-el-Amarna.


Wir kennen diese Krieger aus den Briefen, die 1887 im Archiv der Ruinenstadt Amarna gefunden worden sind.

Evans nimmt an, das auch die endgültige Zerstörung des Minos-Palastes in Knossos die Folge eines Erdbebens war.

Der nächste, aber auch der einzige Anhalt für die Chronologie ist durch die Stele Merneptaahs gegeben (1225–15), die sich des Sieges über Isiraal (Israel) und der Verwüstung ihrer Saaten (?) rühmt.

Mit unseren heutigen psychologischen Einsichten hätte man lange vor Schliemann und Evans die Frage aufwerfen können: Woher nahmen die Griechen all das Sagenmaterial, das Homer und die großen attischen Dramatiker in ihren Meisterwerken verarbeiten?

Die archäologische Forschung unserer Tage hat dann diese Vermutung bestätigt, die damals sicherlich für allzu gewagt erklärt worden wäre. Sie hat die Zeugnisse für die großartige minoisch-mykenische Kultur aufgedeckt, die auf dem griechischen Festland wahrscheinlich schon vor 1250 v. Chr. zu Ende kam (Freud, 1939a, pp. 121, 125, 128, 146–147 Fn, 150, 174, 175).
APPENDIX THREE

Freud’s *Via Regia* in translation

Author’s note: “id” refers to *The Interpretation of Dreams* and “fl” refers to *Five Lectures*. Where not indicated otherwise, “id” is meant.

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REFERENCES


REFERENCES


INDEX

5th Reserve Company, Austro-Hungarian Army 12
Abbasids 31
Abduction from the Serail, The (Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart) 3
Abdulhamid II 56
Abraham, Karl 16, 31, 46, 91
Abu al-Hassan, Ali al-Masudi 31
Academia Castellana 6, 8
Academy of Sciences, Vienna 56
Achaemenids 75
Adler, Alfred 88
Aeneid (Virgil) 76, 82
Aetiology of Hysteria, The (Sigmund Freud) 43, 58
Ahmad, Aijaz xxix, xxx–xxi
air attacks 21
Akhenaten 28–29, 71, 123
Al Azm, Sadiq xxxv
Alexander the Great xxv, 75–76, 79
Am Römer, Frankfurt 85
Amarna 28, 123
Amarna Letters 17, 28
Amenhotep IV (Echnaton) 16
Psychoanalytic Contributions to the Understanding of his Personality and the Monotheistic Aton-Cult (Karl Abraham) 16
Amorites 107
Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy (Sigmund Freud) xxiv
Analysis Terminable and Interminable (Sigmund Freud) 66
Andalusia 9
Andreas-Salomé, Lou 27
androcentrism xxii–xxiii
Anne, St. 96
anti-Semitism see also Jewishness aggressive expression of xxiii 7
Austro-Hungarian Empire 9, 75, 99
castration complex and xxiv
Disraeli and 23
ever present threat of 103
Freud, Palestine and xxvi
Freud’s final word on 18
humiliation by xli
Interpretation of Dreams 78
metaphor facing extinction, a 65
orientalism and xx
Rank accused of xlv
stereotypes 72
taking the fight to the enemy xxv

Aphrodite 15

Arabian Knights, The 32
Arabs xix, xl, 7, 25
archaeology (as a metaphor) 37–72
comparisons 120–123
English translations 44
Etruscans 63
Jung’s visualisation 47
metaphor banned 59
Minoan and Mycenaean 49, 66
Moses and Monotheism 66–72
negation and 64
of the soul 37
Pompeii 54–56
psychoanalysis and 42
Rome 64–65
Tiefenpsychologie and 60

Armstrong, Richard 77
Artemis 57–58, 87
Ashkenazi Jews 7
Asia Minor 58
Assyriology 16–18, 28, 84, 104
Astarte 15
Astralmythen (Eduard Stucken) 17
Athens 63
Austria 16, 26, 49, 56–57
Austro-Hungary 11–13
anti-Semitism of 9, 75, 99
demise of 26
fragmentation into nations 38, 61–62
Freud victimised xxv
military defeats 35
rivalry with Ottomans 22
Turks and 3, 44
Autobiographical Study (Sigmund Freud) 35

Aziz Pasha 9

Babylon 17–18
Baines, Cecil xli
Bakan, David 105
Balaam 106
Balkans 12, 22
Balzac, Honoré de 81
Bar-Josef, Eitan 20
Bedouin 52
Benghazi 22
Benjamin Disraeli Orientalismus (Boris Segalovitsch) 24
Benndorf, Otto 56
Bergasse, Vienna 39, 83
Bernays, Martha (later Freud) 2
Bernays, Minnah 1, 13, 33
Bettelheim, Bruno 73
Biale, David 25
Bible 17, 77, 105–109
biblical exegesis xlv
binary oppositions xxxv, xxxvii–xxxix, 54–56
Bleuler, Eugen 45–46, 60–61, 88
Bogaskale 17
Bollas, Christopher xxvi
Bombay to Bloomsbury: A Biography of the Strachey Family (Barbara Caine) xlv
book burning 85
Book of One Thousand and One Nights 32
Fragments of an Analysis of Hysteria
(Sigmund Freud) 48
Frankfurt 85–86
Franz Deuticke Verlag 89
free association 86
Freiberg (Prybor)
  final leaving 42, 93, 104
  Freud’s early years 95–96
  Gisela Fluss 3–5
  Jacob Freud in 79, 99
Freud Memorial Lectures xxvi
Freud Museums xxvi, 73
Freud, Amalie (mother) 13, 89, 101
Freud, Anna (daughter)
  edits Freud-Fliess letters 2, 14
  identification with the aggressor 76
  Paris with her father 83
  work on the ego xli
Freud, Anna (sister) 5
Freud, Ernst (son) 2, 14, 26
Freud, Jacob (father)
  arrives in Leipzig 79
  background 99
  counterfeit money affair 51
  hat incident 79
  marriage 101
  rents out Vienna apartment 5
  teaches Bible to Sigmund 106–107
Freud, Lucien (grandson) 32
Freud, Schlomo (grandfather) 99
Freud, Sophie (daughter) 26
Freud: un cas d’identification à
l’agresseur (Christian Jouvenot) xli
“Freud and the Non-European”
(Edward Said) xxv–xxvi
Freud-Jung Letters 19, 22
“Freud, the Via Regia, and Alexander
the Great” (Susan Sherwin-White) 75
From the History of an Infantile
Neurosis (Sigmund Freud) 95
Future of an Illusion, The (Sigmund
Freud) 62
Galeano, Edoardo 81
Galicia 99, 101–103
Gare de l’Est, Paris 83
Gay, Peter 10
geography 80
German General Medical Society for
Psychotherapy 46
Germans xxxvi
Gerusalemme Liberata (Torquato
Tasso) 6
Gesammelte Werke (Sigmund Freud)
xli, 59–61
Gilman, Sander xxxiv, 4, 42
Gingrich, Andre 12, 20
“Glossary Committee” xlii–xliii, xlv, 14, 39
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von
  Freud’s favourite writer xxxix
  letter writing of 2
  West-Eastern Divan xxxix, 39, 87
  writers and scientists 85
Goethe Prize 40, 85
Gomez, Luis 19
Grachus, der Volkstribun (Adolf von
Wilbrandt) 5
Gradiva (Wilhelm Jensen) 47, 51, 54
Graf, E. C. 9
Gramsci, Antonio xxxi
Grant, Jane xlv
“Great is Diana of the Ephesians”
(Sigmund Freud) 57–58, 62,
87, 104
Great Pyramid of Giza 52
Green, André 32
Grinstein, Alexander 63
Groddeck, Georg 50
Grubrich-Simitas, Ilse 41
Guttman, Dr. Samuel xlii–xliii

Habsburgs 35, 61, 102
Hake, Sabina 42
Halbherr, Federico 67
Hall, Dr. Stanley xv
Hamilcar Barkas xxiv–xxv
Hammurabi 18
Handelman, Susan xlvi, 105
Hannibal xxiv–xxv
Harun al-Rashid 31
Haskala 99, 106
“hat incident” xxiv, 78–79, 107
Heberdey, Rudolf 56
“Hebrew Imagination, The”
(Yaron Peleg) 24
Hebrew University, Jerusalem 25
Hebrews 28
Hegel, G. W. F. 38
“hegemony” xxxi
Heine, Heinrich 85–86
Herder, Johann Gottfried von xxxiii, 87
Hermann (Arminius) 70–71
Herodotus 15, 71, 123
Hesse, Herman 27
heteronormativity xxii–xxiii
Hissarlik 44
Histories (Herodotus) 15
Hitler, Adolf 27, 34, 83
Hittites 17
Hochwald 5
Hoffman, Siskind 99
Hofmannsthal, Hugo von 49
Homer 45, 123
Hull, R. F. C. 19
Human All Too Human (Friedrich Nietzsche) 70
humanism xxix–xxx

Hume, David xx

Hungary, 22 see also Austro-Hungarian Empire

id, the xxi, xxxvii
Im Rause lesen wir die Zeit
(Karl Schlögel) 81
India 16
Instincts and their Vicissitudes
(Sigmund Freud) xxxiv, 55
International Psychoanalytical Association 22

Interpretation of Dreams, The
(Sigmund Freud)
dream recounted 63
Fechner cited in 89
Fliess and 14
hat incident xxiv
Jewishness and anti-Semitism in 78
Moses and 68
Orientalist imaginings in xlii, 39, 52
Schliemann and 45
Via Regia 76–77
Introductory Letters to Psycho-Analysis
(Sigmund Freud) 97

Iraklion 48
Islam 91
Israel

Akhenaten and Moses 71
Edom and 77–78, 107
Edward Said and xxvi
Merenptah’s victory over 123
Moloch and 15

Israelitische Bibel 106
Italo-Turkish War 1911 21–22

Jacobsen, Roman 81
Jagellonian University, Krakow 97
Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Balkhi-Rumi 31
Japan xvii, xviii
Jekels, Ludwig 29
Jensen, Wilhelm 47, 51, 54
Jeremias, Alfred 17–18
Jesus 70, 96
_Jew in the Modern World, The: A Documentary History_ (Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz) xxxiii
_Jewish Self-hatred_ (Sander Gilman) xxxiv
_Jewish State, The_ (Theodor Herzl) 24
Jewishness, xxiii–xxv see also anti-Semitism
feminisation of xix, xxiii, xxxiv, 38, 72
Freud and the future of psychoanalysis 45
Freud, Moses and 68, 102
Freud’s humiliations xli
Freud’s suppression of xxxv, xlv
orientalism and xx, 30, 77, 83
John the Baptist 96
_Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious_ (Sigmund Freud) 34
Jones, Ernest
Freud and narcissism xxiv
Freud’s correspondence with 46
gift of sealed ring 91
Glossary Committee and xlv, 14
interest in Napoleon 29
making psychoanalysis British xliii
omission from Freud’s biography 10–11
Orientalism and xlv
Jones, Dr. John P. “Indy” xv, xviii
Joseph (son of Jacob) xxiv, 29
Joseph (Thomas Mann) 29
Joshua 19, 107
Jouvenout, Christian xli
Judaism 17–18, 70, 91
Judeo-Christian world xliv, xlvii
Jung, Carl Gustav 18–20, 45–47
Freud breaks away from 59, 88
labels psychoanalysis xxii
proposed trip to America with Freud 107
supposed racial prejudice 40
Kadesh 108
Kakise, Dr. Kikoko xvi
Kamenz 91–92
Kanda, Dr. Sakyo xvi
Klevce 11
Knossos 48, 67, 71, 123
Koffler Chaim 25
Krakow 97–98
Kraus, Karl 34
Kushigian, Julia 9
Lacan, Jacques 81
Laske-Schüler Else 27
Laurens, Henry 29
_Le colonel Chabert_ (Honoré de Balzac) 81
Le Rider, Jacques xxiv, 57–58
League of Nations 26, 61
Lebanon xxi
Leibniz, Gottfried xx
Leipzig 89–90, 94
Leipzig, University of 18, 89
Lemberg 99
Leonardo da Vinci xxiv
_Les Lieux de la Memoire_ (Pierre Nora) 81
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 91–92, 104
letters (Sigmund Freud) 2, 115 see also specific entries
_Letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig, The_ 26
INDEX

L’expedition d’Egypte. Le reve orientale de Bonaparte (Laure Murat and Nicolas Weill) 29
“libidinal economics” xxii
libido xxxvi–xxxvii
Library of Congress 2
Libya 21–22
linguistics xxx
Lithuania 100, 103
Locke, John xx
Loja, Hadschi 12
London Review of Books xxvi
Louvre 18, 83–84, 104
Löwy, Emmanuel 67
Luther, Martin xlv–xlvi, 10
Luxor 28

Maciejewski, Franz 13
MacKenzie, John xxv, 9
Maclean, Ian xx
Maddox, Brenda xliii
Mahony, Patrick xlvii
Malthus, Thomas xviii
Manheim, Ralph 19
Mann, Thomas 29
maps 89, 102
Margolis, Deborah 63
Marx, Karl 79
Marxism xxv
Mary, St. 96
masculinity, images of 70
Masson, Jeffrey Mussaieff 14
McGaha, Michael 9
Medina, Antonio 9
Memoria del Fuego (Edoardo Galeano) 81
Mendelsohn, Moses 91
Mendes-Flohr, Paul xxxiii–xxxiv, 70
Merenptah, Pharaoh 71, 123
Mesopotamia 17

Methodius, St. 95
metonymy 81–82
Meyerson, Emile 74, 109
Midrash xlv–xlvii, 106
Minoan culture 48–49, 66–67, 72, 123
Mitchell, Timothy 20
Mittwochs-Gesellschaft 7
Moloch 15
Mongols 53
Moors 7, 13
Moravia 4, 99
“Morgenland” 10, 13

Moses
Akhenaten and 28–29
Edom refuses passage 105
Hammurabi and 18
Joshua and 19, 107–108
masculine figure, a 83
positive role models xxiv
Moses and Monotheism (Sigmund Freud) 66–72
archaeology of the soul 37
assembling material for 27
Disraeli in 24
extract 123–124
fundamental ideas for 18
Karl Abraham and 16
last major work 102–103
Moses of Michelangelo, The (Sigmund Freud) 68
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 3
Murat, Laure 29
Musée du Louvre 18, 83–84, 104
Muslims 12
Mycenaean culture 49, 66, 72, 123

Napoleon Bonaparte
Biblical Joseph and 29
business of archaeology 42
Ernest Jones’s interest in xlv
Freud’s identification with xxv
Freud’s interest in as a child 89
Grand Armée 79

Orientalism, archaeology and 37
narcissism xix, xxii, xxxv–xxxvii, 32
Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar 5
“Nathan the Wise” (Gotthold Ephraim Lessing) 91, 103, 105
Nazis 33–34, 46, 85
negation 64–65
“Negation” (Sigmund Freud) 65
Neredva, River 11
Nerval, Gerard de 52
New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis (Sigmund Freud) 25
Nietzsche, Friedrich xxi, xxx
Nile, River 53
Nora, Pierre 81
Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis
(Sigmund Freud) 54
Numbers, Book of 78, 106–109

Odessa 101
Oedipus 56
Oedipus complex
Bible and 109
Freud and xxiv, xxxv
heteronormativity and xxiii
Jekels and 29
Moses and Monotheism and 69
Old Testament 77
On Female Sexuality (Sigmund Freud) 65
On Judaism (Martin Buber) 25
On Narcissism: An Introduction
(Sigmund Freud) xxii, xxxvi, 32
On the History of the Psychoanalytic
Movement (Sigmund Freud) 46
O’Neill, John 105
Ong, Aihwa xl

Ordeal of Civility, The: Freud, Marx,
Levi-Strauss and the Jewish
Struggle with Modernity
(John Murray Cuddihy) xix
Orient Express 33–35
Oriental Club xlv
Oriental Institute, University of Chicago 28
Oriental Wisdom and the Cure of the
Souls: Jung and the Indian East (Luis Gomez) 19
Orientales (Henry Laurens) 29
Orientalism
America, in 108
anti-Semitism and xxiv–xxv, 49
archaeology and 39–42, 44–45, 47, 49–53, 56–68 see also
archaeology
Assyriology 17–18
Austrian ideas 50
binary oppositions in xxxvii– xxxix, 53–56, 82
Bosnia-Herzegovina 10–13
Cervantes 7–9
Chicago, University of 27–28
Clark University conference 1909
xv–xviii
development of 38
Disraeli 23–24
Edward Said on xxv–xxxii
Ferenczi’s obituary 30–31
Freud’s brand of 102
Freud’s letters 14
Goethe’s West-Eastern Divan 87
human psyche and 50
James Strachey and xlvi
Jewishness and xix–xx,
xxxii–xxxv, 23–25, 32
Jung 18–20
male Jews feminised xxiii, 47
Morgenland 10
Moses 69–72
INDEX

Napoleon Bonaparte 29, 37
narcissism and xxii, xxxv–xxxvi, 82
Orient Express 33–35
pagan gods 15
Persian and Arab examples 31–32
race and gender in one discourse 105
self orientalisation xl, 22, 26, 32, 82
Semitic and Aryan Orients 16
Spain and 6–9
stereotypical attitudes, xviii
summary 111–113
textual references in, and translations of, Freud xlii–xlvi, 1–2
Turkish elements 3–4
Orientalism (Edward Said) xx, xxv–xxxi, 12, 20
Orientalism and the Jews of the Mediterranean (Michael Schröter) 7
Orientalism in the Hispanic Literary Tradition (Julia Kushigian) 9
Orvieto 63
Ostjude
Arnold Zweig on 27
dreaded figure of xx, xxxii, 38, 75
from Galicia to Vienna 101
“Oriental menace” of xviii
Ostow, Mortimer 106–107
Ostrau 94
Othello (William Shakespeare) 4
Ottoman Empire
Abdulhamid II 56
Austria, effect of on 3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 12
Freud’s Orientalism and 4, 13
Freud’s treatment of 53
North African provinces 21
Paris Peace Treaty 61
Sick Man of Europe 21–22
Oupis 87, 104
Palace of Minos, Knossos 48, 71
Palestine xxvi, 23–25, 27
Panbabylonism 17–18
Paris 82–84
Paris Peace Treaty 1919 61
Peleg, Yaron 23–24
Pellegrini, Ann xviii, 42, 70
Pentateuch and Haftorahs, The 78
Pfrimmer, Theo 108
phallocentrism xxii–xxiii
Philipsson Bible 42, 68, 104, 107
philosophical hermeneutics xlvi
Phoenicians 15, 49
Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, Paris 83
Pompeii
burial analogies 63
complementing versions 58
dimensions 55
Jensen’s “fancy” 51–52
pervasiveness as metaphor 54
referenced 67
repression and 60
two Pompeiis 56
post-colonialism see colonialism
Postscript (Sigmund Freud) 68
“Present Situation in India, The” (Dr. John P. “Indy” Jones) xvi
Prettau 11
Prussia 89
Psychical Mechanism of Forgetfulness (Sigmund Freud) 12
psychoanalysis
archaeology and 42
birth of 83
Brenda Maddox on xliii
compromise contained in 69
conscious and unconscious xxi
Freud, Jewishness and 68–69
from Jewish to Christian xliv
Jewish science a? 20, 45
Midrash and xlvi, 106
narcissism and xxi, xxxvi
Orientalism and xviii–xx, xxv
xxvi, xxxv, xlii
postcolonial studies and xxvii
xxviii, xxxv
Said’s index xxviii
splitting xxxix
suppression of Jewishness and
the feminine xxiii
translational processes for xlii,
xlvii
Psychoanalytical Association 21
Psychology of the East (Carl Gustav
Jung) 19
Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The
(Sigmund Freud) 12–13, 53

Rand, Nicholas 51–52
Rank, Otto xliv, 91
Rathenau, Walter xxxiii, xxxiv
regression 82
Reinharz, Yehuda xxxiii–xxxiv, 70
Reisebriefe (Sigmund Freud) 1, 13
Renan, Ernest xxvi
repression xix, xxxv, 50–52, 60, 64–65
Ricoeur, Paul xxxvii xlv, 40, 55
Riddle of Freud, The: Jewish Influences
on his Theory of Female
Sexuality (Estelle Roth) xix
Riviere, Joan xlii 14, 67
Robertson, Ritchie xxxii–xxxv, 71
Rockefeller family 28
Rogatika 11
Roith, Estelle xix
Romans xxv
Rome 64–65, 116–120
Rose, Jacqueline xxvi
Rosenzweig, Saul 74
Runia, Elco 80–82
Russians 4
Sachs, Hanns 91
Said, Edward xxv–xxxii
Aihwa Ong and xl
beginnings of Orientalism and 29
definitions xxxv–xxxvi
East and West 12, 82
psychoanalysis and post-
colonialism xx
Sartiaux, Felix 57
Saussure, Ferdinand de xxx
Schiller, Friedrich 87
schizophrenia xxxvii, xxxix
Schleiermacher, Friedrich xlvi
Schliemann, Heinrich
Arthur Evans and 48–49
Freud’s imaginative connection
with 40, 42, 44–45
heroic tradition 56
Schlögel, Karl 81
Schmitz, M. xxxii
School of Oriental and African
Studies (SOAS) xxvi
Schopenhauer, Arthur xxi, xxxiii
Schröter, Michael 7, 29–30
“Secret Committee” 21–22, 91, 103
Segalowitsch, Boris 24
Selim Pasha 3
Sephardic Jews 7, 9
Seville 7–8
sexuality xviii, xxiii–xxiv
Sherwin-White, Susan 75–76,
79, 108
Sigmund Freud Collection, Library of
Congress 2
signification xxxviii
Silberstein, Eduard 2–3, 6–7, 10–11
Simplon-Orient-Express 35 see also
Orient Express
Spain 6–8
Spinoza, Baruch xx, xlvi
splitting xxxv, xxxix, xli–xlii, 54, 58
Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense (Sigmund Freud) xxxix, 32
“Sprachverwirrung zwischen den Erwachsenen und dem Kind” (Sandor Ferenczi) xl
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud concordance of, information from xliii
deorientalisation in xx, xlii indexes and bibliographies 60
James Strachey’s photograph in xlv “Tiefenpsychologie” 59
Via Regia and 74
Woodrow Wilson paper omission 61
Star-Myth Movement 17
Starobinski, Jean 74, 76
Stekel, Wilhelm 88
“Stone-throw is a Freudian slip, A” (New York Times) xxvi
Strachey, Alix xliii, xlv, 39, 74
Strachey, James background xliv–xlv
Disraeli’s picture 24
English translations by xli–xlii, xlvi, 109
Glossary Committee 14
Orient “translated” 31
suffa to sofa 39
Via Regia 74
Strachey, Lytton xlv
Strachey, Pippa xlv
Strachey, Richard xlv
Stucken, Eduard 17
Studies on Hysteria (Sigmund Freud) 37, 41, 43, 93
Subaltern Studies Group xxx
sublimation xxxv
superego, the xxi–xxii, xxxvii
Susa 17
Tasso, Torquato 6
Tell el-ʿAmarna 123
théatre d’hystérie 83
Thebes 123
Third International Psychoanalytical Congress 87
Thomas Woodrow Wilson (Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt) 26, 61
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (Sigmund Freud) xxiii, xxxvi, 52
“Tiefenpsychology” 60
Tögel, Christfried 33
Torok, Maria 51–52
Totem and Taboo (Sigmund Freud) Edward Said on xxvii
Great is Diana of the Ephesians and 87–88
masculinity in 57
mythology in 47
universalism of 69
translations xliii, xlv–xlvi, 14, 73–75
Tripolitania 21
Troy 42, 44–45
Tunisia 21
Turks as barbarians 44
Austrian representations 3
Bosnia and 12
contemporary Turkey 57
Interpretation of Dreams, in 39
Italo-Turkish War 22
new national identity 61
sexual enjoyment among 53
Tutankhamun, King 28
Tysmenitz 99–100
unconscious, the xxi–xxii, 49–50
unstable subject, the xxii, xxvii
Urbano II, Pope 6
“Urheimat Asien”: The Re-Orientiation of German and Austrian Jews, 1900–1925 (Ritchie Robertson) xxxii
Ursprache 87

Valladolid 6, 8
Van Herik, Judith 42

Via Regia 73–109
  Biblical origins 106–107
  earliest appearance 77
  Freud’s Jewishness and 102–104
  Napoleon and 79
  Sherwin-White on 75–76
  staging posts:
    Breslau 93–94
    Brody 101–102
    Buchach 99–100
    Frankfurt 85–86
    Freiberg 95–96
    Kamenz 91–92
    Krakow 97–98
    Leipzig 89–90
    Paris 83–84
    Tysmenitcz 99–100
    Weimar 87–88
  Standard Edition and 74 translations of 125–126
Vico, Giambattista 80–81
Victoria, Queen 10

Vienna
  anti-Semitism in 76
  Freud in 4–5
  Freud leaves 33
  Freud moves from Freiberg 104
  Jewish immigrants from Galicia 101
  Ottomans attacks on 3
  Vienna B’nai B’rith 18
  Vienna Psycho-analytical Society 29
  Vienna University 98
  Villes mortes d’Asie mineure (Felix Sartiaux) 57
  Virgil 76
  Virgin Mary 87, 104
  Voltaire 2
  Voyage en Orient (Gerard de Nerval) 52

Wachinger, Lorenz 25
Wallerstein, Immanuel xxvi
Wavel River 97–98
Weill, Nicolas 29
Weimar 87–88
Westjuden 105
West-Östlichen Divan (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) xxxix, 39, 87
Wilhelm II 18
Winckler, Hugo 17–18
Wittek, Resi 13, 95
women xvii–xviii, xxiii
Worcester Sunday Telegram xviii
Works of Shams of Tabriz, The (Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Balkhi-Rumi) 31
World War I 61

Yahweh 71

Zionism 24–25
Zoroastrianism 32
Zumbusch, Kaspar von 56
Zurich 45
Zweig, Adam 26
Zweig, Arnold 2, 26–28, 68
Zygmunt Stary 98